“Robert Fico” by Gage Skidmore (Flickr: https://flic.kr/p/2qPsEn3), CC BY-SA 2.0
In 1998, Slovaks took a stand against their government to ensure future democratization. After the Velvet Revolution and Divorce, the Slovak Republic became a hybrid regime under the nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) party. Protests, a large-scale civil society campaign, and the 1998 elections, ousted the HZDS. From there, Slovakia was able to establish “an electoral model of regime change” and attain the moniker of liberal democracy. Almost thirty years later, Slovaks may have to repeat history.
Freedom House defines the Slovak Republic as a free, parliamentary democracy. However, the country has continuously struggled with corruption, anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment, restrictions on the media, and strong political polarization. According to Varieties of Democracy, the country’s 2024 Liberal Democracy Index is 0.58, 0.18 points lower than in 2022. Slovakia is currently experiencing a stark level of democratic erosion, weakening both horizontal and vertical accountability. Strong support from the public will be needed to pushback against further backsliding.
In 2023, snap elections allowed Robert Fico to regain his position as prime minister (PM). This would be his fourth term as PM, but his first after resigning in 2018 amidst mass protests responding to the murder of an investigative journalist. Fico and his left-wing populist and socially conservative Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy) party formed a narrow coalition with the center-left Voice Social Democracy (HLAS-SD) and ultranationalist Slovak National Party (SNS). With this 79/150 majority, Fico and his allies have been able to push through pieces of divisive legislation through small margins.
For example, in April 2025, Fico’s coalition proposed a law on NGO financial transparency which garnered significant pushback from the opposition and EU. It would require substantial financial and administrative information from groups, causing concern it would limit the autonomy and freedom of NGOs. While the most contentious aspects of the law were eventually removed due to concerns over violating EU law (i.e. naming NGOs lobbyists), the legislation still passed with the minimum number of votes necessary, 76. Due to legislation like this, Fico’s administrations have generated substantial resistance from the public. However, this term is not like the others.
Fico’s government has increasingly used accelerated legislative procedures to pass legislation. An accelerated legislative procedure, or fast-tracking, is when a bill may bypass the required time limits for education and discussion, if quick action is necessary for the public good. According to the Slovak Parliament’s Rules and Procedures, the government must propose this procedure with good reason as to why delayed action would result in harm.
However, the unnecessary use of fast-tracking is a form of stealth authoritarianism. In Stealth Authoritarianism, Ozan Varol describes the concept as the use of legal procedures to undermine democracy. Tactics include suing opponents, creating legislation to give the executive more power, or surveilling with the promise of protection. All legal means that could consolidate power within the executive. Similarly, the ability to fast-track legislation through Parliament allows the PM to sneak through authoritarian practices through legal means.
During Fico’s last term, from 2016 to 2018, 5.8% of legislation passed through with fast-tracked procedures. Even in the first few months, fast-tracking only reached 12.5%. Within the first few months of Fico’s current term, 59.52% of legislation was fast-tracked. Removing the ability for substantial debate and education has resulted in a number of vague policies containing a multitude of errors, causing the need for revision and amendments. For example, changes to the criminal code were fast-tracked in February of 2024, reducing penalties on financial crimes. Without comment from the public, opposition, and/ or interest groups, key issues were not brought up. This resulted in EU funds being put at risk, as the European Commission worried about lowering safeguards on EU money. The legislation had to quickly be revised to retain the funds.
Additionally, after Fico’s attempted assasination in May of 2024, the current administration has limited the opposition under the guise of subduing violence. Fico’s tent blames the opposition and media for “political hatred”. In consequence, legislation to replace the public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), with the Slovak Television and Radio (STVR), was fast-tracked through Parliament. STVR’s oversight committee is appointed by the government. The increased use of accelerated legislative procedures has allowed the current administration to bypass checks from the legislative branch and public to push forward their agenda.
Vertical accountability is the public’s ability to hold politicians accountable for their actions, usually through mass mobilization, civil society, and/or the threat of removing them from office. Horizontal accountability is the ability of one branch of government to check the power of another. However, with the growing use of democratic and legal procedures to erode democracy (i.e. stealth authoritarianism), keeping executives in check is becoming increasingly difficult. The public must know what the government is engaging in to voice their opinions on it and other branches of government must retain their ability and independence to check the executive branch.
In Slovakia, the use of accelerated legislative procedures bypass both of these requirements. The public is not adequately informed of proposed laws before they are passed, giving no time to protest, debate, or discuss the implications. Similarly, laws are pushed through before opposition members of Parliament can voice their concerns. Fast-tracking legislation is only a small subset of the democratic erosion Fico’s coalition is engaging in; however, it is integral to consolidate power in the executive through legal and non-overt methods. Through accelerated legislative procedures, both horizontal and vertical checks on the ruling party have significantly weakened.
Currently, the opposition Progressive Slovakia (PS) party is polling four points higher than the ruling Smer-SD, at 22% versus 18%. Additionally, protests continue throughout the country, especially the capital of Bratislava. For Slovakia to maintain their hard-fought title of liberal democracy, older Slovaks may have to teach the younger generation how to fight back.
It is obvious, as you mention in your post, that Fico’s government has completely abused Slovakia’s legislative fast-tracking system as a way to increase the power of the executive branch through legal means. It is a quite clever method as well. This fast-tracking system allows the government to push their agenda without allowing the public to comment on the bills being passed, nor allowing the opposition to object to the passing of such bills, or even have an opinion at all. I agree with you entirely when you mention that this is a classic tactic used by a government to move towards stealth authoritarianism. Individuals in power use the already-established legal systems that are meant to serve the people and completely change their function as a way to serve themselves. Slovakia’s case is certainly interesting, as one action such as fast-tracking is able to erode both vertical and horizontal accountability. This means that it is much harder to combat such anti-democratic actions if both forms of accountability are simultaneously eroding as a consequence of such an abuse of power.
The unique nature of Slovakia’s case begs the question of what can actually be done to reverse democratic backsliding within the legislature. As you rightly mention in your post, the public plays a crucial role in pushing back against democratic backsliding through protests. Protesting has been a crucial aspect of democratic resilience in Slovakia’s history, and the public needs to continue to do so. However, in terms of horizontal accountability, solving this issue becomes much harder. Can Slovakia’s courts play a role in democratic resilience? Is there any way that the opposition can rightfully challenge Fico’s actions through legal means?
I think viewing democratic erosion through the lens of vertical accountability is really interesting because I think a broader theme we’re starting to witness across different regimes is that the public is quite limited in terms of what they can do once power-hungry elites are elected. In democracies, the people’s power is exercised through voting. However, it often seems that the public becomes disillusioned due to the relatively weak voice that it has in terms of having a say in how their government makes decisions. You mention the younger generation needing to “fight back” – an idea which is growing in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. However I feel like due to the limited role that the public plays, especially on an individual basis, it seems that even if many voters feel angry or frustrated with the decisions of their government, everyone simultaneously “waits” for someone else to take action and do something. But when everyone has this mindset, it results in a lack of action and a reality where the public doesn’t really have an ability to say “no” to something.
While campaign finance laws obviously vary from country to country, I feel like we’re seeing in the United States how the role of money in politics makes the implementation of vertical accountability a lot more difficult. Because while voters can use their voice at the polls, that’s only once every two to four years – and even then, voters don’t have the ability to choose who their party nominates nor any say in the actions of the politicians elected once they take office. At that point one has to hope that the implemented checks and balances will hold up in the form of horizontal accountability, but as we’re seeing in the US and in the examples you point out regarding Slovakia, those can’t always be relied upon.
It is fascinating to see a newer democracy such as Slovakia fall into a state of decline so quickly. While not fully exhibiting signs of democratic erosion, it is clear that Fico intends to pursue the consolidation of power through the erosion of democratic institutions. Co-opting the media and speeding up the legislative process are similar to indicators currently being exhibited by Italy which may herald democratic erosion. Fico has made clear moves to silence the public’s voice while also putting down political opposition which are two of the main areas where an authoritarian leader can be stopped.
Dampening accountability and public resistance alone do not guarantee democratic decline but they do warn us to keep an eye out for further indicators. Fico would need to bypass term limits to avoid losing his grasp on the nation at the end of his last term as well as weaken the parliament to completely stomp out his opposition. As well as that, there would need to be some action taken against the courts if they still hold any amount of power to uphold the rule of law. Again, the indicators outlined in this post do show a shift away from the previous trend toward strengthening democracy but even where there is a will, there is not always a way.
As you called out, it is on the older generations to inform the youth what life was like in an authoritarian state and how the remnants of such a time have not yet withered away. It should be clear that Fico should not be allowed to roam free as he has shown where he would like to take the nation. It now rests with the people to uphold the pillars of democracy and fortify what took so long to achieve.