On May 29 2024, South Africa held it’s seventh democratic general elections. The results shook the country’s political landscape. The African National Congress (ANC), which had dominated and governed South Africa with a parliamentary majority since 1994, faced a heavy defeat. The party won just 40.2 percent of the national vote, far below the targeted 45% and a loss of almost 20% compared to 2019. For the first time since 1994, the ANC could not govern alone. But what does this mean for South Africa and it’s democratic state? At first glance this looks like an uncomplicated success. After all, a dominant governing party lost support. Instead of maintaining power through its own majority, the ANC entered the GNU (Government of National Unity) that includes 10 parties. The political landscape of South Africa had clearly become more competitive. Yet, as political analyst Salih O Noor argues, coalition politics presents both opportunities for democratic cooperation and risks of political instability. Greater competition, therefore does not automatically guarantee a healthier democracy. But does this increase automatically lead to a healthier democracy? The real question lies in both what the elections changed, and did not. Rather than representing either straightforward democratic progress or clear democratic backsliding, South Africa appears to be a case in which democratic institutions remain relatively resilient while confidence in the democratic system they sustain is under strain. Adam Przeworski’s distinction between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy provides a useful starting point for understanding this. At it’s most basic level, democracy is a system in which citizens are free to choose who governs them. But even this seemingly simple definition requires more than simply holding elections. Genuine competition depends on civil and political rights, neutral electoral institutions, and a predictable rule of law that allows citizens and opposition parties to participate meaningfully. But it can be agreed that democracy is rarely, and shouldn’t be judged only in this minimalist sense. Przeworski points out that people often expect democracy to produce much more than competitive elections. They associate it with representation, accountability, equality, justice, and a decent government. This creates an important distinction. A country can have functioning electoral competition while citizens remain dissatisfied with what the democratic government actually delivers. From a minimalist perspective the 2024 election provides important evidence of democratic resilience. It therefore demonstrated that incumbency did not make the ruling party electorally untouchable. Through Przeworski’s framework, the 2024 election can be understood as a success of democratic competition without necessarily being a success of democratic governance. South Africans demonstrated that they could hold a dominant party electorally accountable, but this did not automatically resolve the economic and political frustrations that had weakened their confidence in democracy. Broader assessments of South African democracy also complicate the idea that the country is experiencing a straightforward institutional collapse. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment continues to classify South Africa as ‘Free’, with a score of 81 out of 100. However at the same time, it continues to identify corruption and weaknesses in state institutions as significant problems. International IDEA similarly treats South Africa’s democratic performance as multidimensional rather than uniformly declining, assessing the country across Representation, Rights, Rule of Law, and Participation. Most importantly, the 2024 election itself provides evidence of continuing institutional contestability. That does not mean South Africa is immune from future democratic erosion. But they do indicate that meaningful electoral competition and important democratic institutions continue to work. Public opinion, on the other hand presents a more complicated picture. A survey was conducted with South Africans shortly before and after the 2024 election. Before the election, only 45% respondents said democracy was preferable to any other political system. Afterward, that figure rose to 55%. Satisfaction with democracy increased even more dramatically by 23% overall. For a moment, it seemed that democratic confidence was restored. But the optimism proved fragile. The longer term trend showed the numbers decreasing. Support for democracy had decreased from 72%in 2011 to below half in 2025. Only 14% of respondents expressed what was called ‘full demand for democracy’. This is where the paradox becomes visible. Citizens successfully managed to weaken a dominant governing party, yet many remained unconvinced to express unconditional support for democracy itself. At the same time, support for particular democratic procedures remains stronger than general support for democracy as a political system. Elections and multiparty competition continue to receive majority support even though fewer than half of citizens now view democracy as preferable to every alternative. These findings show a gap between support for specific democratic procedures and commitment to democratic rule. Does this mean that South Africa is experiencing democratic backsliding? This is where this term needs to be used carefully. Nancy Bermeo defines democratic backsliding at its most basic level as the weakening or elimination of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy. She also warns that the concept is extremely broad and becomes analytically weak unless we specify what institutions are being weakened, how, and by whom. In this perspective, declining public support for democracy is concerning, but by itself it is not enough evidence of democratic backsliding. Public dissatisfaction and institutional erosion are related but analytically different phenomena. This does not mean South Africa is immune from future democratic erosion. Bermeo’s central warning is precisely that modern democracies often erode incrementally rather than collapse suddenly. Institutions can be dismantled piece by piece rather than destroyed in a single dramatic event. But it does mean that calling South Africa simply a case of democratic backsliding misses something important. South Africa’s democratic institutions currently appear more resilient than public commitment to the democratic system they sustain. That is a much more complicated and sharp problem than simple dissatisfaction with the government. Citizens can dislike unemployment, corruption or poor public services without rejecting democracy. In fact, dissatisfaction is part of democratic politics. Therefore the main question surrounds what South Africans are willing to give up in exchange for a government they believe will perform better. That distinction changes how we should interpret South Africa’s recent public opinion data. South Africa’s post 2024 trajectory therefore remains open. The end of the ANC’s parliamentary majority should not automatically be read as proof of democratic improvement, just as declining public confidence should not be treated as evidence that democratic erosion is already underway. The country currently contains elements of both resilience and vulnerability. What matters now is how South Africa responds to this whole tension. Greater competition may strengthen democracy, but only if it is accompanied by factors such as independent institutions, political actors who continue to accept democratic constraints, and a public open to democratic participation. At the same time, the country cannot assume that its existing institutions will protect themselves indefinitely. The 2024 election is therefore best understood as a turning point that leaves us with important questions shaping South Africa’s democratic future.