Tanks did not roll into the capital, nor did generals appear. Yet, between 2015 and 2020, Zambia’s democracy was quietly dismantled through the cunning abuse of legal procedures and regulations. Finally, in 2021, voters rose and ousted the president. But now, years later, the same warning signs are reappearing.

Is Zambia’s democracy doomed to repeat the cycle?

Not necessarily, but the answer lies not in the character of political leaders, but in the vigilance of citizens.

Zambia’s democratic trajectory shows a steep slide between 2015 and 2020. This slide began under President Edgar Lungu.

In April 2017, Lungu charged opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema with treason, claiming that Hichilema had obstructed his motorcade. Given that Hichilema was the next presidential candidate, this incident is seen as an attempt to neutralize the opposition by detaining him for a long time or politically burying him. Furthermore, he showed authoritarian tendencies by manipulating constitutional interpretations to run for a third term and shutting down major Zambian media outlets such as The Post and Prime TV.

There is a clear pattern and intention behind these actions by Lungu. The point is that he did not destroy democratic institutions to avoid external sanctions but rather used them as tools for his own political survival.

This is why his political style is characterized as “Stealth Authoritarianism”, a form of governance that consolidates power and undermines democracy by exploiting the legitimate procedures and legal mechanisms of democratic institutions.

However, Lungu’s dangerous runaway was bound to collapse in the face of Zambian citizens. The presidential election in August 2021 marked another turning point in the trajectory of Zambia’s democracy.

Faced with economic collapse and oppression such as soaring prices, the people of Zambia chose to vote rather than resign themselves to their fate. Even if Lungu blocked opposition campaigns under the pretext of COVID-19 control and created an atmosphere of fear by deploying troops to the city center, voter turnout exceeded 70%. The overwhelming gap in votes, reaching one million, made it impossible for the regime to even consider rigging the count. In addition, beyond these results, the hard work of civil society organizations also played an important role. Organizations–such as Alliance for Community Action (ACA), and People’s Action for Accountability–raised public awareness by holding conferences for voter education. Groups like Research Services and the Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) sought to prevent fraud by closely monitoring the entire electoral district on election day.

Thus, the peaceful transfer of power was made possible by Zambian citizens restoring vertical accountability.

Lungu’s departure and the rise of the new political leader, President Hakainde Hichilema, brought a sense of freedom to Zambian citizens. They finally felt the revival of political and civil liberties. Hichilema’s promises regarding economic recovery, the restoration of democratic freedoms and human rights, and the end of political violence further heightened expectations for him.

In practice, he demonstrated his ability to lead democratic reforms, such as the abolition of Criminal Defamation of the President and the death penalty, and economic achievements, including implementing IMF structural adjustment measures and restoring GDP growth.

In particular, the abolition of the Criminal Defamation of the President on December 23, 2022, held profound significance. As this law had served as Lungu’s primary instrument of repression of free expression, its abolition was a declaration that the state would no longer suppress citizens’ voices holding power to account.

“Fellow Zambians, during our campaigns for the presidency, we promised to amend all laws that inhibit the growth of democracy and good governance, impede human rights and basic freedoms. Today we have delivered.”

He projected his confidence in this democratic transition. However, as time passes, it is becoming evident that his confidence was not sincere.

With persistent economic hardship and mounting pressure regarding the 2026 presidential election, he repeatedly displayed authoritarian tendencies, such as restricting the opposition party, interfering in the judiciary, and suppressing the media. For instance, Hichilema’s signing of the Cyber Security Act and Cyber Crimes Act in April 2025 sparked widespread backlash and concern. Above all, critics pointed out that the ambiguous phrasing defining illegal activity is designed to suppress free speech by inducing a chilling effect and self-censorship among citizens. This is particularly problematic in that it weakens the democratic space by shrinking the online space as a forum for free discussion among citizens. Furthermore, controversies, such as the suspension of vote counting and the arrest of the opposition leader during the August 2026 presidential election, raise serious doubts about whether his attempts to secure victory were truly democratic.

Seeing Lungu’s authoritarian patterns reflected in Hichilema, citizens find it increasingly difficult to sustain their earlier optimism. Once again curving downward, Zambia’s democratic trajectory evokes memories of a dark past.

To understand the implications of this recurring pattern for Zambia’s democratic future, it is useful to examine the framework of democratic consolidation proposed by Foa and Mounk, and what it tells us about where Zambia stands.

Foa and Mounk (2016) pointed out that it is dangerous for democracy not to become the ‘only game in town’. They identified public support for the democratic system as one of the three critical factors–citizen support for the democratic system, system stability, and democratic rule compliance–determining democratic consolidation. According to Afrobarometer, Zambian citizens’ satisfaction with the operation of their democracy has declined sharply after peaking in 2022. Nevertheless, what is noteworthy is that citizens still overwhelmingly prefer and support democratic institutions and practices, while rejecting authoritarian alternatives. Specifically, they express strong support for regular, open, and honest elections, the freedom to join organizations regardless of government approval, and constitutional limits on presidential terms. This shows that they are focusing on substantive democratic values rather than merely supporting the name “democracy”.

From Foa and Mounk’s perspective, the case of Zambia is, at the very least, taking the first step: citizens’ support for the democratic system. Zambian citizens possess the potential to defend democracy against the authoritarian attempts by their political leaders and have the power to rewrite their history of defending democracy once again.

However, at the same time, we must not forget that this is still the first step. The concerns remain regarding Foa and Mounk’s third condition for democratic consolidation: democratic rule compliance. This is precisely the condition that both Lungu and Hichilema have failed to meet. They have consistently been tempted to undermine or arbitrarily enforce democratic rules and norms to maintain power.

While the support for democracy among Zambian citizens and the absence of anti-system parties and movements can prevent a complete breakdown into authoritarianism, persistent violations of democratic rules by political elites threaten to trigger another rapid erosion of democracy.

It was the votes of citizens that brought down Lungu’s stealth authoritarianism, and it is again the awakened will of citizens that stands against the authoritarian temptations of Hichilema. To defend democracy, they must go beyond merely safeguarding and supporting democratic values; they must more constantly and closely check political leaders seeking to undermine the democratic spirit. They must not be deceived by the ‘seemingly democratic’ bait of political leaders.

Once again, which direction Zambia’s democratic trajectory heads is in the hands of its citizens.