On September 16, 2026, the Kosovo Specialist Chamber in The Hague found former Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi and former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi- guilty of war crimes, including arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder. The crimes occurred during the Kosovo War of 1998-1999, when the KLA fought Serbian forces and successfully liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule and repression. Former President Hashim Thaçi received a 25-year sentence, while the following 3 members received sentences ranging from 13 to 25 years. As the court date approached, citizens counted down in anticipation, with posters hung across multiple parts of town and social media posts, only to be devastated by the court’s decision. The court’s failure to recognize the KLA as key to Kosovo’s independence and freedom from repression sparked political controversy. Thousands of citizens throughout Kosovo protested the verdict, while political leaders across party lines criticized the court. On September 28, Kosovo’s parliament condemned the convictions, with 99 members voting in favor of the declaration and no votes against it. The unity among the members of Kosovo’s parliament proves that cooperation among political opponents can maintain stability in a democracy. However, this unity can also threaten democracy because politicians may work against and push to break apart institutions designed to constrain their power.

Democracy results from elites in opposing parties reaching mutually beneficial agreements. A democracy eventually strengthens as long as politicians are willing to resolve conflict with democratic institutions rather than work against them. As in many countries, governing and opposition parties may disagree on many issues, but the KLA and their country’s freedom give opposing parties an incentive to unite. Although opposing political groups uniting in Kosovo can be a positive aspect of the conflict, it may also reveal the potential downside of unity among opposing groups, especially if they unite against democratic institutions.

Democratic erosion is not always clear to the public, and it rarely happens overnight. Instead, elected leaders can gradually weaken democratic institutions from within. For Kosovo to restrict such conflict at such a crucial time, it should do so through institutional forbearance – politicians should refrain from exercising every institutional power available to them, even if it is legal. Challenging a verdict through an appeal process is appropriate in the rule of law, and Kosovo’s political leaders have every right to criticize the courts. However, this can erode democracy if such criticism and disagreement lead political leaders to limit the court’s authority.

Government institutions are a key component of horizontal accountability because they constrain political actors’ power. Therefore, democratic erosion can occur when political leaders seek to eliminate institutional checks, specifically courts’ jurisdiction. Until today, the peaceful protests and criticism of the courts have been lawful and on the right track to a strong democracy. However, the risk of democratic erosion lies in elected officials’ responses to protests and whether they practice institutional forbearance as institutions weaken.

Democratic erosion is not always visible and clear; it weakens and breaks down from within. Kosovo’s political controversy is a clear example, as the strength of the democratic state rests with political leaders and their response to pressure. When political enemies find common ground in weakening institutions, it can seem like a recipe for long-term disaster.