The relationship between religion and democracy is a complex one, which makes the interaction between religious communities and the state particularly nuanced. At times, churches act as pillars of authoritarian stability; at other times, they become the loudest voices of opposition. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) offers a particularly interesting example in this regard—both similar to and distinct from other historical cases of alliance and conflict between altar and state. What follows is a brief theoretical reflection on a question that has long troubled scholars: why do some religious communities support authoritarian regimes, while others encourage people to resist them?

In The Sociology of Religion, Max Weber (1922) contrasts the role of prophets with that of priests. He describes priests as figures who emerge from within existing social structures and maintain them by preserving religious order and tradition. Prophets, by contrast, arise from outside these structures, challenging the status quo and offering radical change through personal charisma. In short, Weber distinguishes the conservative, institutional role of priests from the transformative, progressive role of prophets.

If we elevate this distinction to the institutional level, a clear analogy emerges. Religious communities that are deeply embedded in state structures and national identity typically uphold the existing order and tradition. Those that are marginalized or discriminated against often assume a subversive role, led by charismatic figures who become central to opposition movements.

Some religious communities, after the fall of an authoritarian regime in which they participated, take over political life and establish new authoritarian regimes once they achieve a favorable or dominant position. Examples include Iran and Myanmar. In Iran, religious structures replaced the Pahlavi monarchy with the Islamic Republic of Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini. In Myanmar, Buddhist monks supported the overthrow of the junta, only to later inspire atrocities against the Rohingya.

Other communities, such as the Catholic Church in Poland and parts of Latin America, or Buddhists in Tibet, became powerful forces for democratic mobilization.

Daniel Philpott argues that two dimensions must align for a religious community to choose a prophetic or priestly path. The first is the degree of incorporation into the regime—what he calls “differentiation,” or “the degree of autonomy between religious actors and states in their basic authority.” The second is “political theology,” the set of ideas religious actors hold about political authority and justice. When differentiation is high and political theology conflicts with the state’s ideology, religion tends to play a destabilizing role.

The case of Óscar Romero and his liberation theology is particularly significant in this context, especially against the backdrop of contemporary autocratization trends.

The SPC does not fully fit existing theories. In Serbia, it is deeply integrated into the regime, and its political theology is nativist and ethno-nationalist, serving as a buffer for state power. In other countries in the region with Serbian minorities, where secular and civic political ideologies conflict with its theology, the SPC has acted as a destabilizing force against democratic processes.

In Montenegro, the SPC was at times privileged and at times discriminated against by the three-decade-long rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). It played a key role in the 2020 political changes and has since become the most powerful political structure in the country. From today’s perspective—given the fragmentation of political power noted by Varieties of Democracy Institute and Freedom House—we can say that the “Iranian scenario” was avoided. However, the SPC has nonetheless become a pervasive force within Montenegro’s new social order, increasingly embedded in society.

Post-secularism and the de-privatization of religion have arrived in Montenegro with a three-decade delay. Civil society is reacting strongly because previously uncontested secular principles—such as reproductive rights and same-sex partnerships—are once again being challenged. Although the SPC has not succeeded in dominating political life outright, it has effectively infiltrated and permeated virtually all spheres of society. This represents its greatest victory to date.

The SPC, which institutionally preaches ethno-phyletism and Greater Serbian nationalism, appears largely indifferent to the magnitude of this social victory. Instead, it remains focused on wielding political leverage—seeking influence beyond the sacred sphere, including Montenegro’s foreign policy—and aligning the country more closely with Serbia and Russia, and against the “morally decadent” NATO and the West.

Yet in doing so, it risks turning its victory into defeat. By clinging to exclusive ethno-nationalism, it may lose the opportunity to secure a stable, authoritative position within Montenegrin society—an outcome that would preclude what Alfred Stepan calls the “twin tolerations.”