Can a democratic government protect democracy while restricting press freedom? Ahead of the 2025 parliamentary election, the Moldovan government used broad emergency powers through the “Commission for Exceptional Situations.” As  documented in Amnesty International’s report, the government restricted  dozens of media outlets, TV channels, and websites without court review. The government said these measures were needed to respond to Russia’s hybrid attacks, foreign funding, and outside interference.  However, this decision raises a serious problem for Moldova’s democracy. The government said these measures could help limit the spread of foreign disinformation. At the same time, using government orders without court review can be similar to the way authoritarian governments have controlled the media in the past. This similarity raises a question about what really changed in Moldova after Maia Sandu was elected president in 2020. Her election changed the country’s leadership and political direction, but it did not automatically change the systems that had supported centralized power. This shows that protecting democracy can weaken democracy when the government uses emergency powers without strong limits. 

To understand why these emergency measures matter today, we must look at how democratic norms were weakened during past political crises. During the period when Vlad Plahotniuc and the Democratic Party had strong political influence, Moldova showed a pattern that political scientist Nancy Bermeo calls “executive aggrandizement.” Executive aggrandizement means that elected leaders weaken the institutions that limit their power. Bermeo explains that this can happen through legal changes that weaken checks on executive power, rather than through a sudden end to elections. This concept helps explain why government power can grow even when elections still take place. Leaders can use legal and administrative procedures to increase their power and make it harder for other institutions to stop them. 

Plahotniuc slowly increased his influence over law enforcement, state media, and the courts. His influence shows how power can become concentrated when courts, the police, and the media are not independent. He lost power in mid 2019 after a major political crisis and large public protests. When Maia Sandu became president in 2020, her election was an important change in Moldova’s political direction. She supported better relations with the European Union and promised democratic and anti-corruption reforms. Removing one powerful leader does not automatically change the system that gave that leader so much power. This supports Bermeo’s argument that democratic institutions can remain weak even after political leaders change. If the government still has so much power, will replacing top officials really strengthen democracy? 

Since 2020, Sandu has continued to support anti-corruption reforms. However, government power has not changed as much as expected. Freedom House has classified Moldova as a “partly free” country. Its report highlights problems with the rule of law and political pressure on courts and judges. It also describes how the Commission for Exceptional Situations used emergency powers to suspend television channels. This raises concerns about whether emergency measures can restrict press freedom without enough legal oversight. Changing political leaders has not fully solved Moldova’s problems with its government institutions. This matters because elections can change the people in power without strengthening the institutions that limit government power. Courts also need to make decisions without pressure from political leaders. 

This problem also affects government agencies such as the Audiovisual Council. Political pressure can make it harder for these agencies to work independently. When checks and balances are weak, political leaders can more easily avoid normal legal steps. They may use government orders because they are faster than the normal legal process. This means that leaders can change while the system stays the same. This creates a risk for the future because future leaders could use the same powers for different political goals. 

Moldova’s democracy faced a serious challenge during the 2025 parliamentary election because of foreign interference. The authorities identified Russia as being behind several hybrid attacks. Some of these activities were linked to groups associated with Ilan Shor. According to the official interim report from OSCE/ODIHR, the 2025 election was affected by concerns about foreign interference. These included illegal campaign funding, vote-buying, and false information. Bermeo describes “strategic manipulation of elections” as changing election conditions to favor those in power. This can happen when leaders limit media access or make it harder for their opponents to compete fairly. In response to foreign interference, the Moldovan government used orders to block platforms and media outlets linked to Russia. The authorities said these measures could help limit the spread of foreign disinformation. However, blocking media outlets through government orders without court review could create future risks for press freedom and civil rights. This raises an important question about how the government can respond to foreign interference without having too much control over the media. 

Moldova now faces a major question. How can a country that supports democracy protect itself from foreign interference without using the tactics of the past? The government needs to respond to the immediate security threat. At the same time, these measures could create future risks for democracy. Government power can become stronger when other institutions cannot review or limit government decisions. The government’s restrictions on the press without court review can weaken the democratic checks that limit government power. Moldova needs clear legal rules to protect democracy. 

Independent Judicial Review: Media bans and website blocking should not depend only on decisions made by the emergency committee. An independent court should review the evidence before or soon after an emergency measure is used. The court should decide whether the measure is legal and necessary. This can make it harder for the government to use emergency powers without limits. 

Independent Media Oversight: Government agencies such as the Audiovisual Council must be independent from political pressure. Clear laws can make it harder for the ruling party to silence political opponents. This would make it harder for the government to use media regulation for political purposes. 

Strong Institutional Checks: Constitutional checks and balances should limit government power no matter who is in power. Moldova’s recent experience shows why democracy cannot be measured only by election results. However, winning an election does not automatically rebuild government institutions or make them stronger. Strong institutions can limit government power even when a new leader takes office. 

The government’s recent use of broad government orders shows that these problems still exist. Moldova faces a real threat from foreign powers, and protecting national sovereignty from hybrid attacks is an important goal. However, protecting democracy also requires protecting the rule of law. Moldova’s experience shows that simply replacing political leaders is not enough to change a political system. If broad government power remains unchecked, future leaders could also use the same methods to increase their power. A strong democracy needs independent courts, strong government agencies, and clear rules. These institutions should still be able to limit government power during a national crisis. This allows a government to protect national security without weakening the democratic system it is trying to protect.