In 2024, the then-President of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, passed a sweeping overhaul of the judiciary in Mexico. The 2024 judicial reforms introduced a dramatic overhaul of Mexico’s judicial system, eroding judicial independence and reducing the Supreme Court from 11 to 9 total justices. The move to make nearly all judges at the federal level is virtually unprecedented in Western democratic systems, and legal scholars warn that such a decision by the ruling party, Morena, risks eroding constitutional safeguards intended to protect the balance of power between the branches of government. The move threatens judicial independence in Mexico, as directly voting for judges, albeit within the context of a screening process, risks the level of independence of the judiciary.

The reforms were introduced by the previous Mexican President, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, also known as AMLO, and his Morena party. Although the motivations for the changes are certainly suspect, Morena stated that the motivations were intended to reduce corruption within the Mexican judicial system. The motivations for the reforms were given that the Supreme Court was seen as ‘elite captured’ and opposed to implementing judicial decisions that were in the broad interest of the Mexican population. In the defense of AMLO, there are likely tenements of truth that the Mexican judiciary is captured by elite interests, many who are disconnected with the indigenous and lower classes of Mexican society. Thus, the concern by certain disenfranchised segments of Mexican society, many of which form AMLO’s base, that the courts are captured by elites with business interests is not entirely unfounded. 

However, critics argue that simply replacing elite-driven courts with Morena-loyalist courts does not stop corruption or political influence, but rather simply changes the nature of the institutional bias within the judiciary system. This motivation clearly mirrors AMLO’s populist and anti-elite rhetoric, which at its worst include attacks on the different branches of government within Mexico. In an interview with the former head of the Mexican Supreme Court, known as the Supreme Court of the Justice of the Nation or Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación in Spanish, judge Norma Piña explained how the changes pose a significant risk to the independence of the different branches of government in Mexico. The former head of the Supreme Court of the Justice of the Nation confirmed that the reforms were likely political in origin, and that they threatened the checks and balances that are required in a liberal democracy. 

Although the reforms were popular within elements of AMLO’s base, many of which are indigenous, lower-class and previously disenfranchised peoples from indigenous backgrounds, the reforms were also met with significant opposition. Among the biggest protestors were from the legal and business community, as well as urban people and civil society actors and student protestors. There were numerous marches, strikes and walkouts due to the reforms, with the most notable being marches in downtown Mexico City, as well as the storming of the senate on September 10th 2024, by protestors attempting to halt the passage of the bill. The opposition parties the PAN and the PRI, intensely criticized the reforms and worked to block their passage. 

It is worth comparing the new judicial model in Mexico to the judicial system in the United States. While in the United States certain lower-level court justices are selected by vote at the state level, important judicial offices such as the U.S. Circuit Courts, or the U.S. Courts of Appeals and at the highest level the Supreme Court are nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Although nominees of course have biases themselves, their insulation from the electoral process once in office and their lifetime appointments allow them to be unconstrained from the electoral system, allowing them to reinforce robust checks and balances and to offset executive power. Contrast this with Mexico, where judges to the highest office, the Supreme Court of Mexico, in Spanish the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, will now be popularly elected and thus directly involved with the political process. Although technically more democratic from a majoritarian perspective, this creates a dangerous precedent for the majority to displace minority rights, and risks serious collusion between legislative and judicial branches, potentially eroding the separation of powers which defines a constitutional liberal democracy.

The decision echoes a clear clash of visions, between majoritarian democracy and liberal democracy. In a liberal democracy, different branches of government are supposed to follow constitutional norms and protect minority rights, even if this comes at the expense of direct majority rule. Under this pretext, the dominant party, Morena, would have more direct control over the court system through the election process, which erodes the non-partisan independence that the judicial branch is intended to maintain. This aligns more with the majoritarian or plebiscitarian vision of democracy, which views certain checks and balances to be infringements upon popular sovereignty and of the ‘will of the people.’