Beginning September 18 and lasting three days, Russia held its first legislative elections since the start of its invasion of Ukraine. The results, a commanding majority for President Vladimir Putin’s allied United Russia, were a foregone conclusion: calculated election interference both before and during the election ensured no other party could have won. In a country like Russia, an authoritarian state with few liberal rights, what end do such make-believe elections serve? This ruse, which gives the impression of a democratic, popular system, implies justification for the Russian government’s actions, and even works to increase support for the government.

              It would be easy for the Russian state to hold a day of performative voting, then publish a big, made-up number touting overwhelming victory. In reality, the electoral deceit is subtler and is made to look convincing – the results even have some correlation with voter behavior. United Russia received 58% of the vote in these legislative elections. Some of this tally is manufactured, but much reflects real voting patterns. For example, one analysis found that 22 million votes were manufactured in the 2024 Presidential election: dishonest, certainly, but also leaving about 60 million actual ballots for Putin.

              Russia employs a range of strategies to fake these results, including ballot stuffing, electronically rewriting results, and sometimes coercing voters, mixed in with some honesty. From time to time, a region will be allowed to report accurate vote counts. The result is that proving authoritarian vote manipulation is not so easy.

              Further supporting this impression of democracy is the supposedly multi-party system. Four other parties won seats, but these serve largely as controlled opposition, which support the primary aims of Putin. The only real opposition party, Yabloko, was removed from the ballot last month and several of its members were jailed. It had dared to criticize the war in Ukraine and its removal eliminated the option for Russian voters to express an anti-war position.

              The seemingly competitive electoral system in Russia presents an illusion of choice. But this is more choice than voters had in the former Soviet Union, where votes could only be cast for the Communist Party. In fact, the introduction of free elections played a significant role in the USSR’s downfall.

              The maintenance of this post-Soviet idea of electoral competition, even as Russia has become even more unfree over the past 5-10 years, works to boost the legitimacy of the Russian state. Theorist Juan Linz examines legitimacy as a mandatory characteristic for a democratic regime, whereby the populace recognizes the regime’s authority to act, but legitimacy can also be desirable for undemocratic regimes as well. A populace that views its rulers as legitimate is more likely to accept their decisions as legitimate as well.

              The Russian state seeks legitimacy through its presentation of what theorist Larry Diamond might describe as “pseudodemocracy,” in which “formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, [mask] (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination.” The existence of what appear to be parties distinct from United Russia, and United Russia’s electoral success nonetheless, tell Russians that it is the rightful and legitimate authority in the country.

              Russia’s need for legitimacy has been particularly important in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. Gauging public opinion in Russia is difficult due to state control of polling, but the war does not seem to be particularly popular with the Russian people. As the war drags on, the economic consequences have steepened and Russia is contemplating an additional mobilization. If the resulting discontent is high enough, Russia would have to more forcefully repress popular sentiment, which can be costly.

              It therefore makes sense for Russia to cultivate a popular opinion of legitimacy. As the Kyiv Independent writes, the election results offer “a mandate for continued aggression in Ukraine.” The Russian government is able to point to what could be mistaken for democracy and claim that the people are in support of business as usual – in support of the war.

              What’s more, the election results themselves can boost support for the Russian government: believing a party is broadly supported by one’s peers can make an individual more supportive of that party. One study found that Russians’ opinions of Putin are lower when they learn he is not popular. With this imitation of democracy and projection of legitimacy, Russia may be able to convince its people that continued invasion of Ukraine is correct and desirable.