Democratic erosion does not always happen in the form of a military invasion or by suddenly ending elections. It can happen slowly, with elections, courts and other democratic institutions still in place. What happened recently with Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), shows how hard it can be to spot democratic erosion like this.
Imamoğlu is one of Turkey’s most prominent opposition figures. He was arrested in 2025 and his long corruption trial began in March 2026. He is one of hundreds of co-defendants facing charges of corruption and abuse of office. The prosecutions have been condemned by Human Rights Watch as politically motivated, while Turkish officials say they are legitimate criminal investigations.
This situation is closely linked to Ozan Varol’s concept of “stealth authoritarianism.” Varol argues that leaders who openly break the law do not necessarily weaken democracy. Instead they may use legal institutions, courts, investigations and other normal looking democratic tools in ways that make political competition less level. This makes democratic erosion harder to detect, because the institutions themselves are still there.
The Imamoğlu case helps to understand this idea. Elections still happen in Turkey, opposition parties still compete. But the main question is if opposition politicians can compete on an equal footing. In May 2026 a Turkish court ordered the ouster of CHP leader Özgür Özel and the party leadership and reinstated the previous leadership. Human Rights Watch argued that the decision was a major interference in the internal workings of the opposition party. But Turkey’s justice minister defended the court’s decision as building confidence in democracy.
Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy helps explain why this is important, too. According to Dahl, democracy is not simply a matter of letting people vote. It needs also real political competition and real participation. Elections could still occur even if opposition leaders were barred from politics, barred from running, or subjected to uneven legal pressure, but voters might be presented with fewer real choices.
A criminal case against an opposition politician does not necessarily imply democratic erosion at the same time. If there is credible evidence that politicians committed crimes, they should be investigated. What matters is whether the law is applied independently and equally to politicians of all persuasions. This renders the argument testable: if the legal system treats government and opposition politicians equally, the case for democratic erosion is weaker. Varol’s idea becomes much more relevant if the law is selectively used to weaken political opponents.
The Imamoğlu case thus demonstrates that modern democratic erosion can occur without the end of elections. The greater risk may be the slow erosion of conditions that make elections genuinely competitive. Varol and Dahl help us see that democracy depends not just on voting, but on whether political opponents have a fair chance to compete.