For much of the decade following the Arab Spring, Tunisia was celebrated as the movement’s only lasting democratic success. While uprisings elsewhere produced civil war, renewed dictatorship, or political instability, Tunisia removed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and established a competitive election system. Recent events demonstrate how dramatically that democratic experiment has deteriorated. On September 3rd, 2026, Tunisia’s Court of Cassation upheld lengthy prison sentences against dozens of opposition politicians, lawyers, businesspeople, and human rights defenders accused of conspiring against President Kais Saied. Some defendants received sentences up to 45 years. Although Saied’s government portrays the case as legitimate law enforcement, it is better understood as an example of stealth authoritarianism. By weakening judicial independence and using courts against his political opponents, Saied has preserved the outward appearance of legality while eliminating the competition necessary for democracy.
The ruling concluded three years of proceedings against 40 defendants. Those sentenced included Said Ferjani, a former member of parliament from Ennahda, the party that led Tunisia’s first government after Ben Ali’s fall. Other prominent opposition figures received sentences ranging from 10 to 20 years. Lawyers were reportedly notified of the final hearing only days before it occurred, limiting their ability to prepare a defense. The government maintains that the defendants attempted to destabilize Tunisia. Nevertheless, the broader political context raises serious doubts about whether the proceedings were independent and fair. Saied has ruled largely by decree, having dissolved the independent Supreme Judicial Council and dismissed dozens of judges. He previously described the defendants as “traitors and terrorists” and warned that judges who acquitted them could be considered accomplices.
These developments illustrate what our course defines as executive aggrandizement: the gradual dismantling of institutions capable of challenging the executive. Unlike a traditional military coup, this process does not necessarily involve the immediate overthrow of the constitution or the cancellation of elections. Instead, an elected leader incrementally concentrates power, often through decrees, courts, referenda, and other formal legal mechanisms. Saied’s actions fit this pattern. He came to power in the 2019 election, but he has since weakened the institutions that could hold him accountable. The court ruling is therefore not an isolated event; it represents the culmination of a larger process in which the executive has reduced judicial independence and then benefitted from the implanted biases.
The case also demonstrates stealth authoritarianism where repressive policies are disguised as neutral applications of law. One mechanism we’ve discussed in class is the use of nonpolitical crimes to prosecute dissidents. Tunisia’s government has not officially imprisoned these figures because they oppose Saied; it claims they participated in a conspiracy against the state. This distinction gives repression a veneer of legality. The inclusion of numerous opposition leaders and Saied’s public threats towards judges, however, suggests that the law is being applied selectively. Courts that should constrain executive authority instead become instruments through which that authority is consolidated.
Tunisia’s deterioration can also be understood through Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy. Dahl argues that democracy requires more than voting; citizens must be able to organize, express political preferences, access a range of media, compete for office, and hold legitimate elections. Tunisia may retain some formal democratic institutions, but this imprisonment streak makes meaningful contestation increasingly difficult. In Schumpeter’s terms, democracy depends on a “competitive struggle” for the people’s vote. When opposition politicians face immense legal barriers rather than an opportunity to compete, that struggle is no longer genuinely competitive.
Saied’s rhetoric further demonstrates the erosion of mutual toleration. This concept requires political actors to recognize their opponents as legitimate rivals with an equal right to compete for and exercise power. By referring to his opponents as “traitors and terrorists,” Saied places them outside the legitimate political community. This resembles the anti-pluralist rhetoric commonly associated with populist leaders: the executive claims to represent the authentic people while depicting opposition as corrupt, dangerous, or disloyal. Once rivals are treated as enemies of the state, extraordinary punishments can be presented as necessary defenses of the nation rather than attacks on democracy.
The government might respond that political status should not shield anyone from prosecution. That principle is correct because democracy requires the rule of law, and leaders must be accountable for their genuine crimes. However, the rule of law depends on independent courts, adequate opportunities to prepare a legal defense, and consistent treatment of government supporters and opponents. Saied’s actions undermine all of these conditions. The issue is not simply that the opposition was prosecuted, but that they were prosecuted in a democratically weakened system. Tunisia therefore complicates the optimistic narrative of the Arab Spring. Removing an authoritarian ruler and holding elections were important achievements, but they were not enough to consolidate democracy. Institutions and norms must continue protecting opposition, contestation, and accountability after the transition. Tunisia’s experience shows that contemporary democracies often die incrementally and under the cover of law. The courthouse, rather than the battlefield, can become the place where democratic competition is extinguished.
Links:
0 Comments