If an active-duty military officer works inside a civilian government agency, who is really in charge of that officer? The civilian agency, or the military that the officer still belongs to?

Indonesia made that question much more important in 2025. In March, Indonesia changed the law that governs its armed forces, known as the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). The new law allows active-duty military officers to work in 14 civilian ministries and government agencies without first leaving the military.

At first, this may sound like a small change in government hiring rules. But Indonesia has a history that makes it much more important. For decades under President Suharto, the military didn’t only defend the country. It also played a major role in politics and civilian government. After Suharto fell in 1998, one important part of Indonesia’s democratic reform was reducing the military’s political role and putting civilian leaders more clearly in control. A Journal of Democracy analysis describes removing the military from politics as an urgent goal after Suharto.

That history is what makes the 2025 TNI Law important. The law weakens the line between the military and civilian government that Indonesia built after Suharto by allowing active-duty officers to work in more civilian institutions. Whether this leads to democratic backsliding depends on whether civilian agencies still have clear authority to supervise, discipline, and remove those officers. That doesn’t mean Indonesia has suddenly become a military government. Elections still happen. Parliament still exists and civilian leaders still run the country. But democracy is not only about elections. It is also about who has power between elections and who can control powerful institutions such as the military.

This is where the idea of democratic backsliding becomes useful. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo describes democratic backsliding as the weakening of political institutions that support an existing democracy. She also explains that modern democratic decline does not always happen through a coup. It can happen through smaller legal and institutional changes while elections and parliaments continue to exist.

The TNI Law is important for exactly this reason. Seen through Bermeo’s framework, the concern is not that Indonesia’s democracy suddenly disappeared, but that a legal change may gradually weaken one of the institutions that helps keep military power under civilian control. It didn’t remove elections. Instead, it changed the rules about where active-duty military officers can work. Before the new law, military officers could serve in a more limited number of civilian positions. The 2025 amendments expanded those opportunities to 14 civilian ministries and agencies. These include areas related to intelligence, cybersecurity, disaster management, counterterrorism, maritime security, border management, and the Attorney General’s Office.

Why does that matter?

Because an active-duty officer is still part of the military. A retired officer who takes a civilian government job has already left the military chain of command. An active-duty officer has not. That creates an important question about responsibility: Who gives the final order, evaluates the officer, and has the power to discipline or remove that person? 

In a democracy, civilian control means that elected leaders and civilian government institutions should have the final authority over the military. This includes the power to set policy, supervise military personnel working in civilian agencies, evaluate their performance, and remove or discipline them when necessary. The concern is not that every officer working in a civilian agency will ignore civilian leaders. There is no evidence for such a broad claim. The concern is about whether the system clearly keeps civilian institutions in control as more active-duty officers enter them. 

The TNI Law also didn’t appear by itself. In February 2025, President Prabowo Subianto appointed a serving general to lead Indonesia’s state food procurement company. International IDEA reported that this was the first time since the Suharto period that a serving general had held such a position. The organization described it as part of a wider trend of using the military in civilian government projects. One month later, parliament passed the TNI amendments. The appointment doesn’t prove that the TNI Law was designed to militarize civilian government. Together, the two developments suggest that the military may be taking a larger role in civilian government. This raises a larger question: Is Indonesia gradually bringing the military back into areas of government that were supposed to become more civilian after 1998? 

Many Indonesians were worried about exactly that. When parliament passed the law, hundreds of students and activists protested outside the building. Critics said the changes could weaken civilian control and bring back practices connected to the Suharto era.

The government disagrees. Supporters of the law argue that the military needs a larger role because modern security problems are more complicated. They point to threats such as cyber warfare, terrorism, and other military and non-military security threats. The law also doesn’t allow active-duty officers to take every civilian job. Their positions are limited to specific institutions.

This is an important counterargument. If active-duty officers can work only in a limited number of agencies, and civilian officials still fully control them, then the law may have a smaller effect on democracy than critics fear. If civilian agencies can clearly give orders to these officers, discipline them, remove them when necessary, and hold them accountable under civilian law, then the claim that civilian control has seriously weakened becomes less convincing. 

But if military appointments continue to expand and civilian agencies struggle to control those officers, then the argument becomes stronger.

Broader democracy reports help explain why this issue matters. Freedom House gives Indonesia a score of 56 out of 100 in its 2026 report and labels the country “Partly Free.” At the same time, Indonesia receives full points for the indicators on whether the president and national legislature were chosen through free and fair elections. In other words, Freedom House sees elections as an important democratic strength while also identifying problems in other areas of political rights and civil liberties. This mixed picture supports Bermeo’s point that democratic backsliding doesn’t require elections to disappear. Indonesia can continue holding competitive elections while other democratic safeguards, including civilian control of the military, may come under pressure. 

The Human Rights Foundation’s Tyranny Tracker looks at more than elections. Its system examines electoral competition, freedom to criticize the government, and whether institutions can hold leaders accountable. HRF classifies Indonesia as “hybrid authoritarian”. However, that is HRF’s own assessment rather than a universally accepted label. More importantly for this issue, HRF specifically points to the expanding role of the military within civilian government as one concern. 

For Indonesia, that is important because reducing the military’s political role was a major part of the democratic reforms that followed Suharto. The question is whether civilian institutions remain clearly in control as active-duty military officers take larger roles inside government. If civilian control stays strong, concerns about deeper democratic erosion will be harder to support. So the real test for democracy is not just how many military officers work in civilian institutions, but whether civilian officials still have the power to direct, evaluate, discipline, and remove them when needed.

Indonesia spent years moving the military out of everyday politics. The 2025 TNI Law has started opening that door wider again.