These days, democratic consolidation has become increasingly difficult, and democracy itself is gradually declining around the world. In particular, it is no longer a rare situation for a country that was once considered an electoral democracy to become an electoral autocracy. Therefore, I chose India as one of these cases and, in this essay, I aim to examine how democratic erosion has taken place within this country.

India is currently a federal democratic republic characterized by a British-style parliamentary system, a bicameral legislature, and a prime minister-centered executive branch (Stanley A, 2026). It became a sovereign democratic republic on January 26, 1950, with the adoption of its Constitution. However it went through a long political process shaped by independence, postcolonial nation-building, party competition, and Hindu nationalism that progressively turned the regime.

At first, India was considered an electoral democracy. According to the V-Dem Democracy Report 2025, “India’s autocratization from 2008 is also emblematic of the ‘third wave of autocratization,’ with its slow but systematic dismantling of democratic institutions.” This process continued over time, and eventually, from 2017 onward, scholars began to classify India as an electoral autocracy.

After gaining independence from Britain in 1947, India was often praised as the world’s largest democracy. In the decades after independence, the Indian National Congress dominated politics and was widely seen as a broad nationalist party that represented diverse social groups across the country. Under leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, the state was strongly associated with secularism, constitutionalism, and a developmental vision. However, this political foundation began to shift with three circumstances according to to Atul and Murali (2025). First, there was the failure of Congress: after the Emergency that took place from 1975 to 1977 under Indira Gandhi, Indira Gandhi prioritized economic growth rather than the earlier pro-poor, poverty-reduction political line. “Rajiv Gandhi continued along this path during the 1980s, even accentuating this shift and largely discarding references to Congress’s earlier commitment to socialism. And then, following economic “liberalization” in 1991(Atul and Murail, 2025),” congress was fully focused to business and economy. Second, the BJP had important advantages that helped it benefit from Congress’s decline. Compared with Congress, the BJP was more ideologically cohesive and organizationally disciplined. It was better able to mobilize support through Hindu nationalist appeals and to present itself as a strong alternative to a weakening Congress Party. Moreover, not that the congress was not functioning as a representative role of people, the BJP was able to attract voters who were frustrated with corruption, inequality, and ineffective leadership. Third, Modi’s own leadership qualities played a major role in his rise. “Modi was successfully persuading business leaders that he offered a better political alternative to the Congress, because of his sharper pro-business proclivities, and because he was more likely to provide a stable, no-nonsense, majority government(Atul and Murail, 2025).” Because of this image, the economy appeared to be more active than ever, and many people viewed Modi as a leader capable of bringing growth and stability. He presented himself as a decisive and energetic leader who could deliver development, strong governance, and national pride.

These three circumstances helped Modi to rise power and it wasn’t such a bad thing in the begging. The economy looked thriving more than ever in India and a majority of people was supporting Modi and BJP for their work. However, after a while this started to take a tool, as India Forum states: “After coming to power the second time in 2019, Modi pushed through important policies that appealed strongly to the BJP’s core Hindu supporters. These included a change in the status of Kashmir, and the amendment of India’s 1955 Citizenship Act (Atul and Murail, 2025),.” Because of this, recent scholars and observers have raised serious concerns about whether India is still functioning as a full democracy, with some even describing it as moving toward a more dictatorial system. Additionally, even some scholars argued that the economy in fact, has not benefited or increased by Modi when compared to the past.

Let’s look at the Freedom House’s evaluation of India for a detailed view. Freedom House measures a country’s level of freedom through two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. When we look at India, while the political rights score is relatively moderate, scoring 31 out of 40, the civil liberties score is only 32 out of 60. Altogether, this gives India a total score of 63 out of 100, which cannot be considered especially high. What is more concerning is that the civil liberties score is lower than the political rights score. This suggests that even if elections and formal political institutions still exist, people’s actual freedoms in everyday life are more seriously constrained. These civil liberties are categorized and scored by Freedom House under four main sections: D. Freedom of Expression and Belief, E. Associational and Organizational Rights, F. Rule of Law, and G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.

First, Freedom House argues that “D. Freedom of Expression and Belief” has significantly deteriorated in India. This can be seen in the declining freedom of the press, the harassment of journalists who criticized the government, increasing self-censorship, and pressure on academic and personal expression. For example, Freedom House notes that “harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi.” In addition, religious freedom has also been undermined by rising anti-Muslim sentiment and communal violence.

Second, Associational and Organizational Rights have also weakened in India over the past few years, as protests are often restricted, nongovernmental organizations face legal and financial pressure, and opposition activities are increasingly constrained by the state. For example, there was a systematic legal penalty that was made “In February 2024 authorities invoked Section 144 of the criminal code, which prohibits gatherings of more than four people under certain circumstances, across multiple regions, restricted internet access, and used force to break up protests during the “Dilli Chalo” farmers’ march”. “

Third, the Rule of Law has been undermined by the selective use of legal institutions, the politicization of investigations, unequal protection of minorities, and concerns about whether the law is applied fairly to both government supporters and critics. In particular, growing concerns have emerged over whether state institutions are acting as neutral democratic safeguards or as instruments that can be used against political opponents. Reports of opposition leaders being investigated or arrested before major elections have raised doubts about the fairness and impartiality of the legal system. This weakens public trust in democratic institutions, since the law appears to function unevenly depending on one’s political position.

Finally, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights have also been affected, especially for minorities and marginalized groups, whose freedom to live safely, equally, and without discrimination has become more uncertain.

Essentially, these analyses suggest that Indian political elites, such as Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), are weakening democratic institutions and undermining accountability. This is not a good sign for democracy, and it is the very factor that turns democracy into an autocracy. In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt introduce four factors that should be noted when they are performed by political elites. They state that “We should worry when a politician 1) rejects, in words or action, the democratic rules of the game, 2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, 3) tolerates or encourages violence, or 4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, p.23). In comparison, these are what India’s political elites are currently executing—especially 2, 3, and 4—as their opponents are increasingly treated as illegitimate, violence and hate speech are insufficiently checked, and civil liberties, including those of critics and the media, are being curtailed.

In addition to this, unfortunately, from what we see, this is not the final outcome. The autocratic rule of these political elites has led to a weakening of horizontal accountability in India. Horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of state institutions to check, monitor, and restrain other state institutions. Looking at how India’s judicial institutions have been tamed by a strong executive under conditions of single-party dominance, it can be said that this weakening of horizontal accountability fits the case very well. For instance, according to Milan Vaishnav in “Backsliding in India? The Weakening of Referee Institutions,” India’s Supreme Court and institutions such as the ECI have become less effective and less credible under BJP dominance. More specifically, he explains that these institutions have been weakened through deference, interference, and neglect: the Supreme Court delayed its response to major constitutional controversies, the ECI was unwilling to adequately punish candidates who violated hate-speech regulations, and other accountability institutions were increasingly subordinated to a powerful executive, “Whether through deference, interference, or neglect, the credibility of these institutions stands diminished” (Vaishnav 2025, p.13).

Thus, the gradually expanding authoritarianism in India could be said to be caused by the rule of political elites and the resulting weakening of horizontal accountability. As political elites accumulate greater power, institutions that are supposed to monitor and restrain the executive, such as the judiciary and the Election Commission, become less independent and less effective. This weakens the system of checks and balances and allows the ruling power to act with fewer institutional limits. Therefore, the rise of authoritarianism in India—also the democracy erosion in India—is a result of elite domination itself, that has also led to institutional weakening.