In our assigned reading by Olán Varol, he describes his theory of “stealth authoritarianism” as a way that “the new generation of authoritarians cloak repressive measures under the mask of law, imbue them with the veneer of legitimacy, and render authoritarian practices much more difficult to detect and eliminate” (Varol 1673)  In addition to this, Varol identifies judicial review and electoral laws as a mechanism of stealth authoritarianism. The actions of the current Salvadoran government employ these very mechanisms that Varol analyzes. In doing so, they vindicate Varol’s theory that modern authoritarians’ shift toward “stealth” authoritarianism creates repressive practices that pose a threat to democracy and are more difficult to detect and eliminate. 

Judicial review is one of the tools that Varol identifies that help perpetuate stealth authoritarianism and one way that it is used is to consolidate power. This mechanism can be defined as restructuring the judicial institution in order to best serve the interests of incumbents. Authoritarian leaders can legally restructure the structure of the courts, the appointments process, and the rules of access to judicial review and use democratic institutions to do so, enhancing such a decision’s legitimacy (Varol 1687). 

This mechanism emerged in El Salvador in May 2021, when the Legislative Assembly, just recently taken into control by a supermajority of Bukele’s party, Nuevas Ideas, voted to remove the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court and replace them with allies. The removal was justified through formal legislative procedures, but it effectively neutralized the judiciary as an independent check on executive authority. Judicial review and its ability to enact checks on the executive’s power was not eliminated, but it was significantly weakened. 

The consequences of this consolidation of power became much clearer in September 2021, when the newly appointed Constitutional Chamber issued a ruling that permitted immediate presidential reelection, reinterpreting the Salvadoran Constitution and a long‑standing interpretation that consecutive terms were prohibited. This is exactly what Varol describes in his judicial review analysis, a decision grounded in legal reasoning and issued by a formally constituted court that still produces an outcome that entrenches the incumbent’s hold on power. Since the change occurred through judicial interpretation rather than transparent constitutional replacement, it is able to hold legitimacy through legality even as it removes democratic practice.

Electoral laws are another mechanism of stealth authoritarianism identified by Varol. I will specifically use a set of laws that aim to create electoral barriers to entry in the case of El Salvador. This type of electoral laws restrict individuals or political parties from being able to compete in elections and gain legislative representation. While the expressed goal is to avoid confusion among voters and keep political stability intact, Coral argues that it can often have much more anti-democratic ramifications including the exclusion of new political parties/candidates, provide unfair protection for incumbents, and embed a political status quo that may not be indicative of the electorate’s interests (Varol 1702). 

The recent amendment and reforms made to the constitution of El Salvador is an example of the electoral laws mechanism meant to raise costs for opposition to unseat the incumbent, President Bukele. The amendment in question is  Article 248 which allows constitutional reforms to be approved by a single legislative session with a three-quarter majority, overturning the previous requirement for ratification by two successive assemblies. This poses a threat to democracy because of the speed and ease in which major constitutional changes can be made, directly taking away power from elected officials and their electorate by no longer requiring their approval on legislation. President Bukele’s party, Nueva Ideas holds a supermajority, with 54 seats out of 60 occupied and are able to exploit this lower threshold for approval to their benefit. As Representative Marcela Villatoro puts it, “[With this decision, you can have a right this morning and lose it in the afternoon…Because they (the Nuevas Ideas party) have made the arbitrary decision to modify the Constitution.]” 

They have already taken advantage of this by rapidly approving dangerous constitutional reform. In July 2025, the Legislative Assembly passed reforms in a matter of hours and removed restrictions on immediate presidential reelections, resulting in indefinite presidential term limits. This allows Bukele to go against the longstanding norm that said consecutive reelection was unconstitutional. Democratic alteration of power is an integral part of democracy, but challenging the action that allowed for this feature to weaken is extremely difficult given that these changes were enacted through formal legislative procedure. As Varol explains, the use of democratic institutions is what allows threats to democracy made under stealth authoritarianism to go undetected and uneliminated. In this case, opposition parties cannot easily reverse these changes without achieving a supermajority themselves, the political costs are too high for unseating the incumbent.

Salvadoran government’s use of judicial restructuring and manipulation of electoral laws highlight the weaknesses Varol argues exist in democratic institutions and can be used to weaken democracy from within (Varol 1681). This shift is especially significant given the country’s history of a competitive multiparty system with meaningful alternation of power between parties such as ARENA and the FMLN, following its civil war and peace agreement. The use of these mechanisms to consolidate power under President Bukele therefore represent a clear departure from a democratic trajectory. Varol argues that an additional issue with stealth authoritarianism is its inability to be detected and much less eliminated, this is also vindicated in the case of El Salvador given that a majority of the population (over 55% according to recent polling) supports unlimited presidential reelection. This complicates the ability to detect and eliminate the current repressive regime because widespread support provides legitimacy to changes that significantly weaken traditional checks on executive power. Varol’s theory provides a clear framework that is applicable to the developments occurring in El Salvador, by identifying the mechanisms modern authoritarians use while making the shift toward legal and institutional channels for repression.