The security crisis of Latin America is a discussion consistently making its way on both the world stage and domestic politics. What is not a constant is the introduction of the relatively quiet nation of Ecuador into that discussion. Over the last two decades, the country slowly entered into a severe security crisis that now has multiple world powers listening to. President Daniel Noboa, after winning the snap election for a 16-month presidency following the “muerte cruzada” instituted by Former President Guillermo Lasso, vowed for a “war on drugs” that is now common practice among multiple Latin American countries. Framing himself as a strong conservative in contrast to the recent left-populist politicians before Lasso, Noboa created a plan of attack that included a mobilization and securitization process in Ecuador that has continued on after winning the election in 2025. Noboa specifically formed a strong relationship with United States President Trump in a political alliance built around their shared goal of eliminating narcotrafficking through the “law and order” approach. Together, they have rebuilt a new framework for global trade and an agreement for joint military operations with a $25 million assistance plan. What does this mean for Ecuador? For the United States? Time will only tell what the future holds, but in the present moment, the relationship between Daniel Noboa and Donald Trump reveals how Ecuador’s current levels of democratic erosion is being justified from the narrative of security. In January of 2024, President Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” against the organized crimes of narcotraffickers that rose the homicide rate over 429 percent over five years according to the Human Rights Watch.

Evaluating Daniel Noboa in a theoretical framework for democratic erosion, his presidency represents three main ideas: executive aggrandizement, securitization, and stealth authoritarianism. Noboa expands and utilizes the security narrative to expand presidential power through a process known as executive aggrandizement meaning through legal channels instead of openly overthrowing the democratic rules. He relies upon emergency powers, military involvement in domestic security, and frequently clashes with institutions seeking to limit executive authority. This is clear especially within his failed referendum where he proposed allowing foreign military bases, a new draft of the constitution, and reducing the members of the National Assembly. The Ecuadorian people did not agree with 61% of voters opposing his referendum according to Reuters but Noboa’s attempt itself is still important to discuss. Though the voters said no, Noboa proposal revealed his cards in a way by showing his agenda with more executive power, military cooperation, and fewer limitations. The president, additionally, under the crisis of security framed the narcotraffickers in an existential security threat in his internal conflict. By framing the conflict in a war sense, he creates an us versus them mentality that makes extraordinary measures seem necessary. This makes emergency measures and the military become part of normal governance for security tradeoffs which fundamentally changes the role of the president from political leader to military commander of a survival project against an enemy. War politics in this way reduces the space for debate and citizens input in their governance. This connects to the concept of stealth authoritarianism because Noboa does not openly reject democracy, but he utilizes the legal tools like referendums and policy changes to expand his own executive authority under a democratic guise.

The United States’ involvement raises questions but also when looking at the shared values of the two presidents, it is not too difficult to see the connections. Both share a strong “law and order” approach to handling crime rates in an anti-cartel narrative. Noboa helps Trump’s policies and executive actions against international drug-trafficking which creates a strong allyship. Since they met in early 2025, the US and Ecuador have signed multiple agreements including using US Special Forces to train the Ecuadorian military while targeting specific drug facilities. This relates back to Noboa’s referendum that most likely referred to allowing the United States create a military base in Ecuador. These joint operations occurring in more backroom channels do strengthen the capacity against organized crime but also expand the military outside of public view under the guise of intelligence. If the policy is shaped primarily through an executive-to-executive cooperation, horizontal accountability degrades across the state institutions. Additionally, looking at the long history of US intervention into Latin America, multiple questions arise regarding whether foreign-backed security is reinforcing the patterns that weaken democracy or allowing Noboa to consolidate more power. Both are problematic and represent strong democratic erosion concerns.

The human rights violations as a result of the militarization of Ecuador have had staggering with multiple violations of international law in the prisons, against arrested individuals awaiting trials, and normal citizens. This uptick noted by the Human Rights Watch has all the key characteristics of democratic erosion by securitization. The Constitutional Court of Ecuador has also questioned multiple parts of the internal armed conflict framework claiming that Noboa failed to provide “sufficient information to justify the existence of one or more non-international armed conflicts.” This is crucial as the Court is one of the remaining institutional checks on Noboa which shows that the erosion of democracy is still being contested. The failed referendum is another representation of this resistance to executive overreach as the proposal were not rejected by the political elites alone as 61% of Ecuadorians disagreed as well. Noboa may be attempting to use legal tools to stretch the democratic constraints, but the public has not allowed him fully to do so. Democratic resistance still exists, but the writing is on the wall of Noboa’s attempts. Trump’s role in this crisis helps Noboa to respond to the crisis by giving international legitimacy to the security narrative. Trump in a sense is acting as proof for Noboa’s agenda while Noboa is proof of Trumps in a symbiotic political alliance. Ultimately, this relationship reveals the current danger of Ecuador’s security conflict. The tradeoffs already being made by President Noboa in the solution to the organized crime violence towards war, military expansion, and foreign investment rings several alarm bells in terms of democratic erosion. The support from the Trump administration only further exacerbates the erosion of accountability. The good news and the trend that hopes to continue is the civil society being fiercely against Noboa’s attempts to consolidate his power. Time will tell whether the security crisis evolves into another crisis of democratic backsliding. If the erosion has already started as this analysis believes, can it be reversed by the courts, voters, and civil society?

Works Cited

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