Moldova is an interesting case of a country stuck between two major orientations. It has been tied with Moscow for centuries, getting colonized by the Russian Empire, and being a part of the Soviet Union up to 1991. Even after its independence, Moldova continued to be heavily influenced by the Russian Federation. This influence combined with the effort to integrate into the European Union demonstrates the result of being located between the East and the West. This tension has been a massively critical factor in Moldovan politics in recent decades. As a result, Moldovan elections have effectively become state-scale races between Domestic and Foreign interests. The parliamentary election that took place in 2025 shows us how Moldovan democratic institutions demonstrated democratic resilience in times of significant foreign pressure. 

Although Moldova has maintained various democratic institutions since its independence from the Soviet Union, the quality and stability of democracy in Moldova are considered uneven by various international institutions.  According to V-Dem, the liberal democracy index hasn’t been stable, continuing to repeatedly rise and fall to this day. According to IDEA, the Republic of Moldova is in the top 25 percent regarding performance in political equality, and has advanced significantly regarding Political Equality, Absence of Corruption, and Judicial Independence. However, IDEA also emphasized that Moldova has been struggling to abolish corruption, abuse of power, and state capture. Lastly, Freedom House rated the freedom of Moldova at 60 out of 100, classifying it as partly free. Functioning of Government and Rule of law received particularly low scores. With these unsolved institutional weaknesses, Moldova entered the 2025 election season, putting its democratic resilience to the test. 

The parliamentary election was held on September 28th, 2025. This election demonstrated the importance of the choice between Russia and Europe in contemporary Moldovan politics. The Pro-EU faction was represented by the Party of Action and Solidarity, or PAS, that was closely associated with president Maia Sandu. They had won the prior election in 2021 and had been playing a critical role in the pro-western trajectory of Moldova with the strong parliamentary majority. By the time of the 2025 election, the PAS government had initiated the procedures for the integration into the EU and had received candidate status in 2022, along with formally starting accession negotiations in 2024. However, during Maia Sandu’s first term, Moldova had to suffer from inflation, high living costs, and high poverty rates, increasing fears of the formation of a Pro-Russian parliament that would likely oppose most relations with the EU. Meanwhile, the Pro-Russian faction was represented by the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, or BEP. It was led by Igor Dodon, the former pro-Russian president of Moldova. 

Ultimately, the results did not favor BEP. PAS won with 50.1% of the vote, retaining their position as the majority despite decreasing seats to 55 from the 63 out of 101 that they acquired in 2021. However, the decrease in support for PAS didn’t lead to a dramatic result for BEP. BEP won 24.2% of the vote, receiving 26 seats. Although the numbers show a victory by PAS, the election was littered with allegations regarding Russian interference, such as disinformation, vote–buying, and cyber-attacks. 

According to OSCE, organizations that were funded by foreign sources conducted vote–buying schemes and disinformation campaigns. Vast networks of social media accounts spread manipulative narratives on social media platforms by using AI–generated videos, troll farms, and automated bots. There were also multiple cyberattacks that were targeted at Moldovan election authorities. Most of these attacks were concentrated within the few days before and during the actual election. An important example of Russian intervention was conducted through the Moldovan Orthodox community. According to Reuters, multiple members of the Orthodox church took free trips to Russia. Some of them were expected to warn Moldovans about the risks of integrating into the EU after being given bank cards from Russia. Another hint of influence was that Russian operatives were deeply involved in Orthodox church telegram channels.  

Dahl’s concept of polyarchy shows why this situation matters. Elections are not the only source of democracy. Effective political contestation and access to alternative sources of information are also significant elements. The influence of Russia is a threat to this condition since it alters the information that is available to people. Therefore, these tactics are highly significant since they are more than capable of distorting the basis that voters use to make political decisions. It is the equivalent of weakening the foundation of a building instead of weakening the building itself. Thus, disinformation can significantly affect elections even when elections remain competitive, and real political alternatives do exist.  

Political polarization might have been another important factor around the 2025 election. Although this blog is focused on the recent election, political polarization has existed for decades in Moldova.  However, the polarization between pro-EU and pro-Russian groups that had existed in Moldova formed a basis that foreign disinformation was able to exploit. Foreign attempts to spread misinformation could have appealed to pre-existing disagreements such as international relations and traditional values. Thus, foreign interference is closely related to domestic politics, emphasizing that political polarization could weaken a country’s resistance against interference by increasing gaps that could be exploited. 

Disinformation, vote–buying, cyberattacks, and polarization are all factors that put Moldova’s democratic process at risk. Dahl demonstrated how the landscape of the information around elections is deeply intertwined with democracy itself. However, despite these threats, the election remained competitive and offered alternative choices for voters. Additionally, supported by the Moldovan government’s endeavors to take proactive measures, the election process was smooth and there were no significant disruptions. These endeavors included conducting 844 searches, blocking host.md as an anti-cyberattack measure, and removing candidates who were accused of receiving or offering bribes. This raises the question of whether the presence of functional elections indicates the proper functioning of democracy, which can be explained with the arguments of Schmitter & Karl. They suggested that elections should be examined by being combined with broader processes regarding democracy. Thus, a functioning election is not an inherent indicator of a functioning democracy, and Moldova’s single day of peaceful election is a single detail on a list of indicators. However, the erosion of democracy does not necessarily mean the breakdown of that democracy. As previously mentioned, despite the various kinds of foreign influence, the functionality of electoral institutions maintained a level that resulted in a smooth electoral process on election day. A simple and analytical summary of the 2025 election would be that Moldova saw significant pressure against its democracy and successfully demonstrated democratic resilience in response.  

The 2025 parliamentary election in Moldova indicates that democratic resilience isn’t achieved by simply holding an election and requires the ability to absorb and advance through impacts. Actively maintaining and strengthening the structural robustness of the democratic system that the election stands on is just as significant as the election itself.