After his defeat in 2022,​​ former Brazilian president Jair​​ Bolsonaro refused to concede explicitly and was​​ absent during the presidential inauguration. Following his criticism of the election results, far-right supporters of Bolsonaro​​ stormed the presidential palace,​​ as well as congress and the supreme court.​​ Wearing bright green and yellow, representing Brazil's flag,​​ the protesters smashed windows, climbed on the roof, and ransacked the buildings offices, calling for a​​ military​​ intervention.​​ Criticized​​ by congress​​ and the minister of justice for being a​​ coup-attempt, and anti-democratic, this event was​​ eventually found to be​​ part of a​​ larger coup attempt​​ by Bolsonaro to challenge the legitimacy of the Brazilian government and remain in power.​​ 

Brazil's institutional response​​ to Bolsonaro's attempts at undermining the​​ electoral​​ process​​ was quick, efficient, and decisive. After the January 8th insurrection, the Superior Electoral Court ruled that Bolsonaro would be​​ ineligible for office until 2030. Additionally, when Bolsonaro's coup decree was discovered, a landmark trial occurred in 2025, and Bolsonaro was​​ sentenced to up to 27 years in prison. Even through attacks on the country's electoral system and a physical insurrection, Brazil's institutions held strong and pushed back against the actions of right-wing populist leader Bolsonaro. Courts in Latin America have been​​ hailed by Political scientists like Aníbal Pérez-Liñán​​ for exhibiting strong institutional resistance to attacks on democracy by using proceduralism and formal legal arguments to stop reforms that would contribute to executive aggrandizement, highlighting the strength of the judiciary to halt democratic erosion.

Beneath these overt attacks, a different threat to Brazil's democracy has arisen: the increasing distrust of the government and its institutions, and in turn​​ increased polarization, associated with​​ concern over judicial overreach, further exacerbated by selective support of the courts.​​ Elites work to use the strengths of the court to their advantage, by​​ engaging​​ attacks on the electoral process. Populist​​ elites like Bolsonaro force the courts to respond, manufacturing the judicial overreach they need to criticize the courts, choosing when to support or​​ chastise​​ the courts' actions and rulings.​​ Although the TSE worked to halt attacks on Brazil's democratic institutions,​​ the political elites selective support of the courts has succeeded in undermining the public's trust. Public opinion data from​​ Latinobarómetro​​ in 2023 reveals a lack of trust in the courts in Brazil. Only 14.5% of the population reported "A lot of trust" in the judiciary, and 21.9%​​ reported​​ “No trust” in the judiciary. Although the intentions of the court and the criticisms of politicians may be to protect democracy, their effect remains the same: the erosion of public trust in the judiciary and the democratic center.

“Lawfare”, which describes​​ using the law to deligitimize​​ and even​​ remove​​ the political opposition from office, has been a common tool used by political opponents to silence and restrict the opposition. Accelerated by​​ Fischa Limpa, a law enacted in 2010 with the intention of preventing corruption by banning politicians who had been impeached or convicted of a crime from running for office for eight years. Elected in November of 2010, Dilma Rousseff served as the​​ first female president of Brazil, later falling victim to lawfare, eventually ending in her impeachment. Rousseff was accused of manipulating the federal government to​​ cover up economic turmoil​​ discovered during Operation Car Wash, a federal investigation named​​ “Lava Jato”, focused on uncovering corruption in Brazil's government and its largest industrial company,​​ Petrobras. Rousseff's impeachment began on December 2, 2015, and she was eventually​​ removed from office​​ on August 31, 2016.​​ 

Dilma’s impeachment criticism extended past her support base, being criticized by​​ academic scholars,​​ Brazilian investigative journalists, and​​ policy experts​​ for being a parliamentary coup. It was determined by federal prosecutor Ivan Claudio Marx that Rousseff had​​ not broken the law​​ in​​ the​​ handling of​​ the public budget. Additionally, although Dilma's vice president, Michel Temer, was involved in the financial scandal,​​ he remained untouched​​ and eventually took over the presidency, further fueling criticisms of a targeted takedown. The right framed the court's actions as a​​ necessary moral cleansing​​ of the executive, while the left​​ condemned the courts​​ for weaponizing the law to stage a coup. ​​ 

In response to the coup and attacks on the electronic voting system, the left has begun to rely on “Militant Democracy,” described by​​ RevDem​​ as a “strategy that advocates the proactive use of legal tools rather than relying on norms or goodwill alone”. In 2018, before the election, Bolsonaro announced that he was​​ afraid of losing the election​​ to fraud, turning to social media to attack the current voting system without providing any concrete evidence of such threats. In 2021, after he attempted to pass a law in Congress requiring paper ballots in addition to the electronic voting system, Bolsonaro was​​ investigated by Brazil's Supreme Electoral Court​​ for attacking the electoral system. After this attack, the TSE passed​​ a resolution​​ mandating the take-down of anything deemed to be disinformation about upcoming elections. To the right, these actions weren't seen as protections; instead, they were​​ denounced by Bolsonaro supporters​​ as an​​ overreach of the courts​​ and elite-driven persecution to restrict political opposition. These anxieties fueled the belief that the government is not acting to protect them and instead contributes too much power to unelected officials. On the other hand, the left encouraged the court's decision, describing it as a​​ necessary protection​​ for fair elections in Brazil.

Brazil's courts have​​ worked to help the country​​ withstand​​ attacks on its democracy, but these same courts have also been​​ accused of judicial overreach.​​ As the judiciary continues to perform its constitutional duty, political elites' constant criticism of the courts​​ increases​​ polarization. Leadership on both the left and the right chose when to support and when to chastise the courts, polarizing the public and undermining public support for Brazil's judicial system. The effect is clear: public opinion data from​​ Latinobarómetro​​ displays a dangerous level of polarization regarding the legitimacy of democracy in Brazil. 11.6% of the population "strongly agree" that democracy is the best system, but the opposite end of the spectrum also has even stronger support, with 13% of respondents who "strongly disagree" that democracy is the best system. A lack of opinions in the center displays how actions from the court are viewed through a​​ tribalistic lens, increasing polarization, and decreasing trust when action is taken against one's party. This strong distrust in democracy is what built the base for events like Bolsonaro’s Coup attempt, and with every act of the courts that is framed by the opposition as an overreach or persecution,​​ Brazil's judiciary continues to be trapped in a cycle where their upholding of the constitution is forced into elite driven narratives which undermine their perceived legitimacy.