First the father, then the brother-in-law and sister—and now the youngest daughter. The fourth prime minister from the Shinawatra family has been dismissed by the constitutional court. In August 2025, the youngest daughter of the Shinawatra family and the youngest ever prime minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra stepped down after a short term of about a year. The trigger for that impeachment was a leak of a call between her and Cambodia’s former leader Hun Sen, which contained details of Paetongtarn familiarly calling Hun Sen “uncle” and disparaging her own country’s military. Another Shinawatra prime minister was removed from the office even after the similar controversies repeated for about 20 years. Thaksin’s continued political influence reflects the ongoing struggle between political elites and mass-based political support, revealing how elite resistance and political loyalty can challenge democratic accountability in Thailand.
Thaksin Shinawatra started as an ordinary police officer, which was quite different from the traditional royalist elites. In 2001, after earning a lot from a telecommunication business, he ran for office with very unconventional, radically bold promises. He offered tangible benefits like the ‘30 Baht healthcare scheme’ and farm debt relief for the marginalized rural farmers from the north and Isan regions. According to Phongpaichit & Baker (2008), Thaksin’s populist policies responded to the needs and economic anxieties of Thailand’s massive informal population, which emerged under an outward-oriented development strategy. This population included people who had difficulty finding stable jobs and getting social benefits. Thaksin also launched a war on drugs that resulted in over 1,100 deaths in a single month. An eight-year-old boy also got killed in this process and provoked an outcry over the incident. Despite the international outrage over inhumane police killings, his strict stance on drug crime only solidified his image among his supporters as a strongman who got things done. Thaksin won the 2001 election with an absolute majority and was even re-elected thanks to his explosive support from the rural areas.
However, his glory days didn’t last long. Thaksin’s explosive support and his dominance over radical policies alienated Thailand’s traditional ruling class. Royalist elites, high-ranking military officers, and Bangkok’s conservative establishments were afraid that Thaksin’s populist policies might become a new threat to the authority of the royalty. This conflict reflects the influence of political elites, who seek to preserve their traditional power against a leader supported by mass voters. Their use of military intervention and judicial decisions raises questions about whether political institutions were used to protect democratic accountability or to maintain existing power structures. Eventually, in 2006, a military coup took place while Thaksin was on his overseas trip. Thaksin was removed from his power and faced corruption charges and prison sentences. Phongpaichit & Baker (2008) also explains that Thaksin’s populist policies increased opposition among the urban middle class, contributing to the outbreak of the 2006 military coup. Despite the fact that Thaksin faced numerous corruption allegations and serious political controversies and his own commitment to democracy was questionable, the coup prevented voters from determining his government’s political future through democratic means. Thaksin fled abroad for about 15 years to avoid the charges, and this incident triggered the war between the pro-Thaksin populists and royalist conservatives.
Although Thaksin himself couldn’t lay a foot on Thailand, his influence on Thai politics never disappeared. He led campaigns behind his political proxies and renamed political parties. In 2008, his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat was elected as prime minister and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra in 2011. They served as Thaksin’s avatar, securing Thaksin’s political standing and continued the Shinawatra Family’s political influence. Despite the Shinawatra family’s continued triumphs, the conservative establishment relentlessly pressured them. The Constitutional Court repeatedly dissolved Thaksin-aligned parties, and another military coup in 2014 eliminated Yingluck. According to Thompson (2021), opposition movements in Thailand grew stronger as the military and monarchy struggled to present recent elections as democratic while the legitimacy of the monarchy has declined. These developments encouraged the growth of political parties, public protests and critical social media activities.
The current political situation in Thailand shows the struggle over democratic power is still ongoing. In the February 2026 general election, the Bhumjaithai Party, a conservative party associated with military aligned political networks, won the largest number of seats with 192, followed by the People’s Party with 120 and Pheu Thai with 74 seats. In the same month, 60.2% of the voters supported the drafting a new constitution as a replacement of 2017 constitution introduced under military force. These electoral results show that elections and public participation remain as an important part in Thai democracy, while demands for constitutional change continue. However, democratic reform is still a challenge in Thai politics. In August 2026, even though a political amnesty law came into force and around 6000 could benefit from this law, it excluded offences related to insults about the monarchy, leaving some pro-democratic activists unable to benefit from the law. Although Thailand continues to take actions for democratic reform and hold elections, limits over the political expression and the power of established institutions remain challenges to democratic accountability.
The endless rivalry between the conservative and the pro-Thaksin forces entered a new phase with the rise of a new force, the People’s Party. The king and the conservatives became alarmed by the People’s Party, which gained huge support from the younger generation while pushing to reform the royal insult law and the military. As a result, they formed an alliance with their oldest enemy, Thaksin. Thaksin ended his 15-year exile and returned home, with his eight-year prison sentence being reduced to one year through a royal pardon. He placed his youngest daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, as Prime Minister and even showed up at her ceremony. Even though she had to step down after only one year over a leaked phone call, Thaksin’s political influence remained significant. The conservative Bhumjaithai Party won the most seats from the parliament with the help of Thaksin’s supporters.
This alliance shows that struggle in Thai politics is more complicated than a conflict between democratic and anti-democratic forces. Thaksin, who once challenged the traditional political establishment, later cooperated with the conservative forces that have opposed him for years. This suggests that political parties these days may easily change their alliances when their interests change. If political leaders can change their alliances to protect their political power, how could the voters trust them to take democratic responsibility? The continued influence of the monarchy, the military force and the established political networks also raises questions whether winning elections connects to the full control over political decisions. Thailand’s democratic struggle is therefore not only about which party wins an election, but also about whether the elected leaders are free under the political pressure from the powerful forces and whether the voters’ voices are being heard.
Thaksin Shinawatra’s career shows that Thailand’s struggle for democracy goes beyond elections alone. Even though support from the working-class and rural voters has been helping him and his networks survive repeated challenges, alliances among powerful political forces played an important role in shaping Thailand’s political future. Ultimately, democratic accountability remains a challenge whether voters’ rights are respected and elected leaders can exercise their power without undue pressure from established institutions.

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