Turkey Still Has Elections. So Why Is Its Democracy Eroding?

Turkey still holds elections. Opposition parties still compete, and they sometimes win. But still, concerns about the condition of Turkish democracy have grown over the past decade. This raises an important question: how can democracy still erode while the elections continue? Turkey shows why elections alone are not enough to protect democracy. Democratic erosion, or democratic backsliding, can occur gradually when elected leaders weaken the institutions that are supposed to limit their power, even while citizens continue to vote and opposition parties remain active.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt provide a useful framework to understand this process in How Democracies Die. They argue that modern democratic erosion does not always begin with a military coup or the cancellation of elections. Instead, it can happen gradually. Elections might still continue, opposition politicians may remain active, and newspapers or media still operate while democratic institutions weaken step by step. Levitsky and Ziblatt compare this process to a soccer game. The government does not have to cancel the game. Instead, it can control the referees, sideline opposition players and rewrite the rules. The “referees” are institutions such as courts, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory bodies. This process can be understood as the weakening of institutional checks and balances. If these institutions lose their independence, they become less capable of checking the power of government, allowing an elected government to gradually tilt the political playing field in its own favor. This is important because democratic erosion can occur through institutions rather than through their complete elimination.

Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg present an argument in How To Lose A Constitutional Democracy, which is more focused on aspects of democracy that are being eroded. They introduce the concept of constitutional retrogression, which means that democracy can weaken gradually rather than collapse suddenly. They explain that this process involves the weakening of competitive elections, political freedoms, and the rule of law. This can happen when elected leaders use existing laws and political institutions to increase their own power. As a result, institutions that are supposed to limit government power may become less independent, making it difficult for opposition parties to compete fairly. This idea helps to explain Turkey’s situation because elections still take place, but concerns about judicial independence and media freedom remain. Turkey shows that democracy can become weaker even when its basic political institutions continue to exist.

Turkey’s experience after the failed coup attempt of July 2016 also illustrates this problem. The coup attempt posed a serious threat to Turkey’s elected government, creating legitimate security concerns. However, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the crisis also created an opportunity to strengthen the power of Turkey’s government. After declaring a state of emergency, around 100,000 public officials were purged, several newspapers were closed, and more than 50,000 people were arrested, according to their account. Those affected also included members of the Constitutional Court like judges, prosecutors, journalists. The important issue is not that the government responded strongly to a security crisis. It is about what happens to democratic checks after the government’s power has expanded. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that this incident provides opportunities for executives to weaken institutional constraints. In other words, the crisis allowed executive power to increase while institutions that could check that power became weaker.

The Venice Commission examined strong concerns about the concentration of presidential power and the strength of checks and balances, while reviewing the proposed constitutional amendment. The issue was not whether presidential systems are inherently undemocratic, but whether other institutions would have enough independence and authority to check executive power. This connects directly to Levitsky and Ziblatt’s idea of “rewriting the rules.” They explain that governments can strengthen powers already in place by amending the constitution or political institutions even while using official legal procedures. Therefore, changes of Turkey’s constitution show that a setback in democracy does not necessarily occur only through the sudden destruction of democratic institutions.

Jennifer Gandhi explains a similar problem in The Institutional Roots of Democratic Backsliding. Her analysis helps explain how political institutions can be used to increase government power instead of limiting it. Instead of removing democratic institutions completely, leaders can change the rules to reduce the power of opposition parties. Gandhi specifically discusses Turkey’s AKP government as an example of how political leaders can use their power to weaken institutions that challenge them. Huq and Ginsburg’s argument helps explain why Turkey’s constitutional changes are important. Even when changes follow legal procedures, they can still weaken democracy if they give the government more power and reduce institutional independence.

The media environment provides another example. Levitsky and Ziblatt discuss Doğan Yayın, once one of Turkey’s most powerful media groups. Its outlets included secular and liberal voices and frequently clashed with the AKP government. In 2009, the company was fined approximately $2.5 billion for tax evasion charges. It later sold major media assets, some of which were acquired by pro-government business interests. This example illustrates why media freedom is an important part of democratic competition. Competitive elections require more than access to a ballot. Opposition parties must also have a meaningful opportunity to communicate with voters, while citizens need access to independent information about both the government and its opponents. Pressure on independent media can therefore make the political playing field less equal even when opposition parties are still legally allowed to participate.

Recent evidence suggests that these concerns remain relevant. Freedom House’s  2026 report on Turkey states that Turkey maintains a multiparty political system and that opposition parties have achieved important victories in elections. But at the same time, it points to pressure on opposition figures, concerns over judicial independence, and restrictions on independent media. Also, Freedom House’s 2026 assessment classifies Turkey as “Not Free,” with a score of 32 out of 100. The continued success of opposition parties is important because it shows that the political competition has not disappeared. However, elections alone do not guarantee equal democratic competition. If institutions that check executive power become less independent and independent media operate under significant pressure, elections can continue while the broader political environment weakens.

However, Turkey’s political situation also shows that democratic competition has not completely disappeared. In Secularism, Islamism, and the Future of Turkey,  Kuru discusses the success of opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral election. After the first election result was canceled, İmamoğlu won the second election by an even larger margin. This is important because it shows that opposition candidates can still receive strong public support despite pressure from the government. Although this does not mean Turkey’s democracy has fully recovered, it suggests that elections can still create opportunities for political change. Turkey’s future democracy may therefore depend not only on limiting executive power, but also on whether opposition parties can continue to compete fairly.

Case of Turkey is therefore very useful to understand democratic erosion. Democracy is not only about a citizen’s vote. It also depends on whether courts can independently constrain the government, journalists can check those who are in power, and opposition parties can compete fairly. It also shows how democratic erosion can occur gradually without eliminating elections. Checks and balances, judicial independence, and media freedom are therefore important for maintaining meaningful democratic competition. The key question is not simply whether elections exist, but whether the institutions surrounding them allow meaningful democratic competition.