Just recently Donald Trump visited Dayton, Ohio, a region which is defined by the prevalence of their manufacturing sector, and which has seen negative impacts from ever increasing US reliance on manufactured imports. As a result of the blowbacks from increased international trade, those within the manufacturing sector have used its influence to lobby for protectionist policies, and some unions and individuals in the industry supported Donald Trump’s “America First” economic plans he touted in all of his campaigns. However, just days prior to Trump’s visit to Dayton, roughly 1,400 employees were laid off from the Navistar truck factory in the region, as production moves to Canada. While layoffs of this type are nothing new to the region, there is an interesting puzzle posed when considering broader US-Canadian trade relations at the current moment. 

The United States and Canada are currently engaged in a tumultuous trade war (which is especially interesting, as the long standing allies… should not be). In fact, the day prior to the layoffs, the United States placed a ban on many Canadian imports. While the most notable import ban is that of Canadian alcohol and spirits, there were also bans on manufactured goods such as motorcycles. While the current state of US-Canada trade relations is quite complex, the US manufacturing industry continues to take blows despite promises to bring jobs back to the United States, ever rising prices, and increasing economic inequality (Winters & Page, 2009; Bartels, 2016). This begs the question of who Trump’s trade wars are meant to benefit. And if the audience benefiting from the international economic policies the Trump administration has implemented, represent a shift to a less democratic political system. Are Trump’s trade wars a sign of the continued influence of the American audience on international trade policy? Or are they a sign of the declining influence of the American masses’ economic influence?

In the past, protectionist leaning interests have had a heavy sway on the trade policy of the United States. But despite the influence of protectionist interest groups the American manufacturing industry has still taken heavy blows. These impacts have been seen through mass layoffs, closing down and exporting production outside the US, and once bustling centers of production losing their foundational companies. This continual defeat of economic prospects for America’s manufacturing employees resulted in the industry looking toward Donald Trump and cries for “America first” economic policies to bring jobs back home. Upon first glance, this is an indication of proper operations of a democratic society. There is apparent vertical accountability and an adequate mechanism to punish political actors who the masses are less than pleased with (Przeworski et al., 1999). However, there is more to this story than meets the eye. 

Once Trump entered office for his second term, tariffs started rolling out, however, jobs (especially manufacturing) did not necessarily start increasing again, in fact since he took office in January of 2024 there has been a slight decrease in jobs in the manufacturing sector (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026). All this to say, the expectations of the manufacturing sector that supported Donald Trump, have seemingly been let down. Thus, begging the question of how Trump’s international economic policies are actually affecting the American people, and who are the winners and losers from these policies. There are two potential explanations when considering the reasoning behind the trade wars the Trump administration has taken:

1. Tariffs and trade wars are hurting the mass American people, but benefiting economic elites.
2. The trade wars are performative, to buy support in the name of perceived economic benefit, rather than actual economic benefit.

Either of these options pose a problem. These problems are that the economic impacts of Trump’s international policies were and continue to be sold to the Americans who supported them as in their benefit, when in reality they are benefiting economic elites. If this is the case, this indicates that there has been a decrease in influence of the American voter and calls into question the effectiveness of vertical accountability in the United States. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest these trade wars are having disproportionate impacts, with the losers of these policies being the mass American audience, and the winners being elites. Ranald (2026) notes that the benefits to elites have come in the form of prominent appointments in the Trump administration and international economic policies that benefit those very elites. The shift towards benefiting the elites at the expense of the masses, shows a tightening of Trump’s “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and the democratic processes of the US lessening. 

In short, the Trump administration seemingly thinks that their economic policy does not need to answer to the will of their electorate, and they do not need to fear removal of power as a result. The coming 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential election have the potential to signal two things. First, either economics are not a concern enough for the American voter to have punishing effects on elected officials. And if past elections are any indicator, this does not seem to be the case. On the other hand, in the case that economics does impact the vote, the reaction of the Trump administration will signify whether or not democratic accountability is continuing to decline, especially in the vertical sense. Specifically, if there is a “blue wave”, or punishment of the Republican party (especially in areas which have been disproportionately impacted by Trump’s economic policies) and President Trump accuses this check of being fraudulent and denies the results of the elections, this will signify the continued attempts by this administration to contribute to the decay of America’s democratic institutions.