Turkey, once hailed as a model of democracy for its neighbors, has experienced a steady democratic decline over more than two decades of rule by President Erdoğan and the AKP (Justice and Development Party). One of the most notable examples of Turkey’s democratic backsliding in recent memory occurred when prominent opposition leader, Ekrem Imamoglu, was arrested on corruption and terrorism charges in March of 2025. Imamoglu, the main political rival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also had his university diploma revoked days before his arrest, thereby rendering him ineligible to run according to the Turkish constitution. In response, citizens erupted into mass protests, viewing these actions as overtly political.
While this was a rather conspicuous example, the arrest of Imamoglu has been just one of many anti-democratic measures taken by Erdoğan and the AKP. This arrest, and the convergence of several other factors, including unfair elections, the weaponization of institutions and rule of law, and suppression of the media, have downgraded Turkey from a flawed democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime, with some even claiming it to now be a “full-blown autocracy.” This decline is perhaps best captured by Freedom House’s March 2026 report, which awarded Turkey the worst due process score globally and maintained their assessment of Turkey as “Not Free.”
Uneven Electoral Competition
Unfair elections, a mainstay of competitive authoritarian regimes, have been paramount to Erdoğan and the AKP’s consolidation of power. Beginning in 2014, claims of fraud during vote counting were widespread. This, in tandem with a lack of international oversight and the use of a computerized voter roll system, has raised concerns about transparency and electronic manipulation of voting records. Further tilting the playing field, the AKP has exploited campaigning rules by holding celebratory construction project launches. Disguised as politically neutral public appearances, these events are able to circumvent legal barriers on early campaigning, meanwhile other parties are not awarded the same luxury.
Institutions as a Tool of Control
Another tool employed by Erdoğan has been weaponizing institutions and the rule of law with the goal of consolidating his own power. This ramped up in 2016 when a failed coup attempt prompted Erdoğan to declare a state of emergency. Though he finally lifted it in 2018, he introduced anti-terror legislation shortly thereafter, which came with similar provisions, including extended pretrial detention, the criminalization of speech deemed “terrorist propaganda”, and the use of special courts to prosecute critics. These special courts are a key example of how Erdoğan has weaponized the legal institutions and undermined judicial independence. According to the European Commission’s 2025 report, judicial independence in Turkey continues to suffer as politicization worsens. Specifically, government officials have intervened in ongoing cases numerous times, thereby placing pressure on judges and prosecutors and hurting their ability to remain impartial. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt, forbearance, or the willingness to restrain oneself from exhausting institutions and legal processes for one’s own gain, is necessary for democratic survival. The issue is not just the existence of anti-terrorism laws or partisan appointments, but the degree to which Erdoğan has deployed them against political rivals while shielding loyalists from equivalent scrutiny. For example, 14 mayors and over 200 officials belonging to the CHP, or the Republican People’s Party, have been imprisoned for corruption, while similar allegations against AKP allies have gone unpunished. Given this, Erdoğan’s actions represent not only an abuse of power and the erosion of forbearance but also the transformation of state institutions into tools of political control rather than constraint.
Declining Press Freedom
Also contributing to their democratic backsliding has been the assault on the media perpetrated by Erdoğan and his AKP party. Beginning as early as 2007, Gülenist allies had started detaining journalists and judges, and today, this intimidation of critical voices has only grown. According to Media Freedom Rapid Response, there were over 137 documented violations of press freedom in Turkey in 2025 alone. This has created a chilling effect as critical voices have been subject to firings, fines, and even imprisonment. Media outlets themselves have also become tools of the regime as they are either bought out or are owned by the state outright. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), for example, is state-owned and has been criticized for refusing to air ads from the CHP opposition party. According to Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy, the availability of alternative sources of information is a core pillar of democracy, and therefore so is the freedom of the media outlets that disseminate such information. When the information environment becomes distorted, citizens can no longer make informed electoral choices, which makes media dominance a direct mechanism of political control.
The Future of Turkish Democracy
While the road ahead for Turkey is a long and complex one, not all hope is lost. On the one hand, elections remain close and relatively competitive, with Erdoğan winning the 2023 presidency by only a four-point margin, and the CHP securing sweeping victories across the 2024 municipal elections. On the other hand, the conditions for future free and fair elections are deteriorating quickly. With fourteen CHP mayors now imprisoned, Erdoğan’s primary rival disqualified from running, and a media landscape ranked 158th out of 180 countries, the window for democratic correction is narrowing. Ultimately, Turkey’s trajectory demonstrates that democratic erosion is not the result of a single bad actor or a dramatic rupture, but of a slow, coordinated effort of a ruling party and its network to quietly raise the cost of dissent, capture institutions, and silence critical voices. Turkey’s shift from a celebrated model of democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime shows that when guardrails like judicial independence, a free press, and the rule of law are dismantled, the gap between what a democracy looks like and how it functions in practice can widen until the two are no longer reconcilable.

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