Apr 20, 2026

A Democracy in Costume

Student Author: Jaemin Noh

This is a student blog post associated with the Democratic Erosion Course. This post does not represent the views of the Democratic Erosion Consortium.

What do you do when your own country tries to fool you? If elections are the heart of democracy, then Venezuela should be heartless. It still holds elections. People still line up to vote. Politicians still campaign. On paper, the system has not disappeared. But that is exactly what makes Venezuela such an important case to study. Its problem is not that elections vanished. The problem is that elections stopped doing the job they are supposed to do.

In Venezuela, elections were transformed from a way to hold leaders accountable into a political performance designed to protect those elites already in power. That shift is important because it shows how democracy can be weakened not only by open dictatorship, but also by institutions that continue to exist while losing their democratic purpose.

This makes Venezuela more disturbing than the original version of authoritarianism. There was no obvious violence, no tanks in the streets. Instead, democratic procedures were hollowed out from the inside. The country kept the appearance of democracy while quietly removing most of its substance.

To understand how this happened, consider the 2024 presidential election. The problem was not just that the election was controversial. The deeper problem was that it failed at the most basic democratic test: allowing citizens to make a meaningful political choice and know that their votes would be honestly counted. According to the Carter Center, the only major international observer the government allowed in, the election did not fit international standards of electoral integrity and could not be considered democratic. Opposition poll watchers collected tally sheets from 80% of precincts, showing challenger Edmundo González Urrutia winning with 67% of the vote. Yet the National Electoral Council announced Maduro’s victory without releasing results from any of the country’s 30,026 voting precincts that the Carter Center called a serious breach of electoral principles. Even though an election is supposed to create accountability, Venezuela created plausible deniability.

That distinction matters. A sham election does more than distort results. It also gives the government a script. That is politically useful. It allows an authoritarian government to wear democratic clothing. It also creates confusion for outsiders and fatigue for citizens. If there is technically still a vote, then every abuse can be softened into a dispute over “procedure.” That is exactly why fake elections can be more dangerous than no elections at all. When there is no election, people recognize repression more easily. But when there is an election that looks real enough, power becomes harder to challenge. The system can fail while still pretending to function.

And the election itself was only one part of the story. Venezuela’s democratic erosion also depended on what happened around elections. According to Freedom House, all major opposition candidates were barred from contesting the election. The 34 political parties that presented candidates, only three belonged to the opposition. The government did not release the full results after the election, and many outside groups said it could not be trusted. When protests broke out, security forces responded with force, at least 24 people were killed, and by mid-August, a reported 2,400 people had been arbitrarily arrested. This can be serial problem because democracy is not just about people voting. It is also about whether those votes can actually stop the government from doing whatever it wants.

This is why Venezuela is a useful example. It shows that elections alone cannot protect democracy. Elections only work when they happen in a system where people can compete fairly and where the government is kept under control. When those conditions break down, voting can be there like always, but it stops having real meaning.

This also explains why courts matter so much. A democracy can survive messy politics or even bad leaders. But it struggles to survive when the institutions that are supposed to limit power start supporting it instead. In Venezuela, the courts lost their independence long before the 2024 election. As HRW explains, the judiciary stopped functioning as an independent branch of government in 2004, when President Chávez packed the Supreme Court with his supporters. That same court then certified Maduro’s disputed victory in August 2024 without producing any voting data to support the claim. Over time, the courts stopped acting as a check on power.

Once courts stop protecting the rules, governments do not need to break them in obvious ways. Instead, they can use laws, procedures, and official systems to justify their actions. In other words, they do not need to remove democracy. They can simply use it against its own purpose like turning the tools of democratic governance into instruments of control. This is one of the most important things about Venezuela. Repression did not always look dramatic. It often looked normal. It came through banning candidates, using legal pressure, and controlling procedures. This makes the system harder to challenge. It is easier to resist open dictatorship than a system that still looks legal and organized.

The events after the 2024 election show this clearly. When people protested, the government responded with force, not confidence. Reports describe arrests, intimidation, and violence after the election. At the same time, information was controlled and limited. This shows that the government was not just trying to win the election. It was trying to control what people could know and say. Because of this, calling Venezuela simply “authoritarian” is not enough. What is more important is how the system still looks democratic on the surface. Elections still exist. Courts still exist. But they no longer work the way they should.

And this matters far beyond Venezuela. The lesson is simple. Democracy is not just about having institutions. It is about how those institutions are used. A country is not truly democratic just because it has elections or courts. Those things only become important if they still protect people and limit power.

That is why Venezuela is a warning worth taking seriously. The biggest threats to democracy are not always loud or obvious. Sometimes they look normal. Sometimes they follow the rules. And that is exactly what makes them so hard to stop.

 

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3 Comments

  1. Hunter Porter

    Jaemin, I agree with you that holding meaningless elections is more dangerous than holding no elections at all, especially in a place without a free press, because they allow the regime to claim legitimacy without any way to respond. Under the guise of democracy, they are able to claim themselves the winner without giving citizens the ability to prove them wrong. You are right to point out that the judiciary is also at fault here because of Chavez’s packing of the courts. This is a problem that transcends any individual branch of government, but there are areas of hope. Over the past few years, we have seen wannabe autocrats kicked from power using democratic means: Bolsonaro in Brazil and Orbán in Hungary. These cases provide some hope for democracy in Venezuela.

  2. Fiona Musaraj

    This is a very compelling post that describes how democratic institutions can persist in action but actually lose their function. I really think the adjectives you use to describe Venezuela’s democratic situation, like “hollow,” really gravitate the reader towards your post — I know I felt that way. The opening paragraph was especially tone-setting for the rest of the post. It sets up the scenario with vivid argumentative language, which provides an attention-capturing moment. I also agree with your statement that the non-obvious erosion of democracy is more dangerous than clear authoritarianism because people do not notice it. This means that its occurrence is less convincing, more power can be exerted without a hint, and people lose their liberties without realizing.

  3. Halle Goldsmith

    This post provides a strong example of how democratic backsliding can occur while formal institutions remain in place. The phrase “democracy in costume” reflects what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt describe in How Democracies Die as the use of legal mechanisms to undermine democracy from within rather than through sudden coups. Leaders may preserve elections, courts, and constitutions outwardly, while weakening accountability, restricting opposition, and concentrating power behind the scenes. This is especially dangerous because citizens and international observers may not immediately recognize erosion when democratic symbols are still visible. The post effectively highlights the difference between procedural democracy and substantive democracy, where true democratic governance requires not only elections but also civil liberties, checks and balances, and meaningful political competition.

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