When we think about democracy, we usually think about elections. People vote, a party wins, and the government is supposed to represent the people. But what if a country keeps holding elections while the rules become less fair? Hungary made me think about this question differently. My argument is that Hungary shows how democracy can become weaker without elections disappearing. Since 2010, changes to political institutions, the media, and electoral competition have made it harder to challenge the ruling party. The problem is not simply whether people can vote. It is whether their votes can lead to a real change in power.
What Changed After 2010?
Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party returned to power in 2010. Since then, the government has made constitutional and legal changes that increased its influence over institutions that should be able to act independently. Freedom House describes these changes and the problems they have created for political rights and civil liberties. Hungary still has opposition parties and elections, so it would be wrong to say there is no political competition at all. Still, elections can exist even when one side has a major advantage.
Nancy Bermeo’s article, On Democratic Backsliding, helped me understand why this matters. Bermeo explains that democracy today often becomes weaker through gradual actions by elected leaders rather than through a sudden military takeover. She calls one process executive aggrandizement, when leaders weaken institutions that are supposed to limit their power. This idea fits the changes in Hungary. A government can use laws and constitutional reforms to gain more control, even while presenting those changes as normal political decisions. I think this makes backsliding harder to recognize, because each individual change might not look dramatic on its own.
When Elections Are Not Enough
Another problem is how elections translate votes into political power. International IDEA explains that Hungary’s electoral system can help turn a plurality of votes into a large parliamentary majority. A big majority then makes it easier for the ruling party to change laws and institutions. This creates a difficult cycle: winning elections gives a party the power to change the rules, and those new rules can make it harder for opponents to compete later.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way discuss a related idea in their article on competitive authoritarianism. They explain that opposition parties can still compete in elections even when the government uses its advantages to make competition unfair. I do not think we should use this term as a shortcut that answers every question about Hungary. But it is useful for asking whether the opposition has a realistic chance of winning, not just whether its name appears on a ballot. In Hungary, the existence of elections does not by itself prove that the political playing field is equal.
Andreas Schedler also argues that elections can be manipulated in ways that go beyond changing the vote count on election day. His work made me think about the conditions before people vote. Can voters hear different opinions? Can opposition parties reach the public? Are the rules applied fairly? If these conditions are weak, an election can look normal while giving voters fewer meaningful choices. That is why I think we should pay attention to the whole election process, not only the final results.
Why the Media Matters
The media is one of the clearest examples of this problem. People need information from different sources to decide whether they support the government. Freedom House raises concerns about government influence over media and pressure on independent journalists in Hungary. This does not mean that every news outlet supports Fidesz or that independent journalism has disappeared. But unequal access to information can still make a difference, especially during an election.
For example, imagine that voters regularly hear positive stories about the government but rarely hear detailed arguments from the opposition. They can still cast a ballot, but they may not have the same opportunity to compare political choices. Schedler’s argument about the conditions of a meaningful election is helpful here. Fair competition depends partly on whether different political groups can communicate with voters. To me, media freedom is not a separate issue from elections. It helps determine how meaningful those elections actually are.
The Rule of Law and Independent Institutions
The rule of law is another important part of Hungary’s case. International IDEA looks at democracy through several areas, including representation, rights, rule of law, and participation. Its Hungary profile reports a decline in rule of law between 2019 and 2024. It also raises concerns about institutions such as the Constitutional Court. These issues matter because elections cannot protect democracy on their own if there are few effective limits on what elected leaders can do.
A court, for example, should be able to review government decisions without simply following the ruling party. If institutions become less independent, people may have fewer ways to challenge government actions between elections. This connects back to Bermeo’s idea of executive aggrandizement. Democratic backsliding can happen when checks on power are weakened one at a time. It is not just about one leader staying in office. It is also about what happens to the institutions that are supposed to hold that leader accountable.
What the Democracy Data Shows
Different organizations measure Hungary’s political changes in different ways. Freedom House focuses on political rights and civil liberties. International IDEA separates democracy into several dimensions. V-Dem uses a wider range of indicators, including elections, media, political rights, and the judiciary. In its 2026 Democracy Report, V-Dem identifies Hungary as a leading example of a country that has experienced a long period of autocratization.
These measurements do not use exactly the same definitions, so I would not treat them as interchangeable. Still, they point to a similar concern: important democratic protections have weakened over time. The value of looking at several sources is that they help us see more than one part of the problem. A country might continue holding elections while its courts, media environment, and political competition change in ways that are less visible.
Why Hungary Matters
Before looking at Hungary, I mostly imagined democratic backsliding as something obvious. I thought it would mean elections being canceled or a government suddenly becoming a dictatorship. Now I think the harder cases are the ones where democratic institutions remain in place but do not work as fairly as they should. Hungary is especially important because the changes have happened over years, through decisions that can appear legal and ordinary.
The main lesson for me is that democracy needs more than voting. It needs a real chance for opposition parties to compete, independent media that can question the government, and institutions that can limit political power. Hungary still has political participation and opposition voices, which is important to acknowledge. But those facts do not erase concerns about whether the system is fair. Instead of only asking, “Does Hungary hold elections?” we should also ask, “How much real choice do those elections give people?” That question gets closer to what democratic backsliding actually means.
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