On February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s (Burma) military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized control of the country and overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for democracy party. The coup terminated an ongoing process of partial democratic transition that persisted for nearly ten years. It shows one of the clearest instances of democratic regression in recent history. Beyond the abrupt power seizure, the coup exposes the instability of democratic institutions when unelected individuals hold significant structural influence.

Why did this coup happen?

Military power never fully left; Myanmar’s transition began in 2011 but was still incomplete. In 2011, the Tatmadaw junta officially dissolved after a 2008 constitution guaranteed the military 25% of parliamentary seats and key ministerial control. A former military General served as president of the country until 2015, when the NLD won another landslide victory, and Aung San Suu Kyi became the de facto leader as the state Counsellor. The military had enough parliamentary seats to veto constitutional amendments, control over important ministries, and autonomy from civilian oversight. This showed that Myanmar was never a fully consolidated democracy. Instead, it operated as a hybrid regime, with democratic elections overlaid on a foundation of entrenched military authority.

On November 8, 2020, Myanmar held general elections that were broadly considered competitive by observers, despite existing structural challenges. The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, achieved a victory in the elections, while the military supported union experienced substantial setbacks. These results reflected widespread public backing for ongoing civilian leadership. Following the election, the military claimed there was widespread voter fraud, although no credible evidence supported these allegations. The Union Election dismissed these claims and did not find any systemic irregularities that would demand overturning the results. Despite this, the military justifies its actions by asserting that they were necessary to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. This reasoning exemplifies a common trend observed worldwide in democratic declines: elites declare to protect democracy while actually weakening it. By alleging electoral fraud, the military aimed to reveal itself not as a usurper of democratic power but as a defender of justice. The timing was particularly significant; the coup took place just hours before the newly elected parliament was scheduled to assemble.

There were structural weaknesses in Myanmar’s democracy, and its transition has frequently been characterized as partial or hybrid. While elections were competitive, civilian leaders occupied government positions. The military retained constitutional safeguards and significant economic influence. Additionally, civilians lacked authority over the country’s coercive institutions. The 2020 election did not signify a decline in democracy; instead, it showed democratic resilience. It was the power of civilian mandate that prompted an authoritarian backlash. The NLD’s victory indicated that voters were rejecting ongoing military interference. Consequently, the coup can be seen as a preemptive move to prevent long-term marginalization.

How did this coup unfold?

            Three months after the election, the military arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and multiple NLD elected leaders. A state of emergency was declared, and authority was transferred to Min Aung Hlaing. The military invalidated the election results and guaranteed that future elections would be held following a period of emergency rule; however, the junta has repeatedly extended this period. The public response was immediate and extensive. Citizens initiated the Civil Disobedience movement (CDM), orchestrating strikes, demonstrations, and acts of administrative non-cooperation. Healthcare professionals, educators, government employees, and private-sector workers all refused to operate under military authority. The Tatmadaw countered with intensifying authoritarianism. Lethal force was used against protestors; many were detained, and extensive restrictions were imposed. Over time, peaceful protests turned violent as local factions united against the junta. Myanmar plunged into an extended conflict and a humanitarian emergency. Unlike gradual backsliding cases, Myanmar’s was sudden and violent. However, the origins of that downfall were found in years of constitutional instability.

What does it reveal about Myanmar’s democracy?

            It reveals that holding elections is not enough, although they are necessary for a democracy, but without institutional safeguards, elections can be reversed by military coups. Systems that blend democratic processes with deeply rooted authoritarian frameworks generate instability. As long as the military held constitutional veto authority, Myanmar’s democracy stayed reliant. Hybrid regimes frequently encounter significant collapses when there are changes in power dynamics.

Five years after the coup, Myanmar’s path supports the argument that democratic vulnerability happens from insufficient institutional change. The military’s ongoing extension of emergency rule, disbandment of the NLD, incarceration of Aung San Suu Kyi, and organization of tightly regulated electoral schemes reveal that the coup was not a brief disruption but a definitive authoritarian entrenchment. The extended civil war emphasizes how swiftly the breakdown of democracy can lead to the collapse of the state when coercive institutions remain uncontrolled. Instead of acting as a route back to democracy, the promised elections turned into tools for legitimizing the regime. Myanmar’s situation shows us an important lesson in democratic theory: without complete civilian oversight of the military and dependable institutional balance, electoral wins alone cannot protect democratic governance