Recently, the global rise of democratic regimes that began in the 1970s with the Third Wave of Democratization has come to a halt. In its place, many countries have experienced democratic backsliding and a resurgence of authoritarian rule. Across different regions, democracies began to decline, as autocracies consolidated power. Turkey represents such a case which began with the AKP rule. AKP, or the Justice and Development Party, came to power in 2002 by winning the general elections and they have been in power ever since. They first emerged as the advocate of small family-owned businesses in Anatolia but gained popularity quite quickly, especially from the support of the urban poor. Moreover, the collapse of the center right really paved their way to become this hegemonic party that they are now.
During their first term (2002-2007), no significant instances of democratic erosion were noticed. This is largely attributed to their attempts in fixing the 2001 Economic Crisis and their cooperative relationship with the West. Negotiations with the European Union progressed, economy was turning back to normal and the regime looked institutionally stable. At the same time, the AKP was aiding the poor, creating foundations and charities to distribute various resources to different parts of Turkey, strengthening their support among lower income voters. However, the trajectory shifted dramatically after the beginning of AKP’s second term in 2007, followed up with 2011 and 2013 in particular. This blog will go over the events that started after 2007 which led to unprecedented levels of democratic erosion and backsliding within Turkey, ultimately causing a democratic breakdown and turning the regime into competitive authoritarian.
After dealing with the economic crisis and increasing their support even more, it was time for AKP to consolidate its rule. They followed six steps to become the undisputed hegemonic power of Turkey while significantly damaging the democratic system and institutions under which they govern. The first step was winning the parliamentary majority, which they did in 2002 quite comfortably. Come 2007, they wanted more consolidation so they picked Abdullah Gül, a prominent member of AKP, to become the new president of Turkey. This event was massively boycotted by many, especially the military. As a response, the military wrote an e-memorandum and released it for everyone to see, saying that Gül becoming president wouldn’t be approved by them and it is against the secular ways of Turkey. AKP responded by calling a referendum winning, as the people essentially chose Abdullah Gül as their new president.
Following the presidential crisis, the AKP turned its attention to the military who had previously threatened them with the e-memorandum. For decades, the Turkish military had positioned itself as a guardian of the secular Kemalist regime and their 2007 e-memorandum demonstrated their continued willingness to intervene in politics, as they did very recently in 1997. This alleged plan to intervene and the publishing of the e-memorandum were important threats for the AKP leaders so they began to purge important military figures with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Countless arrests within different ranks of the military were made, opening key military positions for replacement. What AKP did was, they replaced the former military officers with members of the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement was led by a popular religious leader called Fethullah Gülen who was the former ally of AKP rulers. As a result, the long-standing military threat and its capacity to act as a political actor was diminished.
Having weakened the military, the AKP now turned to the media. Critical media outlets were challenging and opposing governmental policies. So, the AKP began purchasing major media groups like ATV and Sabah, and replacing their owners with loyalists for increased support and reduced criticisms. Additionally, a massive media censorship was enacted, resulting in many independent newspapers and TV channels to not be able to publish any opposition related news. These developments marked a significant decline in media freedom, undermining one of the foundational safeguards of liberal democracy: free media.
Yet another important step towards consolidation for AKP was to take over the Constitutional Court. After the 2010 referendum, AKP’s demands were met when the majority of the electorate approved the changes. Prior to the referendum, 3/5 of the majority was needed to change the constitution or close down political parties. However, after the referendum, AKP turned it into 2/3 of the majority, which was again very harmful to the Turkish institutions.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning the suppression of various civil protests, especially the infamous Gezi Protests of 2013. The Gezi Protests saw unprecedented levels of resistance and uprising from the people of Turkey. Even though it sparked in Istanbul, it quickly spread across the country with the rise of social media. The government responded with high levels of repression, as police forces clashed with the protests, resulting in countless injuries and even several deaths among those who participated in the protests.
All of these events, I argue, resulted in the fall of democracy and the rise of autocracy in Turkey. It was a near flawless process for the AKP to take over every key institution and fully consolidate its authoritarian rule while maintaining its high popularity. There is however, a very important figure who I haven’t mentioned yet. This figure is none other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who is the most important actor behind all the developments that occurred since 2002.
Erdoğan, as a right-wing populist, followed a populist discourse similar to other authoritarian leaders like Orban, Chavez and Vucic. He was always a fan favorite with his personality and effective speeches. These past few years have shown that former AKP supporters may have had enough of AKP but still have positive sentiment and trust towards Erdoğan because they see him as a charismatic figure who not only brought them wealth and goods but is capable of representing their interests. As the electorate became more polarized, they began to feel dislike and hatred towards the opposition and its supporter, leading to unprecedented levels of affective polarization within the society. Erdoğan also managed to create an uneven playing field, making it easier for him to win elections, as he exploited the state resources. Later on, he fully captured control over AKP as he became the president of Turkey while maintaining his position as the face of his party. He teamed up with the former opposition party, the ultra-nationalist MHP, and created the super-presidential system, giving him increased levels of power. It wouldn’t be right to pinpoint a certain event that caused the democratic breakdown of Turkey but one could argue that this was the final nail in the coffin. As Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü explain in their article, Turkey is unfortunately not a democracy anymore. (Gümüşçü and Esen, 2021). Generally speaking, all of these events that are mentioned above resulted in the collapse of democracy in Turkey, replacing it with a competitive autocracy.
REFERENCES
Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2021). Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism. Party Politics, 27(6), 1075-1091.
Erem Bilgesu from Sabanci University crafted an intriguing post about Turkey’s democratic collapse. Their claim that Turkey is no longer a democracy and is now a competitive autocracy is well supported by the evidence of the rise of the AKP rule. The AKP, also known as the Justice and Development Party, came to power slowly, as it began as a small and family-owned business. At first, the democratic backsliding was unidentified, but it was during their second term in 2007 that the democratic erosion became apparent. This involved AKP following six steps, such as winning the parliamentary majority and suppressing the military who threatened them. The writer concluded that these events led to the fall of democracy and the rise of autocracy, and that when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became president, that fully secured the switch. I agree with these points, as this clearly led to the collapse of democracy in Turkey. It is unfortunate that this happened and that it was not recognized sooner. However, as noted in this text, and by Nancy Bermeo (2016), democratic backsliding can be difficult to identify, as it can occur slowly. The rise of AKP was a gradual and downhill journey that destroyed Turkey’s democratic governance. Furthermore, there are some aspects of Turkey’s collapse that were not particularly mentioned or that could be expanded upon. Specifically, these include the relationship between populism and the actions made by AKP, early warning signs of democratic backsliding, and Turkey’s government practices currently, along with the level of tension in the country.
AKP clearly exemplified traits of populism. Specifically, when Gül was president, they engaged in practices to consolidate their authoritarian rule and weakened civil liberties by restricting media access. Since Gül was already the prime minister before, gaining presidential powers allowed him to control other branches of government. Adding on, Frances Lee (2019) notes that once a populist is in power, they tend to degrade democracy by weakening civil liberties, the fairness of the electoral process, and the rule of law. The text effectively explains how the rule of law and civil liberties were weakened, however, there could be more discussion on the extent to which the fairness of the electoral process was changed during this period. Moreover, populists typically come to power through democratic processes, but it is their manipulation of electoral practices and democratic institutions that allows for this. Similar to above, the inclusion of how AKP manipulated electoral processes to stay in power could be incorporated, especially since it is explained how the military and others boycotted Gül being AKP’s candidate, as this may seem contradictory to the high levels of support they received. Furthermore, Jan-Werner Müller (2016) states that there are three traits of populist governance which include hijacking the state’s structure, widespread corruption and clientelism, and systematic citizen repression. This is similar to what AKP did, as they took advantage of their position in power with Gül and manipulated the democratic institutions, exploited corruption by implementing huge media censorship, and suppressed civil protests and the military.
The early warning signs of democratic backsliding are crucial to identify, thus I recommend extending the discussion of the spotting of these signs. Although I recognize that there were not any major signs of democratic erosion noticed during AKP’s first term, I question whether there were concerning events happening simultaneously that were more hidden from citizens. Bilgesu notes that during AKP’s first term of leadership, they were making an effort to return Turkey’s state to being stable and amend the economic crisis of 2001. Were these actions genuine or could they have been potentially part of a plan to avoid any noticeability of warning signs? As Ziblatt and Levitsky (2018) state, authoritarians must be identified first in order to be kept out. Warning signs could include denying democratic rules, rejecting the legitimacy of their opponents, or tolerating and encouraging violence. If these warning factors were detected sooner, could this have led to the prevention of this democratic collapse? Eventually, AKP exemplifies some of these signs, such as the suppression of police forces that resulted in injuries and deaths, but it is not until their second term that it becomes noticeable. Moreover, the writer could add if warning signs were seen before they came into power at all, specifically when they were just a small family-owned business. It would be interesting to see if others who originally worked with them observed any populist characteristics portrayed by AKP.
One last aspect Bilgesu could have expanded more on is Turkey’s government practices currently, and the level of tension associated with it. Particularly, explaining how the government system’s practices have changed due to this form of ruling, and the citizen’s reaction to it, could provide more context to the situation overall. It is briefly stated that Turkey is now faced with a competitive autocracy, along with some aspects that occurred during Erdoğan’s ruling. With this knowledge, the writer could add the extent to which civil liberties are being violated currently and how biased the electoral process is in terms of reelecting the present ruler. Moreover, there could be more included about the level of tension in Turkey. Knowing the current situation, one could assume that there would likely be great tension between this form of governance and the citizens. It would be interesting to observe the difference in levels before this collapse and now. Conclusively, this was a very well-written post and it was an intriguing read. There were only some additional pieces of information that could be added to the argument, yet I agree with all the points made about Turkey’s democratic collapse.
References:
Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky (2018), How Democracies Die
Frances Lee (2019), Populism and the American Party System: Opportunities and Constraints
Jan-Werner Müller (2016), What is Populism
Nancy Bermeo (2016), On Democratic Backsliding