Bulgaria saw massive protests in 2020 against Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and his administration. These demonstrated the democratic backsliding that had been occurring since the mid-2010s. Jana Tsoneva outlines the anti-government movement in an article titled “What is Happening with the Bulgarian Protest Movement” for Al Jazeera. 

The protests themselves addressed a range of issues including a lack of accountability and frustration over rampant corruption in the Borissov administration. The catalyst for this mass movement was a raid on anti-corruption activist and opposition figure, Ruman Radev. Bulgarian civil society called this out as a government attack on the opposition. They immediately took to the streets in protest. 

Protests, even violent protests, are not indicative of democratic erosion alone. So why were the protests of 2020 in Bulgaria different? Let’s start by examining the years leading up to the protests. 

Reporting by Euronews highlights the discontent amongst the Bulgarian public toward Borisov who had been the head of three consecutive governments since 2009. Borisov had been slowly consolidating power and putting his political allies in positions of authority within his administration. His time in office saw Bulgaria shift from a democracy to a government more closely resembling an autocracy. 

Levinsky and Ziblatt introduce the idea of “democratic referees” in Chapter 4 “Subverting Democracy” of their book How Democracies Die. Democratically elected leaders can consolidate power if they have these “referees” on their side (Levinsky and Ziblatt). At the core of this theory is the idea that modern states, like Bulgaria, possess a series of institutions that investigate and punish any wrongdoing of political actors (Levinsky and Ziblatt). Law enforcement agencies, an independent judiciary, and regulatory agencies all serve as these referees. In the case of Bulgaria, Borisov has these referees in his pocket. 

Take the Chief Prosecutor, Ivan Geshev, a long-time ally of Borisov, for example (Euronews). Evgenii Dainov, a Bulgarian political scientist, examines the lead-up to the protests in his article “Bulgaria’s Revolt Against the Past.” In the months preceding the protests, Geshev would regularly release lists of “political enemies” that the state would be “going after” (Dainov). These included figures critical of the government and publishers of independent media (Dainov). Geshev’s lists are a prime example of what Levinsky and Ziblatt would consider using “referees as a powerful weapon” to prosecute opposition (Levinsky and Ziblatt). 

Additionally, the degradation of the Black Sea coast, an area supposed to be protected by the government, further highlighted the rampant corruption under Borisov (Dainov). The environmental damage excused because it was profiting the Bulgarian government was a pillar of popular protests. Many Bulgarians felt the poor environmental conditions of the Black Sea outlined the rampant corruption permitted under Borisov. These were only a few of the reasons Bulgarians began calling for Borisov’s resignation in 2020. 

Now let’s examine the protests themselves and how they indicate democratic backsliding. Despite beginning in July 2020, the protests “entered their most violent stage to date” that September with the employment of “water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray” by law enforcement (Tsoneva). The government used the escalation of the protests in as an “excuse to stop negotiating” any reform or exit from office (Tsoneva). Throughout September, close to 100 prominent protest leaders were arrested, and some were badly beaten by law enforcement, including independent journalists (Tsoneva). 

More specifically, Borisov’s response is the strongest indicator of backsliding. As previously mentioned, during the protests, Borisov continued to use his referees as a weapon. The law enforcement response was targeted at the protest leaders and journalists trying to report on the events (Euronews). There was a lack of objective reporting on the crisis thanks to state influence in Bulgarian media. Excessive force was used against peaceful protests and there was an overall crackdown on dissent. 

The harsh response by Borisov’s administration is blatant suppression of civil society, a common theme amongst eroding democracies. With Borisov’s allies in positions of power, he is immune from investigation or “removal from power” (Levinsky and Ziblatt). Borisov “turned on opponents” once he had control of the referees both leading up to the protests and during them (Levinsky and Ziblatt). By using law enforcement and a judicial system designed to be independent of the executive, Borisov is hiding his persecution behind an “air of legality” (Levinsky and Ziblatt). 

These protests demonstrate an important pushback by the public against their “authoritarian Prime Minister” (Dainov). But what came next? Borisov finally resigned following a year of mass protests, but this doesn’t mean Bulgarian democracy has fully recovered. Since his resignation, the government has been severely fragmented with seven elections in the last three years (EU News). Borisov himself is also still present in Bulgarian politics, just not as Prime Minister (EU News). Bulgaria is still trying to recover from the instability caused by the 2020 protests. 

The future of Bulgarian democracy is unclear, but the extent of democratic erosion during the 2020 mass movement was very clear.