The Novi Sad Canopy Collapse and Vučić’s response  

Can authoritarianism be spread transnationally, and if so, how does it affect democratic regimes in an era of increasing autocratization, particularly semi-consolidated democracies? While the effects vary depending on the regime, transnational authoritarian influence can significantly undermine democratic norms, impacting not only democratic institutions but also citizens living under these regimes. For instance, on November 1, 2024, a canopy at the Novi Sad railway station, Serbia collapsed, killing 16 people. The initial canopy was built in 1964 but was later renovated as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the renovations, many believe that the collapse was a result of “rampant corruption and nepotism,” with joint infrastructure projects between Serbia and China often disregarding basic safety rules. In the wake tragedy protests erupted across the country to oppose government corruption, threatening President Aleksandar Vučić’s grip on power, by challenging government narratives of economic progress and stability. These delegitimization efforts have come in the form of the polarization of the media to reflect government narratives and depicting the grassroot protest movements as alleged “foreign agents.” Vučić had even organized a military parade on Sept 20, 2025, as a projection of strength. Such efforts have been seen by many analysts as democratic erosion, with the country increasing ties with other autocratic regimes, such as China and Russia, while also trying to balance relations and even integrate itself into the European Union (EU). Though, Serbia’s efforts to integrate itself into the EU have been strained by this wave of democratic backsliding and political violence. For instance, in 2025 the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the “wave of state-influence violence” while expressing support for peaceful protests against Vučić’s government.  

Despite recent escalations, the state of democracy in Serbia has been undergoing a backsliding process over the past six years. 2020 marked a significant shift, with the country being declared a transitional/hybrid regime by Freedom House, despite having been a semi-consolidated democracy in 2010. Analyzing both the 2020 and 2026 Freedom House reports highlights just how far democracy has declined. In 2020, Serbia scored a 23 in political rights and 43 in civil liberties, by 2026 this figure had dropped to 18 and 35. 

 In this blog I will analyze the role of foreign economic influence, specifically China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its contribution to democratic backsliding in Serbia. My argument rests on the points made by various scholars that foreign influences can embolden the development of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, Serbia’s joining of the Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated significant investment and infrastructure projects. However, these investments have created an export dependency on China, strengthening Vučić’s increasingly authoritarian regime through a series of state-driven economic narratives of growth and stability.  

Foreign Influence and Democratic Erosion- The Case of China   

Foreign influence can weaken authoritarian resilience by creating incentives for these regimes to democratize. For instance, American political scientist Joseph Wright argues that some conditional factors, namely foreign aid can bring about democratization. Such instances occur when an authoritarian leader seeks to maintain power and holds a “large distributive coalition,” which is likely to win in a free election process. However, Wright also argues that aid can also embolden authoritarian regimes who might expect to lose political power during a democratic transition. In the case of China, its economic projection has done little to increase the “longevity” of authoritarian regimes. However, economic transactions with China can embolden and increase the likelihood of survival for authoritarian regimes under the condition that a regime is dependent on exports to the Chinese state. An example of this relationship is the case of Cambodia and its economic linkage to China via the Belt and Road Initiative. Such a relationship has enabled the Cambodian’s People Party to solidify its power, shifting the country from a “competitive authoritarian regime to a closed political system” by 2018. 

While bilateral relations between Serbia and China were established in 1955, no strategic partnership was established until 2009 and later strengthened in 2015-2016 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. By 2022, China had become the second largest trading partner, with Serbia exporting $1.17 billion, establishing an export dependency on China. Aside from trade, China has invested heavily in Serbian infrastructure, which has been criticized for its lack of transparency and for prioritizing political symbolism over economic efficiency. Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy emphasizes that democracy requires government transparency and responsiveness to citizens. For Serbia, the opacity of Chinese investments has significantly weakened government accountability and contributed to the process of democratic backsliding. As with the case of Cambodia, this growing export dependency has enabled President Vučić to establish a stabilitocracy. Such a term refers to, “hybrid regimes ruled by autocrats with authoritarian tendencies, who legitimize their power through widely publicized stabilization and vague promises of prosperity and progress.” In Vučić’s case, this has come in the form of media manipulation with the backing of the SNS to amplify government achievements, while simultaneously expanding his presidential authority. Chinese investments have contributed to the erosion of media independence by enabling Vučić to claim and amplify his “success” in stimulating economic growth.  

Conclusion 

In recent years, Serbia has made significant strides to integrate itself into the EU, while attempting to simultaneously maintain ties with regional partners, such as Russia and Hungary. However, the country appears to be moving towards democratic backsliding under President Vučić, with the suppression of independent media and protests, as well as his attempts to maintain a grip on power. This has culminated in Serbia’s transformation from a semi-consolidated democracy to a hybrid regime over the course of a decade. While not the sole reason, this growing sense of democratic backsliding has been enabled by Chinese investments in Serbia via the Belt and Road Initiative, establishing an export dependency on China. These contributions and investments have enabled Vučić to suppress dissent by propagating economic development and growth within the country. Additionally, it has, ‘entrenched a system in which transparency and accountability are largely absent.’