If citizens remove an authoritarian-leaning government through the democratic process of voting, is that the start of democratic recovery? If your answer is “yes,” Zambia might make you think again.

Zambia shows that winning democracy back at the ballot box is easier than building institutions strong enough to protect it afterward.

Under the government of Edgar Lungu, Zambia’s democracy had already been weakening. According to V-Dem data presented by Our World in Data, Zambia’s Liberal Democracy Index fell from about 0.37 in 2015 to 0.27 in 2020. This shows that democratic backsliding was already happening during Lungu’s presidency. However, in the 2021 presidential election, opposition candidate Hakainde Hichilema defeated Lungu, and the transfer of power happened peacefully. After Hichilema came to power, Zambia’s Liberal Democracy Index started to rise again. But this recovery did not last for long. After reaching its highest score in 2022, the index started to fall again through 2025.

The reason Zambia is interesting is that it shows that democratic recovery does not always keep moving in a positive direction. An election can bring democracy back quite quickly, but keeping that recovery is a different problem. Zambia’s case shows that replacing a government through elections can be easier than building institutions that stop the next government from using the same repressive tools again.

Also, Zambia’s democratic problems did not suddenly begin with Hichilema. Democratic backsliding had already been happening under Edgar Lungu and the Patriotic Front (PF). The Lungu government restricted political freedom by limiting assemblies and arresting opposition politicians. The Carnegie Endowment also explains that political competition, civil society, and press freedom had all become weaker during this period.

But even during that time, the opposition and civil society did not disappear.

Danielle Resnick argues in How Zambia’s Opposition Won that the resilience of Zambia’s civil society was one of the important reasons behind Hichilema’s victory in 2021. This mattered because the election was far from being an even contest. The Carter Center described the election environment as an “unlevel playing field,” noting that the opposition UPND faced restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly and that the Public Order Act and COVID-19 regulations were not applied equally. Even with these disadvantages, the opposition remained organized, and civil society still had independent networks that could monitor the election.

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) is a clear example. In 2021, CCMG deployed hundreds of observers across the country and used a Parallel Vote Tabulation to independently verify the presidential results. It found that the official results accurately reflected the vote count it observed. This is important because it shows that even though the Lungu government had weakened democratic competition, it had not completely destroyed the actors that supported democracy. The opposition was still organized, and civil society was still able to monitor the election. These conditions helped make Hichilema’s victory and the peaceful transfer of power possible in 2021.

Hichilema’s presidency initially brought real democratic changes. In 2022, his government abolished the presidential defamation law, which had been used against political critics. Some radio and television stations that had been shut down under the previous government were also allowed to reopen. The Supreme Court also ruled that the closure of The Post, an opposition-leaning newspaper, had been illegal. By the end of 2023, the Access to Information Act had also been enacted, giving citizens more access to government information.

These changes help explain why Zambia’s Liberal Democracy Index rose after 2021. The recovery was not just about changing the president. Space for media activity and criticism of the government also expanded. As Schmitter and Karl argue in What Democracy Is…and Is Not, democracy depends on more than elections. Citizens also need to be able to organize, speak freely, and participate in politics. In this sense, the early changes under Hichilema were not only a change of government. They were part of a real democratic recovery.

But the recovery did not last.

Hichilema had promised to reform the Public Order Act, but the law continued to be used to restrict opposition rallies. In 2023, police blocked several opposition gatherings and arrested opposition leaders and supporters during a protest. These restrictions also started to affect political competition. In its 2025 report on Zambia, Freedom House lowered Zambia’s score for whether opposition parties had a realistic chance to gain support or win power from 3 to 2. One reason was the selective restriction of opposition activities. Elections were still taking place, but the space for opposition parties to meet voters and gain support was becoming smaller.

Freedom of expression was also still a problem. Even though the presidential defamation law had been repealed, opposition figures were still arrested after criticizing the government. Laws such as the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act also continued to raise concerns about online speech. So, one repressive law disappeared, but other legal tools that could be used to restrict criticism were still there.

This is where Zambia connects closely to Nancy Bermeo’s argument in On Democratic Backsliding. Bermeo explains that democratic backsliding does not always happen through a coup or the cancellation of elections. It can also happen gradually, especially when opposition groups face pressure and political competition becomes less equal before election day. Zambia shows this clearly. Elections continued, and opposition parties still existed, but their ability to organize, hold rallies, and reach voters became more limited.

At the same time, it would also be wrong to say that Zambia simply became a full authoritarian country again. Freedom House still classified Zambia as “Partly Free,” and multiparty elections and some civil liberties remained. However, barriers to fair opposition competition and restrictions on political expression were still there. This means that Zambia’s democracy did not suddenly collapse. Instead, some democratic gains remained, while others started to weaken again.

Therefore, it is not contradictory that Zambia’s Liberal Democracy Index rose and then fell. The 2021 election brought a real change of government, and Hichilema’s early reforms also created meaningful change. However, changing the government and building strong democratic institutions were not the same thing. If the laws and political tools used by the previous government to restrict political competition are not fully reformed, the new government can also use the same tools later.

Ultimately, the more important question in Zambia is not simply who becomes president. It is how much the system can limit the power of the president who wins an election. Can opposition parties organize freely between elections? Can citizens and journalists criticize the government? Can the same democratic rules continue to apply even when power changes hands? These questions matter more for whether democratic recovery can actually last.

Zambia’s experience shows that restoring democracy and protecting democracy are different challenges. Voters can replace a backsliding government through one election. But building institutions strong enough to limit whoever wins the next election is much harder.

Zambia shows that democracy can be restored through voting. It also shows that democracy cannot be protected through voting alone.