Oct 19, 2026

From Reformer to Authoritarian

Student Author: Sara Kelly

This is a student blog post written by a student participant in the Democratic Erosion Course. This post was not written by nor does it represent the views of the Democratic Erosion Consortium.

How is Zambia’s Current President Showing Signs of Democratic Backsliding

In Zambia, Election Day occurs on the 2nd Thursday of August every 5 years to elect the President and Vice President. To be elected president in Zambia, a candidate must receive more than 50% of the votes cast. In this year’s general elections, on August 13th, incumbent Hakainde Hichilema, member of the United Party for National Development (UPND), held his position, defeating opposition leader Brian Mundubile. After Hichilema defeated previous incumbent Edgar Lungu in 2021, he claimed he would reverse the momentum of democratic backsliding Lungu created. This included abolishing the Criminal Defamation of the President Law and the Death Penalty. He also hoped to replace the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act; these “cybersecurity tools” were a form of digital authoritarianism. However, Hichilema quickly failed to meet his campaign promises and has been consolidating power. His clearest authoritarian tendencies publicly arose during this past year’s election cycle. 

A key aspect of a functioning democracy is fair and free elections. Many issues occurred during and following the election process that can be seen as undemocratic because Hichilema’s actions challenge the fairness and freedom of elections. Levitsky and Ziblatt, in How Democracies Die, describe 4 behavioral actions as warning signs of democratic erosion. These include rejecting the democratic rules of the game, denying opponents legitimacy, tolerating or encouraging violence, and curtailing opponents’ civil liberties, including the media. During their campaigns, Hichilema rejected Mundubile’s civil liberties and refused to grant him media access. For example, during his campaign, Mundubile received 0.1% television coverage and 1.1% radio coverage, while Hichilema and the UPND received 96.2% of election television coverage and 90.5% radio coverage. Similarly, Hichilema received approximately 98.35% of direct speech time, while Mundubile had recorded no direct speech time. Although not directly by Hichilema, his 1st-term supporters, who felt they needed to be loyal to him, removed Mundubile’s opportunities for freedom of speech. As a result, Mundubile struggled to share and spread his campaign goals. Instead, Zambia’s civilians had continued access to information about Hichilema’s re-run for the presidency, regardless of whether they were supporters. These actions made it increasingly difficult for civilians to learn of other campaigns and their goals, keeping Hichilema in the continued spotlight. A similar situation occurs with the opposition’s lack of freedom of assembly. Zambia’s Campaign Timetable was created to allow challengers to challenge incumbent Hichilema by hosting campaign periods in each of Zambia’s provinces. Hichilema broke the Campaign Timetable rules, hosting unexpected rallies. This costs challengers their opportunity to assemble and hold rallies. Hichilema’s pop-up rallies took dominance, leaving many challengers with events blocked, canceled, or suspended. Finally, restriction of civil liberties is also evident in Hichilema’s failure to accept criticism. During the campaigns, Hichilema’s party arrested a journalist who publicized a private conversation Hichilema had. Another party leader was arrested after criticizing Hichilema’s actions. These are clear signs of authoritarian tendencies because they restricted challengers’ opportunities for fair elections and restricted the civil liberties of those with differing views from Hichilema. Also, Levitsky and Ziblatt in chapter 1 address that rising authoritarianism rejects democratic rules.

Similarly, Varol, in Stealth Authoritarianism, explains that stealth authoritarians protect and entrench their power rather than use direct methods of repression; they use judicial review to consolidate power. Hichilema’s most evident rejection of democratic rules occurred when, on the final day to propose a petition to challenge, the highest Constitutional Court was unexpectedly closed for no specific reason. By closing the courts, he was consolidating his power, protecting himself from challenges. In Zambia, a challenger has 7 days to file a petition against the election results. By closing the courts, Hichilema and his supporters used presidential oversight to stop Mundubile from contesting the results. This meant that, with no challenge received, Hichilema was to be sworn in for his second presidential term, but Mundubile still had time to submit a petition if the courts hadn’t “unexpectedly closed.” Another tendency that Levitsky & Ziblatt raise is that authoritarian figures encourage or tolerate violence. During the counting of election votes, there are accounts of violent disruptions and violence against poll workers. Supporters of Hichilema used violent attempts to scare and harm those counting ballots, attempting to push the election in a certain direction. Also, some of the violence included attempts to steal election results, potentially changing election outcomes. Hichilema’s government did not attempt to curb violence or speak out about the incidents; rather, it tolerated it, as many authoritarian figures seem to do. 

Hichilema’s actions have been independent incidents, but taken together, it is evident that Zambia’s democracy, with President Hichilema, is experiencing a gradual democratic decline and leaning towards authoritarianism. Huq and Ginsburg, in “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy,” describe the shift towards authoritarianism as incremental decay that involves the weakening of election quality, freedom of speech, and rule of law. When Hichilema came into power, he promised to undo the harms caused by President Lungu. However, he has done the opposite, even performing similar acts to President Lungu, including arresting the opposition leader for treason. Zambia is another example of how nations do not have to experience an immediate switch to authoritarianism. Instead of bringing reform and comfort to Zambia with Hichilema in the lead, they have experienced heightened discomfort and fear for whats to come, with signs of their declining democracy at the forefront. 

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