Introduction

What if a country could still hold elections and call itself a democracy while its political system was becoming increasingly unequal?

Serbia still holds elections, but that does not mean that its political system works on equal terms. The country holds multiparty elections, has opposition parties, and operates under a parliamentary system. Yet these features do not tell the whole story. Over time, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has gained greater influence over the media, elections, and its political opponents. I argue that Serbia’s democratic backsliding has occurred not through the disappearance of democratic institutions, but through the SNS’s growing ability to make political competition increasingly unequal across elections, media, and digital platforms.

The interesting part is that these institutions have not disappeared. People can still vote, opposition parties can still campaign, and citizens can still participate in political life. The problem is the unequal environment in which these activities take place. The ruling party has advantages that its opponents do not have, particularly in access to media and public resources. The central issue, then, is not whether Serbia still has democratic institutions, but whether those institutions still provide meaningful and equal political competition.

Unequal Conditions in Serbian Elections

Freedom House currently rates Serbia as “Partly Free.” Its reports describe pressure on opposition groups, independent media, and civil society. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report places Serbia in the “Transitional or Hybrid Regime” category as well. The two assessments use different methods, but they raise similar concerns about political rights, civil liberties, and the conditions under which political institutions operate.

The 2023 parliamentary election is one example. Freedom House found that the election was held in an unequal environment. Progovernment groups had greater access to the media, public-sector employees faced pressure, and administrative resources were used in ways that favored the ruling side. President Aleksandar Vučić was also highly visible during the campaign. His role made the distinction between the government and the ruling party less clear. Freedom House also reports that the SNS has built influence over private media through public funding and state-affiliated companies. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights reached a similar conclusion in its observation of the election. It found that the ruling party’s systemic advantages, media bias, pressure on public-sector employees, and misuse of public resources created unjust conditions for contestants.

An election can therefore exist without giving all political groups the same opportunity to compete. Opposition parties are still allowed to participate, but reaching voters becomes more difficult when one side has much greater access to media and public resources. The problem is not simply whether people are allowed to vote. It is also the environment in which they make their choices.

V-Dem’s Democracy Report 2026 presents a similar concern from a different perspective. The report classifies Serbia as an electoral autocracy and describes a long period of democratic decline. According to V-Dem, Serbia was considered a liberal democracy when its process of autocratization began and had moved into the electoral autocracy category by 2014. The report also argues that Vučić and the SNS have weakened the integrity of elections to the point that V-Dem no longer considers them free and fair.

This pattern reflects the gradual form of autocratization discussed by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019). Their argument helps explain Serbia’s case because democratic institutions have remained formally in place while the conditions surrounding political competition have gradually become less equal. This does not mean that elections have disappeared in Serbia. What has changed is the political environment surrounding them. A country can therefore keep its elections and other democratic institutions while gradually changing how those institutions actually work.

How Political Influence Spreads Online

The media environment adds another part to the problem. Freedom House reports that the state and the ruling party have used advertising contracts and indirect financial support to influence private media. Some of these outlets are owned by people who support the SNS. Journalists working for independent media have also experienced intimidation, professional pressure, and harassment. Independent outlets face intense economic squeezing and regulatory hurdles that distort the public sphere. As a Reuters Institute report points out, these challenges go beyond sporadic harassment, operating instead as a systematic strategy to limit citizens’ access to pluralistic information before elections. When financial and administrative pressures restrict independent funding, critical reporting becomes harder to sustain, leaving the media landscape heavily skewed.

The same political influence can be seen online. In a 2024 investigation, BBC News examined thousands of social media accounts connected to the SNS. The investigation found coordinated activity designed to promote Vučić and the ruling party while attacking political opponents. The BBC also spoke with people who had taken part in these campaigns. One interviewee described participating in online harassment of political opponents while working for a state-controlled organization. This provides a more direct example of how political activity and state-linked employment can overlap in online spaces.

It is tempting to describe these networks simply as a “bot army,” but the BBC investigation shows that the situation is not quite that simple. Many of the accounts were run by actual people rather than being completely automated. What mattered was the way they worked together. If many accounts post similar messages at the same time, the activity can make a particular political position seem more popular than it really is.

This is also supported by Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2023 report, which notes that Meta removed more than 5,000 accounts connected to the SNS for coordinated inauthentic behavior. The network was found to support Vučić and criticize the political opposition, and Meta linked it to SNS employees and some Serbian state employees.

Online manipulation can therefore affect political discussion without removing every opposing opinion. Critical voices can remain online but become much harder to see when they are surrounded by coordinated posts and harassment.

This online activity also connects to the problems found in traditional media. Television and other major media outlets can influence which issues receive attention in the first place. Social media campaigns can then shape the discussion around those issues. This matters for democracy because political competition depends not only on the formal right to speak, but also on whether citizens can make political choices in an information environment that is not systematically distorted in favor of one side.

Conclusion

Serbia’s experience shows that democratic backsliding does not have to begin with the disappearance of elections or the formal institutions of government. Those institutions can remain in place while the conditions around them change. In Serbia, the SNS’s influence over media, political competition, and online communication has contributed to a political environment in which opposition groups face significant disadvantages.

The sources used in this case study show different sides of that process. Freedom House focuses on political rights, civil liberties, elections, and the media environment. V-Dem places Serbia’s recent history within a longer process of autocratization and classifies it as an electoral autocracy. The BBC investigation looks more closely at what happens online, showing how coordinated social media networks can be used to promote the ruling party and attack its opponents.

For this reason, looking only at whether a country holds elections is not enough to understand its democratic condition. It is also necessary to look at how fairly political groups can compete, how independently institutions and watchdogs can operate, and what kind of environment citizens face when they participate in political discussion. Serbia shows that democratic institutions can remain formally intact while the conditions that make those institutions meaningful become increasingly unequal.