Stealth authoritarianism is the process in which political elites gradually erode democratic systems not through overt force but by manipulation of the public’s fear. In this context, El Salvador has appeared as a representative example. By emphasizing crime reduction and public safety, the current administration has created a political environment where the weakening of democratic norms is portrayed as an inevitable trade-off for stability. However, this strategy has a hidden purpose behind it which is the consolidation of state power.
The democratic erosion taking place in El Salvador is deeply related to the rise of President Nayib Bukele and his political party, Nuevas Ideas. The political landscape was dominated by two main parties for decades which were the right wing, Nationalist Republican Alliance and the left wing, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Due to the public disappointment from long standing political forces, Bukele successfully activated anti-establishment sentiment. By distancing himself from typical political elites, he won the 2019 presidential election and an overwhelming legislative supermajority in the February 2021 election. This eventually gave him unprecedented control over the legislative process.
Patterns from different sources clearly support this trend. Data from International IDEA and V-Dem proves that El Salvador’s democratic performance has been declining continuously since the 1990s. The Liberal Democracy Index(LDI) reached its peak in the mid 2010s but has fallen since 2020. This means institutional weakening on a broader scale.
One of the earliest indicators of this trend was the decrease of freedom of expression. As insecurity became the center of political issues, the government started increasing its influence over media, expanding censorship under the reason that these measures were necessary for maintaining order. As a result, the Electoral Democracy Index(EDI), which is meant to capture the fairness and competitiveness of elections, had also declined.
This kind of power centralization is maintained by the strategy called “millennial authoritarianism”. This is a mixture of traditional populist appeals with modern political tactics. Bukele uses his image of a young and tech-friendly leader that communicates directly with citizens through social media while bypassing traditional institutional filters. This populist behavior serves to frame his actions as the direct will of the people. Therefore, he has used his legislative dominance to dismantle horizontal accountability by replacing the nation’s top prosecutor and the justices of the constitutional court in May 2021, and technically neutralized the independent bodies designed to constrain executive power.
Bukele’s action shows how populist leaders can erode democratic institutions, and at the same time, maintain the outside image of democratic legitimacy. Characterized by the marginalization of critical media, the threat of political opponents and the frequent use of the military to pressure the legislature, his governing style shows distance from democratic norms as if he was responding to public demand. By using social media to cultivate a personalized brand of governance, Bukele changes public support into a tool for consolidating authority illustrating the precarious nature of democracy when populist rhetoric is used to justify the systematic erosion of checks and balances.
This pattern is also connected to the increasing concentration of authority in the executive branch. The system of checks and balances has weakened as the executives gained control over both the legislature and the constitutional court. Additionally, the 2025 constitutional reform that removed presidential term limits and enabled indefinite re-election, institutionalized this shift. From a theoretical perspective, this shows a familiar authoritarian pattern: when checks and balances fail, power becomes centralized under a dominant leader. What makes this case particularly stand out from the rest is not only the institutional changes themselves, but the way it is justified. The decline of democracy can be seen through indicators such as the drop in LDI and EDI. This shifts the focus from the intentions of political elites to the conditions under which citizens end up accepting the disappearance of their own rights.
The democratic backsliding in El Salvador is also driven by broader systemic factors that challenge conventional wisdom regarding how political institutions fail. According to scholarly sources, the long term costs of historical political pacts, along with the unintended consequences of anti-corruption efforts, have ultimately cleared the path for such centralization. When political elites weaponize the promise of fighting corruption to discredit all institutional constraints, the meaning of democratic accountability is redefined. This shows that the current erosion is not merely the result of an ambition of an individual leader but also a consequence of failed efforts to reform the existing order, which created a vacuum that populist actors were able to exploit by portraying any form of institutional oversight as a barrier to national progress.
Beyond the case of El Salvador that we looked at, this pattern shows a broader weakness in modern democratic systems. In many countries, democratic institutions rely heavily on public trust instead of strong protections, making them vulnerable to leaders who can manipulate public perception similar to the case of El Salvador. When insecurity becomes the central issue of politics, citizens may become more willing to accept a decline in checks and balances for the sake of stability. This is what makes stealth authoritarianism seem as a threat. It doesn’t destroy institutions outright, but gradually reshapes them with public consent. As a result, the distinction between democratic governance and authoritarian control becomes blurry, raising concerns that similar patterns could happen in other political situations where populist rhetoric and institutional distrust align.
Ultimately, El Salvador’s current political situation shows how the transformation into authoritarianism is a warning sign that democratic institutions can be eroded from within. When fear and insecurity is abused by the elites as a political tool, the boundary between protecting the state and controlling the population becomes blurry. Today, the biggest and most serious threat to democracy isn’t a sudden collapse, but instead a gradual transformation into a system that retains democratic forms while centralizing power in the executive.
This is incredibly well put. You point out how institutional distrust due to institutional failures create a political landscape that enables the rise of a populist authoritarian leader, as seen in the El Salvador case. This is incredibly interesting because one might assume that institutional distrust would lead constituents to grow skeptical of the populist leader. In the El Salvador case, however, the interesting and somewhat concerning trend has been that even as he formalizes his authoritarian powers he maintains significant support from his constituency. This has made many consider the same question that you address in your post, regarding whether these conditions can be replicated in surrounding nations. What makes Bukele’s model so efficient and can it be replicated by others? You do a great job of pointing out the role of media and control of public image has played in his rise to power. This is something many overlook when discussing Bukele’s tactics, and I believe may have contributed to his success in larger part than many are acknowledging. Both his suppression of “critical media” and his ability to market himself to his constituency in a particular way brings a dangerously youthful spin to democratic erosion, creating an interplay between virality, a curated digital footprint, and public perception that I think we will see more of in the future.
I absolutely agree with your blog post as there has been a big decline in democracy in El Salvador and even in the United States. Bukele has shown good actions these years by bettering the safety of the Salvadoran people which is what we see, because that is what the media is showing us, but under all of that Bukele wants to abuse the good power and the good things he has down for the people against them, by trying to stay in office instead of having an equal and fair election, which obviously makes the democracy of El Salvador go down. It is hard to think of El Salvador going back to its ways or keeping it the way it is.
This is a great analysis of how President Bukele has utilized stealth authoritarianism and populism to simultaneously gain public support and erode democracy in El Salvador. The section where you discuss the weakening of democracy as an inevitable trade-off for stability is incredibly well put, as Bukele has forgone certain human rights and democratic norms in order to maintain the success of his “war on gangs.” While campaigning for president, Bukele labeled gang members, such as those belonging to Barrio 18 and MS-13, as terrorists and the true enemy of Salvadorans, establishing the “us-vs-them” mentality synonymous with populism. As president, Bukele led a nationwide crackdown on gangs, aimed at minimizing the presence of gang related violence and deaths, through means of police raids and harsh prison sentencing. In doing so, the Bukele administration has condemned numerous human rights violations, many of which occurring at the Terrorist Confinement Center (CECOT), which has been labeled as the epicenter of human rights violations by the international human rights community. Bukele has resorted to the suppression of media and human rights NGOs to cover up the atrocities occurring in the CECOT facility, trying to maintain the public image as the bringer of stability. This further demonstrates your point that Bukele is a prime example of how an elected official can come off as democratic while simultaneously eroding democracy.
Ajung, the points you raise are interesting, and it makes me wonder what the breaking point would be for the people and institutions of El Salvador to put up any resistance against the Bukele regime. This case is unique to me because of Bukele’s approval rating giving him the popular mandate to rule despite eroding El Salvador’s democratic institutions. In my own with with the case of Erdoğan and Türkiye, I have found that attempts at resistance have been more popular and have found more success when boosted by young people, who form a sector of the electorate that are too young to know a time before the Erdoğan regime, and suspicious of his claims that Türkiye is better off now than before. I’m interested in whether you have come to similar conclusions for the future of El Salvador if Bukele remains in power, or if you think that an “aging out” of authoritarianism is a viable path forward where no others seem to be emerging.
Glad to see more and more folks talking about Bukele’s regime. As much as we focus on some of the more traditionally outspoken autocrats across the globe, it’s important to remain vigilant of authoritarian leaders who pursue their ends, as you’ve pointed out, more stealthily. Bukele presents a dangerous precedent for other autocrats to use by illustrating how promises of anti-corruption and a perceived willingness to be tough on crime can undermine democratic institutions and solidify control. Great post!