Second Blog post
On March 6, 2026, Ecuador’s electoral courts ordered the suspension of the country’s largest left leaning opposition party, Revolucion Ciudadana (Citizen’s revolution). The party, recognized as the primary opposition of Noboa’s right-leaning National Democratic Action alliance, was effectively blocked from registering for the 2027 local elections and any other political activity. While the decision has reportedly been justified in connection with a separate case, in which an individual was allegedly encouraged to implicate the party in money laundering allegations, it is widely interpreted by political commentators as a targeted attack against opposition as an effort to consolidate executive power.Reports show this is not the first time Noboa’s administration has targeted opposition.
The right wing president and leader of the National Democratic Action alliance, Noboa was elected Nov 2023, following a wave of high levels of gang violence activity under former president Guillermo. Guillero had removed himself from power as political dissent grew, due to the lack of reform on gang violence and drug trafficking scandal. Following the transition to power, Noboa’s appointment appealed to “tough on crime” voters and by January 2024, had militarized his approach by declaring a “state of internal armed conflict against gang organization in Ecuador (mayorga & thaler, 7). This decree has been criticized by both international and domestic law as an increase on executive aggrandizement. Despite local courts finding his emergency decree as invalid, Noboa chose to first ignore the court’s ruling , and then surrounded the court building with soldiers and tanks, after the court cited concerns on reported injustices.The recent events in Ecuador and Noboa’s use of his political authority reflect a general trend to democratic erosion, in which Noboa uses executive aggrandizement to transform the political institutions in favor of his political agenda.
Noboa’s administration has been criticized for using his executive power to weaken opposition capacity and civil society by limiting state spending. On April 22, 2026 NBC local news reported on Ecuador doctors protesting the crisis in public hospitals, as resources are scarce to the point patients are bringing their own medication to their procedures. The lack of resources can be allocated to hospitals only receiving 30% of the profits needed to perform effectively. In addition to the limiting of public resources, a recently approved law requires decentralized independent governments to allocate a minimum of 70% of their budget to “investments, maintenance, and replacement of infrastructure “. This law significantly restricts the local governments ability to invest in education and social programs that are unique to their communities. The reduction of public local resources, forces decentralized governments to lose control over their territory and increase dependence on the executive. This is dangerous to democracy as it allows for a precedent that enables Noboa’s administration to consolidate power especially when the courts are in their favor, and or control. In Nancy Bermeo’s On democratic Backsliding, one of the main methods of democratic erosion is executive aggrandizement through institutional change that is formally legal and democratically valid. The fiscal restructuring and budgeting allocations for decentralized governments reduce institutional autonomy at the local level. The case of Ecuador under President Daniel Noboa illustrates how democratic erosion occurs through covert incremental institutional changes rather than regime changes. While elections and courts remain in place, their function is shaped by executive driven control that alters the validity of any political competition. According to General knowledge news, just last February, former members of Citizens Revolution had their homes raided in part of a larger operation investigating the organized crimes of money laundering. Delegitimizing and limiting the ability of opposition to participate undermine the core condition of democracy, a free and fair election. It is important to note that the now banned Citizens revolution, lost to only 44% in the last election and has significant influence over major cities in Ecuador, it;s exclusion from future elections, means that a significant percentage of Ecuadorian citizens will not be represented.. The manner in which the 2027 elections will be a significant determinant in whether current patterns of democratic erosion are maintained.
Works cited
https://gk.city/2026/01/28/allanamiento-casa-luisa-gonzalez-caso-caja-chica-explicado/
Bermeo, Nancy. “ON DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING.” Journal of Democracy 27.1 (2016): 5-19. ProQuest. Web. 25 Apr. 2026.
Mayorga, Galo and Kai M. Thaler. “Crime, Crackdowns, and Democracy in Ecuador.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 37 no. 1, 2026, p. 120-133. Project MUSE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2026.a977949.
Your piece does an excellent job of connecting recent developments in Ecuador to the concept of executive aggrandizement, and I believe it accurately reflects the paradigm outlined by Nancy Bermeo in On Democratic Backsliding. One topic that deserves additional discussion is how the suspension of Revolución Ciudadana fits into what Bermeo refers to as “strategic manipulation” rather than blatant authoritarian rupture. As you point out, the employment of electoral courts and legal explanations offers the impression of procedural legitimacy while weakening genuine political competition. This is consistent with Bermeo’s claim that modern democratic decay frequently occurs via institutions rather than against them.
Your comments also reminded me of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die, with a focus on the erosion of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. Noboa’s choice to disobey court orders and deploy military force surrounding judicial institutions appears to be a blatant violation of forbearance—using legal authority in ways that, while legally allowed, contradict democratic values. At the same time, targeting a major opposition party implies a breakdown in mutual toleration, with political adversaries no longer regarded as legitimate competitors.
I also think your point regarding budgetary centralization is quite important, and it might be expressed more broadly in terms of state capability and vertical accountability. By limiting local governments’ budget autonomy, the executive may be changing not only political rivalry, but also the avenues through which voters can hold leaders accountable. This relates to broader course issues of how democratic decline affects not only elections, but also the entire ecosystem of accountability institutions.
One question remains: how much popular support does Noboa retain despite these actions? As we’ve observed in class, public legitimacy is frequently used to justify democratic backsliding, particularly in “tough on crime” narratives. Do you believe public opinion in Ecuador is facilitating these institutional reforms, or are we witnessing mounting resistance that may limit further degradation ahead of the 2027 elections?