In the May 2023 Turkish presidential election, the world watched closely to see if voters would finally have the power to put an end to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 20 year rule. However, the voters’ choice was an illusion. Erdogan secured his re-election in a runoff, which extended his rule into another decade. From the public eye, the election outcome looked competitive, with high turnout of voters, multiple parties for selection, and a clear runoff between the candidates. However, beneath the surface, the election was anything but fair.
The election clearly connects to a central theme of democratic erosion in which the elections are increasingly being perceived as legitimate, but the results are systematically tilted long before the voting even begins.
Fraud vs. Manipulation
As Nancy Bermeo explains in her article, On Democratic Backsliding, modern autocrats rarely engage in election fraud such as falsifying vote counts or ballot-stuffing, which were common tactics used in the Cold War era. Nowadays, such blatant fraud violations are quickly exposed by the media, international watchdogs, and civil society as a whole. Erdogan has shifted towards using strategic manipulation to skew the competition long before the citizens ever cast a vote.
In the upcoming time before the actual election, Erdogan’s government had perfected their strategic manipulation for takeover:
Media Control
Pro-government outlets took over renowned TV and newspapers, while the few and far between independent journalists were threatened, censored, and even jailed on miniscule accounts. For instance, in 2016, an Istanbul court seized Zaman, which was Turkey’s largest daily newspaper at the time, and transferred control to government officials. In addition, the AKP government used the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund to be able to confiscate media outlets, such as Sabah newspaper and ATV television, which would later be transferred to Erdogan loyalists. According to Freedom House statistics, over 90% of Turkish media operates and is certified by both direct and indirect government influence.
Opposition Harassment
In early 2022, Ekrem Imamoglu was Istanbul’s mayor and a rising opposition challenger in the upcoming election. He was detained and sentenced by Erdogan’s regime to over 2 years in jail for “insulting public officials”. Soon after his sentencing, Imamoglu’s university diploma was annulled, his lawyer was arrested on more false charges, and he was given a political ban according to Article 53 of the Criminal Code. All actions against Imamoglu reflected how Erdogan used strategic harassment, presented as legal actions, yet truly pursued ways to strip his rivals of any type of competition or credibility against his rule. Imamoglu is only one example of Erdogan taking away political opponents’ power and disguising it as lawful. Erdogan continues to come for opposition parties and politicians that even slightly differ from his regime’s path forward.
Institutional Changes
A common theme that demonstrates a shift from democracy to autocracy is when leaders gradually dismantle the checks and balances through legal reforms. Unlike the 2016 coup attempt, this type of democratic erosion is subtle, often designed and presented to the public as a “reform”. However, these actions have not come about overnight. After the coup attempt, Erdogan initiated mass purges across the judiciary branch, dismissing and detaining thousands of people. Within days, a loyalist packed board called The Supreme Court of Judges and Prosecutors suspended 2,745 judges. Over the next few months, more than 4,300 judges and prosecutors were permanently removed from their positions. In turn, this left the judiciary to be packed with Erdogan’s political loyalists and marked his success of stripping away checks and balances between the branches of government. Clearly representing usage of executive aggrandizement given his actions to enact “legal” reforms to gain and centralize power for himself.
In addition, his coalition passed Law No. 7393 in April of 2022, which lowered the national threshold from 10% to 7%, appearing to democratize elections, however it fragmented opposition alliances. most importantly altered how electoral boards are built by replacing seniority judges with lottery-selection based. This action clearly allowed Erdogan’s regime to influence who oversees vote count right before the upcoming election. By the time of the 2023 election, Erdogan was not only just a candidate, he was the constructor and controller of the government, the media, and the electoral system as a whole. Linz and Stephan argue that democracy is more often than not consolidated when it is “the only game in town”. For Turkey’s case this no longer is true. Erdogan’s repeated attacks on the media, judicial branch, and society as a whole represents a system where democratic themes exist, but only as long as they do not threaten or disrupt what the ruling party or person wants to do.
Usage of Resources
Following the devastating Earthquake in February 2023, Erdogan used the aftermath to his advantage by announcing huge reconstruction promises, higher wages, and lowering the cost of energy for citizens. None of which he truly acted on, but the empty promises gave leeway for him to blur the line between government aid and campaigning for popularity. Behind the scenes, he shut down Twitter for over 12 hours after the disaster, which successfully limited immediate public backlash. He framed his outreach aid programs to be favored by vulnerable populations just before the election.
Erdogan does not enact obvious ways of corruption, instead he systematically erodes and biases the outcome of any opposition to his power. According to Freedom House and V-Dem, Turkey must hold multiparty elections, but at the same time lack the real freedom of expression, association, or a level playing field to qualify as a democracy. After the 2023 election, it is safe to classify Turkey as an electoral autocracy. This classification becomes clear when measured by Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which requires both contestation and inclusiveness. Turkey fails on both counts.
To fit Turkey into this category, the country must and does exhibit the following:
- The existence of multiparty elections with competitive opposition
- At the same time, opposition candidates are harassed or disqualified on false charges
- Civil liberties, like freedom of assembly and expression, are severely monitored and restricted
- Courts, government branches, and media are systematically undermined
Why This Matters
Many will dismiss Turkey as another flawed system in a troubled region of the world. However, Turkey’s election gives a prime example of how a democracy can be eroded from within, while maintaining the appearance of a legitimate, fair system.
Turkey’s shift into autocracy also affects their stance globally. Turkey is not a marginal state. They are part of NATO, EU candidate, and a major power in the middle-east region. Its transformation into an electoral autocracy normalizes and justifies non-democrartic policies and practices in a global organization that continues to treat them as a democracy. Turkey is now sending the message to other countries that it is possible to consolidate authoritarian power while presenting itself through democratic frameworks. Left unchecked or ignored, Turkey’s demonstration could inspire others to use similar tactics all over the world.
Looking Forward
The 2023 election did not see fraud or stealing of ballots and such. The manipulation of the electoral system began long before, through years of executive aggrandizement and strategic manipulation by Erdogan and his political loyalists. By the actual time for people to go vote, the results were indefinitely tilted beyond redemption.
One lesson to take away from Turkey is that modern democracy does not die with coups, yet often with a “free” ballot. Leaders like Erdogan will exploit democratic institutions and undermine them right under the citizens’ noses. Unless citizens are willing to ask the question of if an election is truly fair and competitive, democratic backsliding will continue to wear away at the system. Turkey’s case specifically must serve as a lesson on how the survival and existence of elections does not equal the survival of a true democracy.
Sources:
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. Crown Publishing Group, 2018.
Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5–19. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, 1971.
It cannot be underscored more than understanding that promissory coups aren’t the only form of democratic backsliding, and are extremely rare in this day and age. In order to mobilize an opposition and stop democratic erosion, there must be a greater understanding in the gradual way that erosion occurs, and often through legal mechanisms. The Turkey case, in which Erdogan maintains the facade of democratic elections while underlying manipulation occurs, is incredibly valuable to study to understand erosion in other states. Democratic erosion now comes through pseudo-democracies, where democratic valued institutions are employed as a ruse, but not actionably used in accordance with democratic standards of freedom, fairness, competition, and inclusivity.
When studying countries that are at the precipice of erosion, citizens need to be empowered that these covert tactics are in fact eroding democratic institutions and rule of law. As the world shifts in a more autocratic direction, we cannot wait for glaring coups that will never come. Rather, one needs to study beyond shell democratic institutions. It brings up the argument that democratic institutions themselves are not a good way to measure democracy anymore due to the covert manipulations that executives employ to consolidate power. What is the value of elections if they are unjust?