• Introduction

The suicide bombing in August 2nd, 2026 (in Kabal, a town in Swat Valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, 14 people died and more than two dozen people were injured) is not only an accident, but also one of the main evidences showing personal security of Pakistani population has continuously threatened. Additionally, we can understand that the current Pakistani government is experiencing weakness of national security with democratic erosion.

TTP (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan – or called, Pakistani Taliban), the prime suspect, has already conducted several terror attacks in Pakistan, including the incident above. TTP is an alliance of a couple of militant groups, established in 2007, and actively performing from their bases around the Afghanistan – Pakistan border line. Their first goal is now known as collapsing the current Pakistani government and establishing their own emirate based on their interpretation of Islamic law.

• Living in the Pakistan

After the establishment, TTP has being conducted indiscriminate attacks to the Pakistani society, and most of those attacks consist of suicide bombing. In addition to the Kabal Terror above, there were the terror attack in mosque of a police compound in January, 2023 (Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) and the nationwide military attack that killed at least 112 members of Pakistan’s security forces in July, 2026.

TTP is actually not the only attacking group: there are also Baloch separatist groups, ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province), etc. All of them have increased the frequency of terror attacks and killed numerous soldiers, police and innocent people. The fatalities do still actively occur recently; 527 times in 2023, and 790 times in 2024 (Freedom House 2024, 2025).

• Democratic Responses

What did the institutions do in this chaos? While the security of people is threatening, is seems like they did nothing for the population – what if they cannot?

After 2018, Pakistan government is considered as shaping a form of “tutelary hybrid regime.” Under this system, the problem is that ultimate authority is possessed by the Pakistani military rather than elected civilians. The military has veto power of core political security domains while the civilian government remains electorally accountable.

The twenty-seventh amendment in November 2025 of the Pakistani Constitution was passed, and the official legal power of the Supreme Court to make decisions, enforce laws, and administer justice was deprived. Lifetime immunity from criminal and civil proceedings to military officers of all three armed services, including Asim Munir (The Chief of Defense Forces(CDF)) and future army chiefs was also granted. This shows that the judicial institutions lost their operational independence. 

In most nations, the process of judicial review is well guaranteed by the Constitution. Through this review, the Judiciary checks constitutionality of the Legislature, laws and policies. This ability works for not only allowing the Judiciary keeping the Legislature in check, but also making policies much more productive. And for effective activation of the review, the government should be under the system following “Separation of Powers.”

Pakistani courts, however, have unfairly failed not only to check the regime’s attempts to significantly undermine electoral competition by issuing rulings that undermined the ability of opposition parties to compete freely and tilted the playing field in favor of the governing coalition, but also to hold regime officials accountable, while intentionally making certain opposition figures face pressure from the regime. They do not make sure about the separation or check the constitutionality of the elites.

And this fact makes sense that Pakistan is now under authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is not just the absence of democracy, but the system supporting ideology or behavioral tendency that is favorable to hierarchy and to closed, concentrated processes of decision making. The current situation where the army occupies all the powers does not allow any conversations and questions. It blocks the institutions making effective responses to the security crisis and makes civilians be exposed to the threats easily. The closed processes might look like producing conclusions far faster, but they can be wrong, out of context, or even bring another severe conflicts. Thus, the Pakistani government does not intentionally ignore the terrorism, but it cannot observe the circumstances and make a good choice.

• Possible Solutions

Katharina Merkel, the founder of Conflict Resolution and Evidence Lab (CREL), argues that democracy can function as a ‘security asset.’ She suggests the ways that democracy can work for civilians and institutions’ security. It would be possible to understand what is missing for Pakistani democracy and security.

a. State Coercion, Repression, and Civil–Military Stability

Professionalized armed forces operating within rule-bound institutional structures are less prone to political intervention. Especially, when civilian authorities maintain effective oversight over promotions, doctrine, and defense governance, reducing the risk that military institutions pursue autonomous political agendas becomes possible. Democracy contributes to internal security not by eliminating coercive capacity but by embedding it within institutional frameworks that constrain arbitrary violence and increase the likelihood that abuses will be detected and punished.

b. Democratic Constraints on Interstate Escalation

One of the central mechanisms in this context is the role of domestic political competition in revealing information during international crises. Active political opposition prevents rapid escalation of conflict by including security decisions within systems of inspection and debate. It changes how leaders calculate risks by requiring broader political support for military action and by exposing security decisions to public debate. 

Thus, democratic institutions influence interstate security behavior by structuring the decision-making environments which leaders operate in. When leaders must justify security policies to both domestic audiences and political rivals, they face greater scrutiny regarding the credibility of threats and the potential costs of military action, which can slow escalation and create additional opportunities for diplomatic bargaining.

• Conclusion

The most interesting point of Merkel’s models is that the author does not object to competition for security. It should be conducted under the system of democracy, of course. Challenging others’ words makes the policy-makers possible to come up with good choices. What the Pakistani government needs is not avoiding the debate, but switching the conflicts from destructive to productive, and some brave people who can ask questions about this system.

• References

1. Freedom House. “Pakistan: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report.” Accessed September 22, 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2024
2. Freedom House. “Pakistan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report.” Accessed September 22, 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2025
3. Khan, Riaz. “A suicide bomber strikes an antimilitant rally in northwestern Pakistan, killing at least 14,” The Washington Post. August 2, 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/08/02/pakistan-suicide-bombing-swat-valley-khyber-pakhtunkhwa/c9f0e86e-8e8a-11f1-9fdc-0a725c989a7b_story.html
4. Merkel, Katharina. “Democracy As A Security Asset: Global evidence review.” Westminster Foundation for Democracy. 2026. https://www.wfd.org/what-we-do/resources/democracy-security-global-evidence
5. Rehman, Zia ur. “Attack on Pakistani Police Station Fuels Fear of Terrorism Surge.” New York Times. August 2, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/02/world/asia/pakistan-police-station-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=6
6. Shah, Aqil. “Pakistan’s New Military Tutelage.” Journal of Democracy 37, no. 2 (2026): 161-174. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2026.a986027
7. Tyler, Dickovick, J. et al. “Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories, Methods, and Cases.” 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 2022. https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/comparative-politics-9780197633304?cc=kr&lang=en&#fragment-4b
8. Tyranny Tracker. “Pakistan.” Accessed September 17, 2026. https://tyrannytracker.org/map/pakistan/
9. United Nations Security Council. “Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).” Last modified May 7, 2020. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-%28ttp%29