Introduction

According to Freedom House, Kenya is a multiparty democracy that holds regular and competitive elections. However, having elections does not always mean that a democracy is strong. In our class, we learned that democracy also requires political competition, participation, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and institutions that can limit political power. Democratic erosion refers to the gradual weakening of the institutions and democratic qualities that support democracy. Kenya is an important case because competitive elections continue to exist, while political competition also puts pressure on democratic institutions and norms. Ethnicity remains an important part of Kenyan politics, and political elites have played a major role in shaping political competition. Kenya shows how ethnic divisions and political elites can put pressure on democratic institutions, while institutions such as the Supreme Court can also resist that pressure.

Ethnic Politics and Political Polarization

One important factor in Kenya’s democratic challenges is the connection between ethnic identity and political competition. Kenya is ethnically diverse, and ethnicity has remained an important part of national politics. Freedom House reports that the Kikuyu and Kalenjin have dominated the presidency since independence and that the politicization of ethnicity continues to affect political competition. The 2010 Constitution and devolution were partly intended to reduce the political importance of ethnicity. However, ethnic identity still influences political alliances and voter choices. Research on the 2022 election suggests that although ethnicity appeared less prominent in that election, it continued to influence political mobilization.

Ethnic diversity itself does not cause democratic erosion. Political disagreement and competition are normal parts of democracy. The problem becomes more serious when political competition is closely connected to ethnic identity. Political opponents may then be seen not only as people with different political ideas, but also as representatives of different groups. Losing an election can feel like losing political power for an entire community. This can make compromise more difficult and increase political tensions.

The 2007 presidential election shows how serious this problem can become. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, the election was followed by intense violence after allegations of electoral manipulation intersected with ethnic tensions. About 1,100 people were killed, and many more were displaced during the post-election violence. This case shows that when electoral competition is connected to strong ethnic divisions, a disputed election can become more than a disagreement over political leadership. It can lead to wider social and political conflict and make democratic consolidation more difficult.

The 2007 election can also be compared with the 2017 and 2022 elections. In 2007, the disputed result was followed by widespread violence and displacement. In 2017, the Supreme Court annulled the presidential election and ordered a new election after finding serious problems with the electoral process. In 2022, Raila Odinga and his supporters challenged the results, but the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the petitions and upheld William Ruto’s victory. These cases show different ways political conflict can affect democracy. The 2007 election shows the danger of political polarization and violence, while the 2017 and 2022 cases show that courts can provide a legal process for resolving election disputes. This does not mean Kenya has avoided all democratic challenges, but it shows why strong democratic institutions matter.

Political Elites and Democratic Institutions

Political elites are another important part of Kenya’s democratic experience. In our class, elites are defined as “small groups of persons who exercise disproportionate power and influence.” Political elites can influence political competition, institutions, and the way political conflicts are managed. Their influence does not automatically weaken democracy. The important question is how they use their power and whether democratic institutions can limit it.

The 2007 election provides a specific example of the connection between political elites and ethnic politics. Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were the main presidential competitors, and the election was closely connected to existing ethnic divisions. After Kibaki was declared the winner, the disputed result contributed to political tensions and violence. Political competition was not only about different candidates. It was also connected to divisions between groups. Political elites can increase or reduce these tensions through how they compete for support and respond to political disagreements. When political competition becomes closely connected to ethnic identity, losing an election may feel like a loss of power for an entire community rather than simply a change in leadership.

This case also connects to Levitsky and Ziblatt’s four warning signs: rejecting democratic rules, denying the legitimacy of opponents, tolerating political violence, and limiting the civil liberties of opponents or the media. The 2007 crisis is relevant because the disputed election result and political violence showed how difficult it can be to maintain democratic competition when political actors and their supporters do not accept election outcomes peacefully. The concern is not simply that political elites have a lot of power. It is that political competition can put pressure on democratic rules when opponents are treated as threats rather than legitimate competitors.

At the same time, Kenya’s political elites do not have unlimited power because democratic institutions can sometimes challenge political decisions. In 2017, the Supreme Court annulled the presidential election and ordered a new election after finding serious problems with the electoral process. This was important because the court used its authority to require another election instead of simply accepting the announced result. This is an example of institutional resistance because a democratic institution placed a limit on political power.

The 2022 election provides another example. William Ruto was declared the winner, but Raila Odinga and his supporters challenged the results. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the petitions and upheld the election results. Freedom House describes the Kenyan judiciary as generally independent and identifies its role in major electoral disputes as an important institutional check. The 2017 and 2022 cases had different outcomes, but both show that election disputes can be handled through legal institutions rather than only through political conflict.

These examples show why democratic erosion is different from the complete collapse of democracy. Kenya continues to hold competitive multiparty elections, and courts have sometimes limited political power. However, Freedom House also identifies serious problems, including corruption, security force brutality, and restrictions and intimidation affecting journalists and human rights defenders. Its 2026 report also points to a narrowing of political space for the opposition. Kenya therefore has institutions that can resist political pressure, but these institutions continue to face challenges.

Conclusion

Kenya shows why democratic erosion should not be understood simply as the disappearance of elections. The 2007 election shows how ethnic polarization and disputed political competition can contribute to serious violence. The 2017 and 2022 elections show that courts can provide a legal way to handle election disputes. Comparing these elections shows that democratic institutions can sometimes resist political pressure even when political competition remains intense.

The Kenyan case also shows the importance of political elites. Ethnic diversity itself is not the main cause of democratic erosion. The greater concern is how ethnic divisions become connected to political competition and how political actors use their influence during elections. When political competition becomes closely connected to group identity, democratic conflict can become more difficult to manage. Institutions such as the Supreme Court can still limit political power and provide legal ways to resolve disagreements.

Overall, Kenya shows that democracy requires more than regular elections. It also requires meaningful political competition, the rule of law, and institutions that can limit political power. Kenya has experienced pressure on these democratic foundations, but its institutions have also shown that they can resist some of that pressure. This makes Kenya a useful example of democratic erosion as a gradual process rather than a complete collapse of democracy.

References

Freedom House. Kenya: Freedom in the World 2026. 

https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2026

International Center for Transitional Justice. Kenya. 

https://www.ictj.org/where-we-work/kenya

International Crisis Group. Kenya in Crisis.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/137-kenya-in-crisis.pdf

International Crisis Group. Kenya: The Impact of ICC Proceedings.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/kenya/b084-kenya-impact-icc-proceedings

International Criminal Court. Kenya’s Post-Election Violence: ICC Prosecutor Presents 

Cases Against Six Individuals for Crimes. 

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/kenyas-post-election-violence-icc-prosecutor-presents-c

ases-against-six-individuals-crimes

Taylor & Francis Online.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2024.2359154