After storming to the presidency in the 2025 presidential elections,[1] Chilean President José Antonio Kast has wasted no time attempting to enact his campaign agenda. In August, the President presented the Chilean Congress with a reform to address organized crime and terrorism, which notably included a provision establishing a new state of exception (estado de excepción). However, two months after announcing this dangerously undemocratic plan in a political system that often cedes to the executive branch, Chile proved the stability of its governance when Kast decided to retract the brunt of the proposal. Following a military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet that lasted almost 17 years, Chile peacefully redemocratized in 1990, with rapid economic growth following suit.[2] For most of its post-dictatorial existence, centrist administrations have governed Chile. This trend shifted with the election of leftist Gabriel Boric to the presidency in 2021, and the ideological pendulum later swung to the far-right with Kast. As a candidate, Kast ran on a platform that described Chile as a country failing to develop, suffering “emergencies” in several areas,[3] most notably security. This reasoning stemmed from security fears in Chile: despite experiencing low levels of crime, 63% of Chileans reported crime as a significant concern in 2024, more than double the global average.[4]

What exactly did Kast’s security plan contain? Known as the Agenda Against Organized Crime and Terrorism (Agenda contra el Crimen Organizado y el Terrorismo, or ACOT), the plan broadly incorporated approximately 30 legislative bills touching an array of security issues.[5] However, the constitutional reform for the state of exception is the most damning provision.  Articles 39 and 44 of the Chilean Constitution outline four types of states of exception: Assembly, Site, Catastrophe, and Emergency. Each authorizes the President to restrict civil liberties to different extents, such as war, grave internal conflict, or natural disasters. More importantly, each exception lasts between 15 and 90 days, with almost all requiring congressional approval before (or shortly after) enactment or renewal by the President. In contrast, Kast’s plan sought to create a new state of exception to address grave and immediate threats to public safety, almost tripling the maximum length of the current powers to 240 days without congressional authorization.[6]

Even without Kast’s proposal, Chile’s constitution gives significant authority to the executive branch, allowing for the possibility of an unconstrained executive to commit undemocratic actions. Although the international community recognizes Chile for its democratic stability (see Chile’s near-perfect score on Freedom House, an indicator of democracy),[7] the legacy of the military dictatorship remains. Despite several recent pushes from both the right and left to institute a new constitution, the Chilean people have rejected two referendums, resulting in the continuation of a framework left by Pinochet.[8] As a result, the government has been described as a form of hyper-presidentialism,[9] with critics noting the concentration of power in the executive. Presently, for example, the President has the authority to decide legislative priorities and issue partial vetoes, in addition to the previously mentioned states of exception.

With this historical context, one might expect Chile to have experienced democratic backsliding; however, the vulnerabilities of a strong executive branch have not yet been exploited. For most of its post-Pinochet history, Chilean presidents have abided by democratic norms, not exercising their full constitutional authority. In fact, in 2023, Boric and the former Chilean heads of state all signed a document that affirmed their allegiance “to democracy, always.”[10] This falls in line with an agentic argument outlined by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, who stated that the survival of democratic governance in Latin America requires a “normative commitment to democracy” by the current generation of politicians (Page 97).[11] Each former Chilean president has embodied this principle, even when addressing security concerns, such as the Estallido Social, through existing powers. Simply put, Kast has broken this solemn obligation.[12]

Most evidently, Kast’s far-right rhetoric indicates no intention for him to act as a restrained executive.[13] Thus, the enactment of ACOT would easily consolidate power even further within the presidency, striking away any semblance of checks and balances from the legislature. This criticism should not be interpreted to diminish the role of government, as public safety is certainly of national concern: after all, social contract theory suggests that governments are formed primarily to protect the public interest. This reform, though, strips away the right of Chileans to freely move, meet, and communicate privately with one another.

Although a super-presidentialism system has flaws, I contend that, in this case, Chile demonstrated the strength of its existing democratic structure through quick rejection of Kast’s proposal across the political spectrum. Besides the obvious opposition from left-wing parties such as the Frente Amplio, as seen in Boric,[14] the moderate right-wing also gave substantial criticism, including the party leader for Evópoli, Luciano Cruz-Coke,[15] who called the reform “intolerant” and unnecessary. As a result, by the first week of October, Kast capitulated to the Congress and withdrew his proposal for the state of exception and other constitutional changes within ACOT.[16] Instead, Kast opted to back an agreement between members of several parties on both the left and right, which would extend the existing state of emergency to uses of public security.[17]

No modern democratic society has perfectly shaped or balanced its governmental structure to accordingly divide all powers. After taking office, Kast believed his mandate, especially over crime, gave him plenary authority to legislatively prioritize this executive power grab. This follows suit in countries across Latin America shifting to the right, such as El Salvador,[18] where states of exception are frequently employed to combat crime emergencies. As described by Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in their book How Democracies Die, “would-be autocrats often use economic crises, natural disasters, and especially security threats…to justify antidemocratic measures” (Page 92).[19] However, the ability of Chile’s legislature to curb the super-presidential system demonstrates the successful horizontal accountability intended by even the Pinochet-era constitution. Although Kast’s administration has held office for less than a year, the rejection of this proposal serves as a warning to the President to act less emboldened, and is an encouraging sign to the Chilean people of a functional democracy.

[1] Kahn, Carrie. “Chile Shifts Sharply Right as José Antonio Kast Wins the Presidency.” NPR, 15 Dec. 2025, www.npr.org/2025/12/14/nx-s1-5644074/chile-kast-right.

[2] Chile, Marca, et al. “Chile Ranks as the Most Prosperous Country in Latin America.” Marca Chile, 14 July 2026, www.marcachile.cl/en/chile-se-posiciona-como-el-pais-mas-prospero-de-america-latina.

[3] Servicio Electoral de Chile. 2025, www.servel.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/JOSE-ANTONIO-KAST-RIST.pdf.

[4] Alcoba, Natalie. “A ‘Fearful’ Country? Crime Concerns Grip Chile Ahead of Presidential Race.” Al Jazeera, 12 Dec. 2025, www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2025/12/12/a-fearful-country-crime-concerns-grip-chile-ahead-of-presidential-run-off.

[5] Mora, Helen, and Helen Mora. “El Detalle De La Agenda Contra El Crimen Organizado Del Gobierno: 19 Proyectos Ingresados, 9 Nuevos Y Una Reforma Constitucional.” La Tercera, 6 Aug. 2026, www.latercera.com/politica/noticia/el-detalle-de-la-agenda-contra-el-crimen-organizado-presentada-por-el-gobierno-19-proyectos-ingresados-nueve-nuevos-y-una-reforma-constitucional.

[6] Sanhueza, Ana María, et al. “Kast Propone Un Nuevo Estado De Excepción Para Amenazas Graves a La Seguridad Pública Con Fuertes Restricciones.” El País Chile, 18 Aug. 2026, elpais.com/chile/2026-08-18/kast-propone-un-nuevo-estado-de-excepcion-para-amenazas-graves-a-la-seguridad-publica-con-fuertes-restricciones.html.

[7] Freedom House. “Chile.” Freedom House, freedomhouse.org/country/chile.

[8] Motamedi, Maziar. “Why Chileans Rejected Conservative Constitution, and What’s Next?” Al Jazeera, 18 Dec. 2023, www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/18/why-chileans-rejected-conservative-constitution-and-whats-next.

[9] Heiss, Claudia. “Reforming Presidentialism in Chile.” Texas International Law Journal, vol. 57, no. 3, 2022, pp. 349–63. login.brown.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/reforming-presidentialism-chile/docview/2762047537/se-2?accountid=9758.

[10] “Compromiso: Por la democracia, siempre.” Gob.cl, 2023, www.gob.cl/noticias/compromiso-por-la-democracia-siempre.

[11] Waldner, David, and Ellen Lust. “Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding.” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 21, Annual Reviews, 2018, pp. 93–113. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628.

[12] “Piñera Levanta El Estado De Emergencia En Chile Para ‘Contribuir’ a Que El País ‘Recupere La Normalidad Institucional.’” BBC News Mundo, 28 Oct. 2019, www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-50206441.

[13] Thykjaer, Christina and Associated Press. “José Antonio Kast gana las presidenciales en Chile y abre paso al Gobierno más derechista en 35 años.” Euronews, 15 Dec. 2025, es.euronews.com/2025/12/15/jose-antonio-kast-presidenciales-chile-gobierno-derechista.

[14] Sanhueza, Ana María, et al. “Boric Critica La Reforma De Seguridad De Kast: ‘Es Una Limitación De Libertades Inédita En La Democracia Chilena.’” El País Chile, 19 Aug. 2026, elpais.com/chile/2026-08-19/boric-critica-la-reforma-de-seguridad-de-kast-es-una-limitacion-de-libertades-inedita-en-la-democracia-chilena.html.

[15] Catena, Paula. “Luciano Cruz-Coke: ‘La Reforma Raya En Lo Iliberal Y No Es Necesaria Para Avanzar En La Agenda De Seguridad.’” La Tercera, 23 Aug. 2026, www.latercera.com/politica/noticia/luciano-cruz-coke-la-reforma-raya-en-lo-iliberal-y-no-es-necesaria-para-avanzar-en-la-agenda-de-seguridad.

[16] Sanhueza, Ana María. “El Gobierno De Kast Retira Su Reforma De Seguridad Por Falta De Apoyos Y Respalda Una Nueva Propuesta Del Senado.” El País Chile, 7 Oct. 2026, elpais.com/chile/2026-10-07/el-gobierno-de-kast-retira-su-reforma-de-seguridad-por-falta-de-apoyos-y-respalda-una-nueva-propuesta-del-senado.html.

[17] Cooperativa.Cl. “Seguridad: Senadores Ingresaron El Reemplazo De La Desechada Reforma Constitucional Del Gobierno.” Cooperativa.cl, 8 Oct. 2026, www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/politica/senado/seguridad-senadores-ingresaron-el-reemplazo-de-la-desechada-reforma/2026-10-07/122424.html.

[18] Goodfriend, Hilary. “An Infinite State of Exception in Nayib Bukele’s El Salvador.” Jacobin, 29 Jan. 2026, jacobin.com/2026/01/el-salvador-us-bukele-trump-authoritarianism.

[19] “How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt: 9781524762940 | PenguinRandomHouse.com: Books.” PenguinRandomhouse.com, 8 Jan. 2019, www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt.