On March 6, 2026, Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani called for the dissolution of parliament and another snap election, after the lawmakers elected last December failed to elect their next president. This would be the third national election in Kosovo in the past year, and political leaders are weighing the costs of snap elections against the need for a functioning government. At the same time, ongoing tensions with Serbia amid war crime trials at the Hague and economic struggles driven by fuel price shocks from the war in Iran leave the state in further crisis. Kosovo’s democratic crisis is rooted in deep political polarization and underdeveloped institutions rather than a specific would-be-authoritarian figure, and its resolution – whether through compromise or new snap elections – depends on leaders’ ability to compromise and prioritize government function over partisanship.
The crisis started to unfold in February 2025, when the parliament formed by the planned elections couldn’t form a governing majority. Last December, after a round of snap elections was held, the new parliament managed to agree on a government led by PM Albin Kurti of the Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje) party. When faced with electing a new president, however, they quickly gridlocked again. Osmani wishes to continue and is upset that former ally Kurti hasn’t backed her bid for another term. Instead, he nominated his fellow Vetëvendosje members Glauk Konjufca and Fatmire Kollcaku. Opposition parties, worried that having a President and PM both from Vetëvendosje would give the party too much power, boycotted the final parliament session before the election deadline, preventing quorum. Osmani immediately dissolved parliament and called for more snap elections, which Vetëvendosje condemned as unconstitutional. Courts partially agreed, suspending the deadline for parliament to elect a new president by 34 days. The past year reveals a clear functional breakdown of Kosovar democracy, not through one bad actor, but through fractionalization and polarization.
Kosovo is classified by V-Dem as an electoral democracy, meaning competitive elections exist but consolidation is still incomplete. The main split in Kosovar government is along ethnic lines – Kosovo is majority ethnic Albanian, and the rift between Kosovo and Serbia is a major underlying political force. Kosovo only gained its independence from Serbia in 2008, which Serbia refuses to recognize. The head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNIMK) recently cautioned that deep tensions remain along this split. The past 15 months demonstrate this, as polarization has led to parliamentary gridlock and erosion of Levitsky & Ziblatt’s key democratic norms of mutual toleration and forbearance. The opposition’s decision to boycott rather than allow quorum and risk a fully Vetëvendosje-led government shows erosion of mutual toleration – they’re unwilling to accept Vetëvendosje electoral success, nervous about what the party will do if given too much power. The back-and-forth of dissolution and constitutional challenge reflects a lack of forbearance, as both Osmani and Vetëvendosje use the limits of their powers against each other. Levitsky & Ziblatt caution that as these norms erode, politicians and citizens become more accepting of undemocratic methods to keep opposition out of power.
Linz’s theory explains that the gridlock of intense polarization creates a power vacuum that undemocratic (disloyal) actors can exploit. Under Linz’s logic, Kosovo’s situation puts it at genuine risk of moving into authoritarianism. The key distinction of this case, however, is that there’s no ‘villain’ to exploit the vacuum. While PM Kurti claimed President Osmani’s dissolution of parliament before a vote was unconstitutional, the Kosovar constitution requires her to do this at a certain point in the process. The politicians disagree on exactly when the constitutional deadline is, and, given that experts were unsure which way courts would go before the decision came out, it’s clear that both sides had decent constitutional backing. The breakdown of government function and the resulting risks facing Kosovar democracy were not born out of specific, targeted actions, but rather political institutions that require compromise and lack sufficient safeguards to avoid excessive polarization and get out of gridlock.
Kosovo’s particular vulnerability to this dynamic is explained by Lipset’s theories of economic development and democracy. Wealthier countries enjoy increased security and stability, as political decisions are less critical for citizens’ livelihoods. Kosovo is a very new country, and, while its economy is growing, it’s still one of the poorest in Europe. It lacks a material buffer to moderate polarization – where wealthier democracies can weather gridlock, Kosovo can’t. On top of that, loss of government function (the government has failed even to produce a budget for over a year) has led to what Lipset describes as a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ – loss of citizen trust in the government’s ability to meet their needs. The legitimacy breakdown is accelerated by external crises, such as the ongoing tensions with Serbia and the oil price shock caused by the war in Iran. Rising oil prices are significantly impacting everyday Kosovars, who are increasingly frustrated by their government’s inability to help them. These external pressures don’t create gridlock, but they raise the stakes of inaction and accelerate the erosion of public trust in a parliament visibly unable to respond.
The best hope for Kosovo right now is a resolution to parliamentary gridlock before the late April deadline, after which new snap elections would be held. As Linz explains, in democratic crises involving undemocratic actors, it’s best to focus on a small number of base issues rather than trying to fix everything at once. Kosovo lacks a disloyal actor to exploit the vacuum, but Linz’s prescription still applies. The immediate priority must be electing a president so government can function again. Stabilizing coalition dynamics, dealing with external issues, and enacting reforms can only happen after that is resolved. Kosovo’s democracy is fragile but not yet broken. However, its case reveals that systemic dysfunction alone can generate democratic risk. Whether through compromise or a third election, its survival depends on leaders choosing government function over partisan advantage.
I was interested in how you connected Polarization and Mutual toleration in paragraph two. I think we see a similar theme across the board: When norms that speak of respect from one candidate to another errode, it leaves room for the electorate to polarize around a specific candidate. I think this was especially clear in the 2020 election, and what partly led to insurrectionist activity after the election results were announced. I was wondering if you would be able to draw a parallel between this and the 2020 situation as well. What would you say is more impactful on polarization, forbearance or mutual toleration. I would say mutual toleration as it is the most outward facing action where forbearance refers more to a restraint in action that is undemocratic.