If elections still exist, what exactly is eroding? Hungary continued to hold elections throughout Viktor Orbán’s sixteen years in power. Opposition parties still existed, and citizens still went to the polls to vote. So why did major democracy-related organizations describe Hungary as a case of democratic erosion? Hungary’s democratic erosion under Fidesz did not occur through the sudden disappearance of elections or through a coup, but through the gradual weakening of political competition, independent media, judicial independence, and checks on government power. Hungary therefore shows that the existence of elections is not enough to say that democracy is actually working well. Democratic erosion can occur even when elections continue because the institutions that make elections competitive and limit government power can gradually become weaker.

The process began after Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party returned to power in 2010 with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This allowed Fidesz to make major constitutional and legal changes without opposition support. The government changed the Constitutional Court, electoral rules, media regulation, and other institutions designed to limit and check government power. Freedom House explains that Fidesz weakened the Constitutional Court and gradually increased its influence over judges. This pattern connects closely to Ozan Varol’s concept of “stealth authoritarianism”. Varol argues that elected leaders can weaken democracy not by openly removing democratic institutions, but by using legal mechanisms in ways that could reduce political competition and checks on power. Hungary fits this pattern because many of Fidesz’s changes happened through laws and constitutional reforms. From Varol’s perspective, I think the important point is that legal changes could make the system less competitive while still keeping a democratic appearance. In other words, the problem is not only what institutions exist, but also what those institutions are actually able to do.

Anghel and Jones describe Hungary’s shift toward authoritarianism as a process of “state capture.” They explain that this process can include weakening watchdogs, gaining control over state resources and institutions, and rewriting political rules so that those in power become harder to remove. This adds another layer to Varol’s idea because it shows that legal changes are not only individual reforms,  they can work together to make the political system increasingly difficult for the opposition to challenge.

A similar pattern appeared in Hungary’s media. Krekó and Enyedi explain that Fidesz built a large media network that included regional newspapers, television, radio, and news websites. Many of these media outlets also received large amounts of advertising money from the government. The government also spent a lot of money on public information campaigns that often used messages similar to Fidesz’s own political campaigns. This gave pro-government media and messages a stronger position. Independent media still existed, but they had a harder time reaching the public when pro-government outlets had more money and a larger audience. As a result, people were more likely to see information that supported the government, while critical or opposition voices had less space. The problem was not that all independent media disappeared, but that the media environment became less balanced and independent outlets had less power to reach the public.

The problem did not stop with the media. Fidesz also changed institutions that were supposed to limit government power, especially the courts. The V-Dem country report explains that Hungary’s 2011 constitution gave the ruling party more influence over the Constitutional Court and reduced some of the Court’s power to review laws. Levitsky and Ziblatt compare courts and other independent institutions to the “referees” of democracy. They explain that if these institutions become controlled by the ruling party, they can no longer act as neutral checks on government power. They also say that Orbán put people from his side into independent institutions, including the Constitutional Court. Looking at Hungary through this idea of “capturing the referees,” I think the Constitutional Court is especially important. The Court did not disappear, but if it became less independent, one of the institutions that was supposed to keep the political game fair became weaker. This makes Levitsky and Ziblatt’s idea especially useful for Hungary because the political game can continue even when the referee becomes weaker.

Political competition also became less balanced under Fidesz. Krekó and Enyedi explain that during the 2018 election, the government and the ruling party often used very similar messages, and state resources gave Fidesz an advantage over the opposition. International observers also expressed concerns that the line between the government and the ruling party was not always clear. This did not mean that opposition parties disappeared or that people could not vote. However, opposition parties were competing from a weaker position. If the ruling party has more state resources and stronger support in the media environment, elections can continue while the competition becomes less equal. This is important in the Hungarian case because the question is not only whether people can vote, but whether the opposition has a real chance to challenge the ruling party.

These changes are also reflected in major democracy indexes. Freedom House rates Hungary as “Partly Free,” while V-Dem also shows a decline in Hungary’s level of democracy. These indexes look beyond elections to areas such as civil liberties, judicial independence, media freedom, and checks on government power. This helps explain why Hungary is described as a case of democratic erosion. The different problems in Hungary are connected. A less balanced media environment can weaken political competition, while weaker courts can make it harder to check the ruling party’s power.

Hungary shows that democratic erosion does not always happen through a sudden collapse of democracy. Under Fidesz, the media environment became less balanced, the Constitutional Court became weaker as a check on government power, and political competition became less equal. Varol shows how democracy can become weaker through legal changes, while Levitsky and Ziblatt show why independent institutions, such as courts, matter. Looking at Hungary through these readings, I think the most important lesson is that democracy can become weaker before its main institutions disappear.

Anghel and Jones also show why this kind of democratic erosion can become difficult to reverse. Once political leaders have had enough time to reshape laws, institutions, and electoral rules, elections may continue without giving the opposition an equal chance to challenge those in power. This means that democratic erosion can become more difficult to correct the longer it continues.

Hungary matters because this kind of erosion may be harder to recognize than a sudden collapse of democracy. The ballot box matters, but democracy does not end there.