When asked about Hungary’s leader, Viktor Orban, Donald Trump stated, “There’s nobody that’s better, smarter or a better leader than Viktor Orbán. He’s fantastic”. Considering the illiberal, autocratic government style that Orban practices, one may ask why the President of one of the largest democracies in the world, is outwardly admiring this individual. This question presents a concerning element of the United States’ future as a democracy. Trump’s admiration for Orban is one thing, but his recent actions suggest that the United States may be following in Hungary’s footsteps on the path to electoral autocracy.
As recounted in How Democracies Die by Levitsky and Ziblatt, Orban and his Fidesz party “began as liberal democrats in the late 1980s, and in his first stint as prime minister between 1998 and 2002, Orban governed democratically. His autocratic about-face after returning to power in 2010 was a genuine surprise”. Orban’s ascent to power presents a frightening fact of democracies: the system of democratic governance permits for anyone to run for government, allowing leaders to present themselves as one thing in order to gain votes but turn around and do the opposite once they get office.
Trump’s climb to power, on the other hand, was rather unconventional. His popularity grew as a result of his successful business ventures as a real estate developer and later as a media personality. In 2015, he announced his candidacy for the Republican party and went on to win the 2016 election. His presidency was primarily focused on restricting immigration, tax cuts, strengthening public infrastructure, and repealing healthcare acts. Despite mixed success and being impeached twice during the presidency, he went on to win the presidential election again in 2024.
Despite these two leaders differing paths to power, they both display traits of populism, a “range of political stances that emphasize the idea of ‘the people’ and often juxtaposes this group against ‘the elite’”. This theory encompasses a wide array of ideologies, some of which capitalize on an “us vs. them” mindset where “all other contenders for power [are] fundamentally illegitimate”. As Muller states, “populists immediately personalize and moralize political conflict: the others, they insist, are simply ‘corrupt’ and ‘crooked’”. Since populism represents a variety of ideologies, the process of putting it into effect differs from leader to leader.
It can be argued that in the current global political sphere, two of the largest states seeing a rise in far-right populism are Hungary, under Viktor Orban, and The United States, under Donald Trump. Hungary’s democracy is farther along in its erosion than the United States and has transformed into an electoral autocracy through Orban’s systemic consolidation of power. While the United States is still classified as a democracy, Trump’s recent actions, justified by protecting the good of the people, can be seen as attacks to the democratic norms of the United States, specifically the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.
According to Reporters without Borders’ analysis of media freedom in all 180 countries, the United States is ranked 57th and Hungary is ranked 68th. The methods through which press freedom has been eroding in these two countries share some striking similarities. Hungary’s attacks on media are mostly centered around systemic media control. This can be seen through the government’s purchase and conversion of nearly 500 news outlets to a pro-government media conglomerate. Fidesz, the ruling party, now controls 80% of the country’s media. In terms of political hostility, the government routinely accuses critical media of spreading false information and has participated in smear campaigns. This is something that may sound familiar when considering the United States media atmosphere, especially under the current Trump administration. In his campaigning for the 2024 election, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) counted 108 times in public speeches or remarks from September 1st to October 24th that Trump “insulted, attacked, or threatened the media”. His Vice President, JD Vance, often holds press conferences among his supporters as “they loudly boo any reporter asking the vice presidential candidate a question”. While this sounds like an immature, juvenile action, its ramifications are far from childish. This constant slander of the media develops a densensitized attitude in the public towards media freedom, allowing for the continuing and gradual curtailing of the press’ rights. During Trump’s second term, he moved to ban the Associated Press from the White House, mirroring Orban’s exclusion of independent journalists from official government events. This is also concerning because free access to information is a key component of democracy, allowing citizens to make meaningful and informed choices, keep government officials accountable, and participate in public life.
Before Viktor Orban came into power in 2010, Hungarian universities typically enjoyed academic freedom and autonomy from the government. This was a fundamental aspect of Hungary’s new liberal democracy after a long-winded communist era. Unfortunately, this independence was short-lived. In 2018, Orban set out to attack the independence of universities. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) was an independent research based university, with a network of 15 research institutes. When approached with a proposal for the government to take over the research network, MTA refused and fought to preserve the institution’s independence. The Orban government pushed this bill through and stripped the MTA of “important financial resources, including scholarships for scientists and funds for research projects… Additionally, the Academy could lose its grant, enshrined in law, to finance its running costs”. Furthermore, controversial topics, such as gender and LGBTQ+ studies or migration policy, were restricted as they were counter to government policies.
This may sound strikingly familiar to an ongoing conflict between the Trump administration and Harvard. In late 2024-early 2025, the Trump administration began pushing to have more influence at academic institutions that they deemed to be too liberal or “woke”. Similar to MTA’s response in Hungary, Harvard refused to comply and consequently experienced a freezing of over $2.2 billion in federal funding. Under the first amendment of the United States constitution, the Supreme Court has previously determined that both public and private universities are able to enjoy a certain amount of freedom when it comes to allocating their funding from the government. The actions taken by the government not only disregard prior precedent as established by the courts but also show an intolerance for opposing views. Harvard subsequently sued the government, claiming that this action violates the First Amendment and doesn’t follow legal procedures. Fortunately the system of checks and balances, a cornerstone of American democracy, is still intact and a federal judge ruled in Harvard’s favor on September 3rd but the Trump administration plans to appeal.
While invasions on the freedoms of both media and universities are only two examples of Donald Trump’s numerous encroachments on free speech, they concerningly illustrate a potential breakdown of democracy in the United States. The United States and Hungary’s similar far right, populist ideology combined with Trump’s outward admiration for Viktor Orban’s give further cause for concern. Fortunately, the United States’ historically strong democratic system supported by a Constitution with checks and balances, for example, offers protection that Hungary did not have against Orban’s institutional changes on their young democracy. This means that there is still hope for the democracy of the United States if attention is brought to this matter now.
I also read How Democracies Die by Levitsky and Ziblatt, and I too noticed the parallels between Orbán and Trump. It was eerie to read about the gradual weakening of Hungary’s democracy through attacking institutions and thinking of the current political landscape in the U.S. Similar to you, I found it unsettling to see how Trump’s rhetoric toward the media and his administration’s attempts to influence universities mirror Orbán’s strategies of consolidating power under the guise of representing “the people.”
Your discussion of institutional resilience made me think back to one of our recent lectures, where we spoke with a scholar who is a court skeptic, he argued that judicial rulings often reflect the prevailing attitudes of their time rather than standing apart from them. This idea feels particularly relevant to your point about the ruling made in favor of Harvard. However, my fear is that the Supreme Court, our highest judicial body, has become increasingly aligned with the political attitudes that characterized Trump’s administration. Ultimately raising concerns about whether the courts can continue to serve as a reliable check on executive power, which was something Levitsky and Ziblatt notably identified as crucial to the preservation of democracy.
The unsettling question, then, is not just whether U.S. institutions will hold, but whether the attitudes shaping those institutions will continue to support the democratic principles they were built to protect.
The parallels between Orban and Trump are striking, especially in the current context of Trump’s second administration. With Trump’s explicit attacks on the media, he has fostered an atmosphere of widespread acceptance of such rhetoric.
More concerning, with such speech he emboldens his loyalists to act in a similar manner: when Pete Hegseth mistakenly added Jeffrey Goldberg, Atlantic editor in chief, to a group chat where he was sharing sensitive military information, Hegseth took to name-calling and discrediting as is Trump’s custom. Instead of taking accountability of such negligence, Hegseth attacked Goldberg claiming him to be a “deceitful … so called journalist” who “peddles garbage.”
Karoline Leavitt, White House Press Secretary, displays similar actions. Recently, she referred to BBC as “100% fake news” and “a propaganda machine.” Such comments are becoming more and more normalized as both Trump’s and his loyalists’ constant attacks of the press do not phase most.
Though the United States has significant checks that make such rhetoric seemingly incapable of truly eroding democracy, unlike Hungary and Fidesz’ ease of institutional media consolidation, another issue remains, namely polarization.
Specifically, such rhetorical attacks on the media drive affective polarization: an emotionally charged viewpoint where individuals view opposing partisans negatively while simultaneously viewing those who agree with them positively. Furthermore, such rhetoric instills an “us vs. them” mentality and is further exacerbated through multiple political actors’ use of it.
Though affective polarization may not be straightforwardly driving violent or anti-democratic attitudes or behavior, it normalizes anti-democratic behavior. More alarming, affective polarization often leads to constituents voting for leaders who have anti-democratic values. In short, while institutional checks do help limit the impact of rhetorical attacks on the press, such speech still poses a problem by deepening polarization.