As of October 20, 2024, Indonesia has a new president.
Prabowo Subianto’s political history is anything but ordinary, as he was able to assume the highest office despite his past involvement with the dictatorship that ruled Indonesia before the rebirth of democracy at the turn of the century (some would say that he escaped accountability for his actions, but that’s a whole other article). One of his chief supporters in his efforts to win the presidency was Joko Widodo, the previous president of Indonesia.
Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, went from living in an illegal shack as a child to ascending political heights until he reached the top. After a decade in power, though, he was increasingly unwilling to give up his power, seeking to establish a political dynasty after his other attempts to remain in office failed.
Widodo threw all of his political weight behind Prabowo Subianto, who was originally his greatest opposing force in the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, defeating Subianto in both. Widodo broke with traditional norms by using the resources of the state to assist Subianto while also derailing competitors. In doing so, he ensured that his son was selected as the vice-presidential candidate with Subianto, cementing his link to the next regime.
Taken together, Widodo’s many instances of overt intimidation on a swath of Indonesia’s democratic institutions provide convincing evidence for democratic erosion in the world’s third-largest democracy.
Widodo’s official actions fall into one of three categories: pressure on freedom of speech, pressure on political parties, and weaponization of existing institutions (all of his actions discussed here also took place within the last year).
Freedom of Speech
In the runup to the general election in February of this year, Widodo turned the state’s resources against groups opposed to the Subianto-Raka ticket. While never explicitly stated by the former president himself (after all, why would he if he’s trying to suppress parts of the media), the state’s Electronic Information and Transactions Law allowed them to censor a documentary named Dirty Vote that features an analysis of the government’s abuse of resources during the 2024 election season.
Several Indonesian legal scholars were featured in the documentary, and they, along with the film’s director, were reported to the police by the Indonesian Santri Communication Forum, a collection of Islamic boarding schools. What makes this whole situation rather dubious is the fact that this organization, known as Foksi, is linked to the Indonesian Solidarity Party, which is headed by Widodo’s youngest son. It is plausible that the president asked his son to influence an outside civil society group into reporting those responsible for a documentary predicated on exposing his government’s corruption.
Freedom of speech and expression, by almost all accounts, forms the basis for a free and healthy democracy. Unfortunately, instances like these illustrate how stealth authoritarianism is slowly eroding academics’ and journalists’ abilities to publish pieces critical of the government. A chilling effect on the media also ensures that the outside world has difficulty understanding the true extent to which speech is repressed.
In the above example, it is unclear what happened to the academics and the film’s director. Even if none of them end up convicted of a crime, they essentially become blacklisted by the government and may have to deal with the financial burden brought on by government prosecution.
Weaponization of Institutions
Widodo also used his power to intimidate local officials during the election season, according to various accounts. The president’s second term was marked by weakening institutions that assure government accountability, chief among them the “defanging” of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2019-2020. The KPK is now under direct supervision by the president and has faced resignations by dozens of employees in the wake of the hostile takeover.
With this democratic institution newly remade, Jokowi was able to turn the KPK on problematic elected officials to squeeze out enough votes to ensure that Subianto avoided a fight against a unified opposition in a runoff.
The ironic corruption of the anti-corruption agency is a textbook example of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s playbook for authoritarianism. By capturing the metaphorical referees that protect the democratic system, the executive is given more latitude to bend the rules and expand their power. The remaining officials in the KPK are now bought out—like many in Indonesian politics—or ignore blatant abuses of power to keep their jobs.
Political Party Pressure
This past August, Airlangga Hartarto announced his resignation as chairman of the Golkar party, the second-largest party in the country, after he was implicated in a palm oil corruption scheme. Golkar was the party of Indonesia’s previous dictatorship and retained power as part of the governing coalition. Hartarto’s replacement, Bahlil Lahadalia, is one of Widodo’s top loyalists and is described by some as his “right-hand man.” The replacement comes only a few months before the party’s next meeting in December.
Despite the party’s claims, the replacement of a top party official ahead of the inauguration of a new president with a loyalist reflects Jokowi’s desire to remain influential in politics. The new regime cannot afford to alienate a key part of their coalition, ensuring that Golkar and—in turn—Widodo have plenty of political capital.
This is another example of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s picture of democratic erosion, this time with sidelining key members of political parties. The erosion of the political party structure allows for undue influence in the policy sphere by people like Widodo, who are now private citizens. In essence, a new political dynasty has been established.
What are the people to do?
So, if democracy is backsliding in Indonesia, why don’t the people do something about it?
It isn’t for lack of democratic support; it’s that—in many ways—Joko Widodo’s presidency did a lot of good for the average Indonesian. Poverty fell substantially during his two terms as wages almost doubled throughout this tenure.
This election offered Indonesians a choice: protect democracy by voting for the opposition or elect Widodo’s anointed successor after a decade of tangible improvement for regular people. Researchers have identified this choice at the ballot box as a problematic trend for the health of a democracy. The democratic process can be slow, and those who offer tangible solutions at the expense of democracy—like Widodo—have proven that they can hang onto power.
Despite all this, Prabowo Subianto is now president and given a mandate by the people to continue the economic growth that characterized Jokowi Widodo’s two terms. Subianto is his own person, though, and it will be interesting to watch for cleavages between him and Widodo. The choice is now in Subianto’s hands: continue along the current path or change course on the erosion of Indonesia’s democratic institutions.
This is a great overview of the political situation in Indonesia following the recent elections. Even though Joko Widodo is out of power, his grip on politics in Indonesia is still just as strong. This post makes it clear that he has attempted to create a dynasty through nepotistic political appointments, and his role in Indonesia’s democracy has heavily limited the freedoms and democratic choices of the third-largest democracy in the world.
This calls into question how we define democracy. Of course, citizens in Indonesia still have the power to choose from different parties, but functionally, at this point, many of the parties are at the behest of Joko Widodo and his friends and family. As this article points out, Widodo’s previous competitor is now president with his son as vice president, and another party is run by someone considered Widodo’s “right-hand man.”
On top of this, typical democratic tenets, such as free speech, are being restricted. This post describes a critical documentary called Dirty Vote that was censored, and those featured in the documentary and the director were reported to the police by an organization linked to a party run by another one of Widodo’s sons.
This post makes it clear that Indonesia at this point should be considered an illiberal democracy because the power of choice is largely meaningless and crackdowns against opposition including censorship and breaking up of protests are increasingly common.
This post does a great job of laying the foundation of how Indonesia’s democracy has evolved in recent history (21st century). It references important literature within the realm of democratic backsliding, especially important additions, like Levitsky and Ziblatt to the topic. It takes a stab directly at the actions of Jokowi Widodo, who was in office from 2014-2024. The formatting also helps the reader to follow where democratic backsliding is occurring, while also preventing specific examples from his presidency. The author uses the actions of Widodo and his rhetoric as a segway into the current president and administration.
The article’s closing remarks show a neutral sentiment, that the choice to uphold Indonesia’s democracy sits within Subianto’s hands, for better or for worse. Though, it seems to be stating on a more internal note that things are looking like democracy will erode, which literature from 2024-2026, would also seem to support. Although there are signs and symptoms of weak democratic institutions in Indonesia, there is still room for hope and we can see visible resistance in certain sectors. Student movements, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and the Judicial branches check on the executive branch have served civil society to some extent in recent history.
The pressures on freedom of speech, political parties, and weaponization of existing institutions are all likely to continue given the connections between Widodo and Subianto. It will really come down to how the institutions will be able to resist these autocratic tendencies before the world’s third-largest democracy is no longer able to actually call itself one.
This is a great post that provides an overview of Indonesia’s current political situation following its recent elections. Although Widodo is out of power, his influence remains, as his role in Indonesian politics has led to significant restrictions on freedoms and democratic choices. Although citizens have the right to vote for whichever party they support, the options are limited because many political parties in Indonesia are under Widodo’s influence and direction. The current president, Subianto’s Vice President, is Widodo’s son, allowing his influence to be mixed with family and politics.
Democratic aspects, specifically free speech, are under attack in Indonesia. This post provides specific examples of this occurring, such as the documentary Dirty Vote, which exposed corruption censored by the government. The creators and directors of this documentary were reported to the police by allies of Widodo, highlighting the widespread influence he exerted during and after his Presidency. Crackdowns against any form of opposition to the government and Widodo are repressed in Indonesia, ‘opposition’ parties are significantly influenced by the government, creating an environment of controlled opposition. Indonesia should be considered an illiberal democracy due to the suppression of opposition and significant influence on the media.