When Tunisia’s citizens overthrew their dictator in 2011, the world hailed Tunisia’s emergence from this uprising as the only country to become a true democracy. For several years, Tunisia served as solid evidence that democracy was a realistic outcome of the Arab Spring for people in the Arab world. However, since 2021, this optimism has rapidly diminished. Politicians such as Kais Saied are adapting to a consolidation of authority similar to that of other leaders in the region. In other words, by centralizing political power through a similar method to his predecessors, he follows a trend in Arab politics in which elected politicians incrementally undermine democratic institutions instead of completely overthrowing them. The signs are becoming increasingly evident that Tunisia is experiencing a decline in the level of democracy, and this will significantly impact future political and social developments in Tunisia and across the Arab world. What happens to the existence of democracies is described by scholars as democratic backsliding, in which elected leaders erode the democratic institutions from within, rather than through a civilian overthrow of the government (Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

A President Who Promised Reform Has Now Removed Limits On His Own Authority

Democratic collapse often occurs when a leader tries to defend their oppressive actions because they claim that they would save the country. President Saied invoked Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution to justify his actions and to seize control of Tunisia. He stopped parliament from functioning and fired the prime minister, intending to rule by executive order. Initially, he claimed that these actions were temporary, but instead of ending with the return of normal politics, they were established as the foundation of a new political system. These actions align with Bermeo’s (2016) definition of executive aggrandizement, leaders who initially use extraordinary powers on a temporary, as-needed basis for the protection of the nation, expand this practice to the point where it becomes habitual, eventually developing into the next phase of competitive authoritarian states, where elections are held but are manipulated by institutions to benefit the president (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Freedom House, 2024).

In 2022, Saied passed a new constitution that significantly expanded the powers of the president to an extreme level. The legislative branch was rendered powerless; the president had absolute control of the executive branch; and there were no checks on the president’s powers. Freedom House has reported that since assuming the presidency, Tunisia has experienced one of the largest losses of political rights on the globe. A crisis that appeared to be temporary has now become a permanent change and can be viewed as the initial development of a competitive authoritarian regime, which maintains elections but manipulates institutions in the president’s favor (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Freedom House, 2024).

The Decline Of Democracy In Tunisia

A key factor in the decline of democracy in Tunisia is the diminishing independence of the judiciary. In early 2022, President Saied dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council and formed a newly appointed Supreme Judicial Council. In effect, Saied chooses who will take part in the council. Those judges who speak out against Saied are generally suspended or investigated. This is not simply a matter of political tension but a deliberate attempt to change institutions so that there is little possibility of resisting them. Such institutional capture has been a typical characteristic of democratic erosion in hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010; V-Dem, 2024).

Many opposition figures, particularly those associated with the Ennahda Party, have been arrested based on loose, vague charges such as “conspiracy against state security.” Many journalists, lawyers, and activists have also experienced increasing intimidation. As reported by The Guardian and Al-Jazeera, those who oppose Saied are routinely picked up under very broad “anti-information” or “state security” laws. According to the V-Dem 2024 Democracy Report, Tunisia is ranked as the fastest-declining democracy in the world primarily because of the attacks on the judiciary and the decrease in space available for dissent. In many ways, these factors are the reasons for Tunisia’s sudden decline in democracy, as observed by international monitoring entities (Freedom House, 2024; V-Dem, 2024).

Elections Continue, But Are No Longer Democratic

While Tunisia may continue to hold elections, an election by itself cannot create a democracy. In late 2022, Tunisia had an astonishing 11% of citizens actually participating in a parliamentary vote, a statistic that reflects extreme distrust among its people. Additionally, the president of Tunisia, Kais Saied, changed the laws governing how elections are conducted to a place that weakens political party power and mandates that all candidates run as independents, referred to as “independents” or “Indie.” With no strong political parties on the ground, citizens cannot hold their representatives accountable in a fair manner; in turn, elections are merely symbolic, rather than a competitive process. The decline in electoral competition is one of the primary characteristics of electoral authoritarianism in a competitive authoritarian landscape (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

Academics define this political environment as an “electoral authoritarianism,” in which an election does legally take place; however, there is such a significant disparity between the government and the people that it is impossible to compete fairly when citizens vote for their leaders. According to the Freedom House report, Tunisia’s current laws favor a presidential candidate and do not allow any meaningful opportunity for opposition parties or candidates to participate in the elections. Consequently, Tunisia may look like a democratic nation on paper, but in fact, the citizens have no legitimate ability to change their leaders through free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2024).

New Crisis Help Justify New Repression

Saied has justified increasing levels of repression through the economic crisis, public frustration with the state of the economy, and mounting tension surrounding immigration into Tunisia. Media sources have shown how racist attitudes towards immigration have scapegoated migrants, particularly Black African migrants, to foster statements of nationalism against these groups. At the same time, opposition party leaders, journalists, and human rights activists continue to be arrested on vague charges of supporting terrorists. 

The elected leaders of Tunisia are guilty of executive aggrandizement, by which they have legally increased the amount of authority they possess and weakened the democratic accountability of leaders and institutions under the guise of national security (Bermeo, 2016).

The overall pattern demonstrates that the ultimate goal of Tunisia’s current downward trend in democracy cannot be classified as “a random event”; in other words, Tunisia’s current state of democratic functioning represents a purposeful political strategy on the part of the ruling regime.

Is Tunisia Now A Competitive Authoritarian Regime?

Tunisia is now classified as a competitive authoritarian regime under the definitions of competitive authoritarianism in political science. While elections continue to be held in Tunisia, these elections are still not viewed as either ‘free’ or ‘fair’ due to the executive branch’s ability to avoid any form of accountability for violating laws, the repression of opposition leaders, the degradation of judicial independence, and the manipulation of the electoral process (Levitsky & Way, 2010:260; Freedom House, 2024; V-Dem, 2024).

Conclusion: Where Tunisia Goes from Here?

Ten years ago, Tunisia stood out as an example of what can be achieved through democracy. Today, it is an example of what can happen to a democracy when power is concentrated in a few hands, the judicial system is being undermined, elections are not free and fair, and there is repression of the opposition. While Tunisia continues to have civil society organizations and individuals, including journalists and activists who oppose these trends, they are facing mounting pressure to conform to the regime’s will.

In order for Tunisia to escape the fate of being another failed democratic experiment, there needs to be both vigorous internal resistance to the authoritarianism being promoted by President Saied and a return of real international support for democracy in Tunisia.

Tunisia now stands at a crossroads; the path the country takes will dictate the future of the last remaining Arab Spring democracy. Recent democratic indicators support this trend, as they place Tunisia amongst the fastest declining democracies globally (Freedom House, 2024; V-Dem, 2024).

References:

Al-Jazeera. (2024). Tunisian opposition figures arrested amid growing political repression. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 

Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19.

Freedom House. (2024). Tunisia: Country report 2024. https://freedomhouse.org

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.

Michaelson, R. (2023, March 17). Tunisia intensifies crackdown on critics as political crisis deepens. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/. 

Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). (2024). Democracy Report 2024: The state of democracy in the world. University of Gothenburg. https://v-dem.net