85 out of 100: What the Score Hides

According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2026, Greece scores 85 out of 100 and is classified as “Free.” Yet behind this high score lie serious concerns. Freedom House itself flags corruption, government surveillance, and poor conditions for migrants and asylum seekers, and Human Rights Watch documents pushbacks of asylum seekers and the surveillance of journalists. This post argues that Greece’s high score reflects its strength as an electoral democracy but masks weaknesses in press freedom, accountability, and migrant rights. Schmitter and Karl argue that democracy requires not only elections but also the protection of citizens’ rights. Freedom House follows this broader view, yet even such a score can hide specific violations. This post first reviews Greece’s democratic background, then analyzes three indicators: corruption, media freedom, and the treatment of migrants. Along the way, it draws on theories of democratic backsliding to explain the problems hidden behind Greece’s high score. 

From Dictatorship to “The Only Game in Town” 

Greece’s transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy began in 1974 under a transitional government, and in 1981 it became the tenth member of the European Community, now the EU, a step tied to the consolidation of its new democracy. Following Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy is one that becomes “the only game in town.” In fact, in their 1996 book, they classified Greece as a completed consolidation. However, this describes stability and does not guarantee that rights are protected. Today Greece is a parliamentary democracy in which, as Freedom House notes, parties compete vigorously and civil liberties are largely upheld. This record makes the concerns examined below all the more striking.

Three Cracks Behind the Score

1. Corruption: Capturing the Referees Freedom House gives Greece only 2 out of 4 on both corruption safeguards and government transparency. Public trust reflects this: in the 2025 Eurobarometer survey, 97% of Greeks said corruption is widespread, the highest share in the EU. The EU Public Prosecutor’s Office is investigating an alleged fraud scheme involving hundreds of millions of euros in EU agricultural funds, and in June 2025 the EU fined Greece €392.2 million over mismanaged farm subsidies. Accountability is also weak: the constitution gives Parliament exclusive power to investigate ministers, and the prime minister has used his majority to block a full investigation. This is similar to what Levitsky and Ziblatt call “capturing the referees.” Elected leaders avoid accountability by controlling the institutions that are meant to check them. 
2. Predatorgate: Watching the Watchdogs Greece ranks last in the EU for press freedom, and the “Predatorgate” scandal involved government-ordered surveillance of journalists and politicians. In 2022, it was revealed that the National Intelligence Service (EYP) had monitored the phones of journalist Thanasis Koukakis and opposition leader Nikos Androulakis. Since 2019, this agency had been under the direct control of the prime ministers’ office. As a result, the head of EYP and Grigoris Dimitriadis, the prime minister’s nephew and chief of staff, resigned. 

Dahl names freedom of expression and alternative sources of information among the institutional foundations of polyarchy, so pressure on journalists weakens a core condition of democracy itself. In July 2024, a Supreme Court prosecutor cleared state agencies of responsibility despite evidence of state involvement, and two suspects in the 2021 murder of journalist Giorgos Karaivaz were acquitted. This pattern matches what Bermeo calls “executive aggrandizement.” Elected governments do not destroy democracy at once, but gradually weaken the media and institutions that check them.

3. Migrants: Rights Without Votes. Freedom House scores equal treatment of population groups at just 2 out of 4. HRW documents pushbacks of asylum seekers, overcrowded detention, and inadequate reception conditions, and the European Court of Human Rights ruled that conditions at the Samos hotspot breached the prohibition of ill-treatment. In the 2023 Pylos shipwreck, which killed hundreds, the Coast Guard is accused of inadequate rescue efforts, yet the investigation has been slow. Such problems fall outside Dahl’s procedural conditions, which concern citizens’ participation, and become visible only through a rights-based, liberal view of democracy. Carreras and colleagues argue that parties and the media cover immigration negatively during campaigns, so anti-immigration attitudes grow stronger as elections approach. In other words, free elections do not protect migrants who cannot vote.
   

Is Greece Still Working? The Case for Correction

It would be unfair to say Greece’s high score has no basis. Freedom House awards Greece full marks for its electoral process, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of NGOs and trade unions, and describes civil liberties as largely upheld. These strengths correspond to what scholars call “electoral democracy,” defined by rules and procedures as in Dahl’s model, while the problems above concern the “liberal” dimension of rights. Greek institutions have also delivered real corrections. In 2024, the country’s highest court ruled unconstitutional a 2021 amendment that kept people from learning they were under state surveillance, and a court dismissed a defamation suit against journalists who exposed the Predator spyware scandal. Sixteen aid workers were acquitted of espionage charges, charges against 35 activists were dropped, and 17 people were convicted for a 2018 racist attack on migrants. Greece also legalized same-sex marriage in February 2024. Outside pressure works too: the EU has fined Greece over subsidy fraud and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is investigating the case.

However, these examples support rather than weaken the argument. Many of the acquitted aid workers had faced years of legal proceedings for rescuing migrants, and several corrections came only from European courts. In other words, the courts repair damage that state actions caused in the first place, and a high score can coexist with the problems described above. This matches Lührmann and Lindberg’s study. Today, democratic backsliding usually happens gradually, led by elected leaders through legal means, so it is hard to notice. 

Reading Beyond the Score

Greece’s 85 out of 100 on Freedom House’s index is real: elections are free, parties compete, and civil society can organize. But the case shows that a single number can hide serious weaknesses. The same report gives Greece only 2 out of 4 on corruption, transparency, and equal treatment, and Human Rights Watch documents surveillance of journalists, pushbacks of asylum seekers, and poor conditions for migrants. Courts and European institutions have corrected some of these problems, yet the problems themselves came from state actions. The theories in this post show the same pattern: elected leaders capture the referees (Levitsky and Ziblatt), gradually weaken the media (Bermeo), and do so through means that look legal, so the backsliding is hard to notice (Lührmann and Lindberg). Greece’s democracy has not collapsed, but it is important not to ignore these early warning signs. 

Greece meets the procedural tests of electoral democracy but falls short on the rights dimension of liberal democracy, so a democracy’s health cannot be judged by its total score alone. To understand it, we have to look at the sub-scores and at what human rights organizations report on the ground.