The current state of democracy in the Philippines demonstrates how hybrid regimes develop through executive power expansion, legal system manipulation, and attacks on fundamental institutions such as courts and news organizations. The Duterte administration used his violent “war on drugs” campaign, which he started two days after his inauguration, to establish a system of government that would continue to operate until his death. He told police to go ahead and kill drug suspects, leading to thousands of deaths in Manila slums like Tondo. The official death toll reached over 6,000 by mid-2017, but rights groups estimated up to 30,000 deaths which included children. He withdrew from the ICC in March 2018, right after the organization began its February 2018 investigation into the killings as probable crimes against humanity. Duterte tried to frame this in a more positive light, declaring it was necessary because drugs represented an existential crisis that demanded emergency powers, which destroyed all legal protections defined under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This process, as described by Nancy Bermeo, operates through government-sponsored institutional degradation which enables executive power expansion in backsliding situations. Duterte established law enforcement as an instrument of intimidation to diminish public faith in judicial safeguards, while using violent methods to perform executive functions without needing a constitutional crisis.
Duterte launched his initial strike against “referees”, best described in Riaz and Rana’s analysis of Bangladesh cases, showing how current leaders modify electoral regulations to gain legal advantages over upcoming contenders. First, he exerted pressure on the Supreme Court to approve the January 2020 Anti-Terrorism Law in October 2019, even though its ambiguous provisions enabled police to perform warrantless arrests of 137 activists by mid-2021. Then, he dismissed Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales in 2018 because she investigated his political allies. Additionally, he managed the 2019 Philippine National Police Reform Law that provided officers “good faith” protection from legal accountability.The presidential power consolidation in these actions followed Levitsky and Ziblatt’s institutional erosion process, as it removed judicial independence and legislative oversight which resulted in reduced executive accountability by the opposition and created unfair electoral contests.
Ozan Varol’s stealth authoritarianism, seen as deploying democratic-legal tools for anti-democratic ends, explains Duterte’s media assault, which subtly entrenched power by raising dissent costs without overt bans. His regime arrested Rappler CEO Maria Ressa for libel 11 times beginning on February 13, 2019. The court convicted her on June 15, 2020, for a 2016 story. Congress revoked ABS-CBN’s franchise on July 10, 2020, after Duterte’s tax-evasion rants, which resulted in the loss of 11,000 jobs and 70 percent of TV reach. Tax raids targeted Rappler in December 2019. Red-tagging resulted in the death of journalist Frenchie Mae Cumpio on December 2021. Per Varol, these libel suits and administrative harassment cloaked repression in legality, chilling free expression, a core civil liberty, and skewing public discourse to favor incumbents, which eroded meaningful partisan alternation by demoralizing critics and opposition media. The 2019 midterm elections further demonstrated Diamond’s electoral authoritarianism because his allies won supermajorities even though opposition voters participated. This was a result of the elections enabling multiple political parties to compete, which gave incumbents an unfair advantage to win elections.
Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., elected May 9, 2022, amid disinformation reviving his family’s dictatorship image, toned down overt killings but entrenched erosion through subtler means. Red-tagging continued until authorities deported activist Gene Roz Jamil in November 2024 after designating him a “terrorist.” Moreover, the tax cases against Rappler would continue until 2025. Executive Order 13 extended “national security” powers in January 2024, which contained elements that mirrored Duterte’s policies. Additionally, Duterte declared a warrant for his arrest which led to selective ICC cooperation from the Philippines. The 2025 midterm elections brought victory to dynastic candidates who supported their family members. Companies like The Maharlika Investment Fund, which contained corruption problems ,received approval from Marcos in July 2023. Most recently and controversially, the flood-control scandal which occurred after Typhoon Kalmaegi on November 5, 2025 revealed corruption across almost all levels of government and corporate institutions. As a result of this exposed corruption, there have been many attempts to bring light to more of the issues in this administration, including “cha-cha” dynasty expansion attempts. The “paradox” of formal freedoms concealing legal repression shows Varol’s hidden methods of operation. Marcos uses Duterte’s institutional takeover of police powers and judicial systems to sustain power imbalances which prevent fair elections and civil rights.
Overall, the Philippines’s recent administrations demonstrate how drug war and anti-terror law and media crackdowns lead to institutional decline. Power structures use legal methods to destroy political opposition through the use of libel and red-tagging, operating as hidden tools of control as described by Varol. Additionally, Diamond describes his pseudodemocracy which allows elections to take place while dynastic control and violence and harassment make it impossible for opposition parties to succeed. These terror methods used by Duterte to establish power control led Marcos to build his “stealth backsliding” system, creating substantial destruction in institutions and setting up Philippines’ democracy to erode permanently if no action is taken immediately.
Hello, I enjoyed reading your post.
As you pointed out, the case of Duterte shutting down media outlets through legal proceedings can be seen as a classic example of stealth authoritarianism. However, he also declared a “war on drugs” and was responsible for the deaths of approximately 30,000 people. Furthermore, he repeatedly made public statements justifying the killing of criminals. As you mentioned, he granted police the authority to summarily execute suspects and provided them with legal immunity, and he even encouraged citizens to participate in these executions, showing no hesitation in openly promoting such ‘executions’. In this process, not only criminals but also innocent civilians and political opponents have been sacrificed, which appears closer to traditional authoritarian governance.
This raises a question for me. Duterte used such blatant methods that he resorted to massive violence against countless citizens without regard for international criticism. Why did Duterte choose to follow legal procedures in dealing with ABS-CBN, even though he seemingly had the capacity to exert direct and coercive control over the network?
In my view, since ABS-CBN was a terrestrial network with immense influence in the Philippines, there may have been ways to make use of its scale and influence rather than shutting it down entirely. Duterte could have pursued more direct and coercive forms of control over the network, including even extreme measures such as physical elimination of its leadership or replacing them with pro-Duterte figures. Given that he had already resorted to large scale violence against civilians, it is puzzling why he chose to follow legal procedures in this case instead of employing more overt forms of control. This led me to consider whether, rather than explaining a regime’s governing style through a single concept, there is a need to explore how different governing styles coexisted.