In Tunisia, democracy did not end with a military coup or a cancelled election. It gradually became weaker. The president used emergency powers, presidential orders and constitutional changes. Critics also faced more pressure. Tunisia used to be called the biggest democratic success of the Arab Spring, but what happened there shows a real problem. Democracy can get weaker even while elections still happen and an elected president is still in office. When parliament and courts lose power, the president faces fewer limits, making it harder for citizens and opposition groups to challenge government decisions.

Tunisia’s move toward democracy began with great hope. For more than 20 years, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia under an authoritarian system. In late 2010, protests began because of unemployment, corruption, economic problems and a lack of political freedom. They spread fast across the country and in January 2011, Ben Ali left Tunisia.

After Ben Ali left, Tunisia started to build a democracy. At the same time, many other Arab Spring protests in other countries ended with violence, civil war or another authoritarian government. Tunisia seemed different. Political parties competed in elections. People had more freedom to organize and criticize the government. In 2014, Tunisia adopted a new constitution designed to prevent the concentration of power after decades of authoritarian rule.

For several years, Tunisia seemed like proof that democracy could work after the Arab Spring. But the problems did not go away. Corruption, unemployment, economic inequality and political instability persisted. By 2021, many people were angry about these problems and about how the government dealt with COVID-19.

Freedom House still classified Tunisia as “Free” in its 2021 report, with a score of 71 out of 100. However, it also said that corruption and economic problems were still making Tunisia’s democracy more difficult to build.

This public anger came before a major political change. Kaïs Saïed was elected president in 2019. He was an independent and was seen as an outsider to the usual political system. On July 25, 2021, during protests and a serious political crisis, Saïed announced emergency measures. He removed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspended parliament. He also took away lawmakers’ immunity and took control of public prosecution. According to Human Rights Watch, Saïed said Tunisia was in a serious national crisis and these steps were necessary.

July 25 was a turning point, but the greater problem was that emergency measures continued while Saïed gained more power.

In September 2021, Saïed said he would rule by decree. That meant he could make major decisions without going through parliament’s normal lawmaking process. According to Human Rights Watch, Saïed also suspended much of the 2014 constitution. Tunisia already had another big problem. The Constitutional Court that the 2014 constitution required had never been created. So there was no independent court that could make a final ruling on whether the president’s emergency powers were constitutional.

In March 2022, Saïed completely dissolved parliament. Later that year, Tunisia adopted a new constitution through a referendum. The new constitution gave the president more power and made parliament and the courts weaker. Earlier in 2022, Saïed had also dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council and replaced it with a temporary body. These changes were important. In a democracy, parliament, courts and other independent institutions should be able to check the president’s power.

Tunisia continued to hold elections, but political competition became weaker. Parliamentary elections under the new system began in December 2022. Major opposition parties refused to take part in the election. According to the Carter Center’s election report, only about 9 to 11 percent of eligible voters voted in the first round. Low voter turnout alone does not mean that a country is not democratic. But Tunisia’s low turnout happened after parliament had been dissolved and important checks on the president had become weaker. Opposition politics had also become more difficult.

Critics of the government also faced more pressure. Opposition politicians, activists, lawyers, and journalists were arrested, investigated, or taken to court. Human Rights Watch reported that by September 2023, at least 40 people seen as critics of Saïed were in prison. The government also used Decree-Law 54, a cybercrime law from 2022, against journalists, lawyers, students, and other people who publicly criticized the government. When people face legal consequences for peacefully criticizing the government, journalists, opposition groups and ordinary citizens may become less willing to speak out. This weakens the ability to hold political leaders accountable.

This does not mean that every government restriction destroys democracy. During a real emergency, governments sometimes need to place limits on certain activities. But these limits should be temporary and necessary. Independent institutions should also be able to review them. In Tunisia, the emergency powers did not stay temporary. Institutions that could challenge the president became weaker and critics faced more legal problems.

This situation is similar to political scientist Nancy Bermeo’s concept of executive aggrandizement, which she explains in her 2016 article “On Democratic Backsliding,” published in the Journal of Democracy. Bermeo explains that democracies today do not always collapse because of a traditional military coup. Sometimes, an elected leader slowly weakens the institutions that can limit the leader’s power. Each change may not look very serious by itself. But together, these changes weaken the checks and balances that protect democracy.

Tunisia is a clear example of this idea. Saïed did not take power through a military coup. He was elected president in 2019. The major changes came later. Parliament was first suspended and later dissolved. He used presidential decrees more often and the courts became weaker. Also, the new constitution gave the president more power. Critics and opposition groups also faced more pressure. Together, these changes show executive aggrandizement because Saïed did not remove Tunisia’s democratic system all at once. Instead, the president slowly gained more power as the institutions that could control his power became weaker.

Tunisia’s Freedom House score dropped from 71 in 2021 to 64 in 2022, changing its classification from “Free” to “Partly Free.” This decline reflects Saïed’s suspension of parliament, removal of the government and restrictions on civil liberties.

Tunisia is important because it shows that democracy can become weak without people noticing it easily. Tunisia removed an authoritarian leader, held competitive elections, expanded political freedom and created a democratic constitution. But these changes did not guarantee that democracy would always be safe. Economic problems and political conflict made many Tunisians frustrated with the existing government. According to a 2022 Arab Barometer report based on a survey conducted in late 2021, 90 percent of respondents supported Saïed’s decision to suspend parliament. This suggests that public frustration can create support for measures that weaken democratic institutions.

Tunisia’s democracy did not disappear overnight. July 25, 2021 was the main turning point, but the changes continued after that day. The emergency measures did not end quickly and later became long-term changes. At the same time, the president got more power while other institutions became weaker. Tunisia shows that democracy can become weaker even when elections still happen. Elections matter, but democracy also depends on independent courts, functioning parliament, meaningful political competition and freedom to criticize those in power. Without them, people can still vote, but it becomes harder for them to disagree with political leaders or have a voice in government decisions.