Democracies don’t usually fall overnight. Most of the time, they get hollowed out while still looking intact on paper. A government can hold onto every outward sign of democracy, real elections, a functioning parliament, a constitution still technically in force, while the actual substance of accountability quietly disappears. Pakistan’s latest constitutional amendment can be seen as a clear example of exactly that. The more interesting question here is not what the amendment did but why nobody involved even bothered to hide it.
The setup
In 2023, Pakistan’s former prime minister, Imran Khan, was sent to prison. Following this, his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf faced a purge ahead of the 2024 election, and its candidates were barred from contesting under their own name and banner. Subsequently, in October 2024, parliament passed the 26th Amendment, which quietly changed how judges are appointed and stripped the Supreme Court’s power to tackle major cases on its own accord. It was highly criticised by legal groups , but the government called it a “routine judicial reform”, and to common people outside the legal community, that’s exactly how it looked. A year later, in November 2025, the same parliament passed the 27th Amendment and that is the event this post is really about. The details of it matter more than what the summarised headlines suggest.
What the amendment does
The amendment did three specific things: First, it created a brand new post called the Chief of Defence Forces and gave it to army chief Asim Munir, who was notified for a five year term in December 2025, along with a five star rank for life. Secondly, it granted Munir and the sitting president lifelong immunity from criminal and civil prosecution, according to the International Bar Association, even after they leave office. And thirdly, it created a new Federal Constitutional Court. One that takes over the Supreme Court’s authority on constitutional matters while also separately amending Clause (2A) of Article 6, which is the constitution’s high treason clause. The clause already said no court could ever validate an unconstitutional seizure of power. The amendment now extends that same rule to the new court too. The general secretary of the Karachi Bar Association warned publicly that this change effectively shuts the door on any judicial review of the amendment itself.
The reaction
This amendment was not passed without criticism. The New Arab reported all three provisions the day it passed, and within weeks the International Commission of Jurists called it a flagrant attack on judicial independence, warning it would significantly impair the judiciary’s ability to hold the authorities accountable specifically because it moves constitutional review out of the ordinary judiciary and into a body with high political exposure. However, the clearest sign that this wasn’t slipping past anyone came from inside the judiciary itself. Two of the sitting Supreme Court judges, Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Athar Minallah, resigned the same day the amendment took effect, and said publicly that the amendment was their reason. Even a Lahore High Court judge, Justice Shams Mehmood Mirza, resigned stating the same. Lawyers in Karachi and Hyderabad went on strike that same week, and an opposition alliance marched from Parliament House to the Supreme Court, declaring a nationwide “Black Day.” These weren’t just opposition politicians giving a press statement but judges walking off the bench, in protest, while still holding the job, and a legal community reacting in real time.
Why secrecy was never needed
A legal scholar named Ozan Varol has a term for this kind of move. He calls it stealth authoritarianism, the idea that instead of tearing up a constitution or forcing leadership on the citizens, leaders weaken democracy by bending the law itself. Every one of the three provisions above followed proper legislative procedure. A real vote happened. Nothing about it looks like a coup, because it isn’t one. It’s legislation, misused and that’s exactly what makes it so hard to fight, because you can’t call something illegal when it followed every rule on the books.
But here’s where this amendment complicates Varol’s own idea, and it’s the core argument of this post. His framework usually depends on concealment, on leaders dressing up power grabs in language about national security or anti corruption reform so people don’t notice what’s happening underneath. This amendment wasn’t concealed at all on the other hand, it was debated in parliament in public session, voted on by name, and covered by international media within hours. So if secrecy isn’t what protected it, something else did, and the 26th Amendment a year earlier looks like the perfect prequel. Researchers who track erosion event by event sort events into precursors, symptoms and resistance. The 26th Amendment was the precursor: first change who appoints judges and strip the court of the power to act on its own. The 27th is the symptom: with the bench already leaning the right way, no independent body is left with the standing or the will to strike it down. The strikes and resignations are the resistance. Stealth authoritarianism doesn’t always need to hide the final move. Sometimes it only needs to hide the setup, one amendment earlier.
Elections without checks
Another way to describe what is happening here, is that political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell wrote about long before Varol did. In his work on delegative democracy, he separated two kinds of accountability. Vertical accountability is when voters hold leaders to account at elections. Horizontal accountability is where courts and other institutions check power between elections. A country can keep the first and lose the second, and still look democratic from the outside. Pakistan still holds elections, although Khan’s party fought the last one without its symbol. But the 27th Amendment goes after the second kind and the more important one i.e., the courts, and the ability to ever legally challenge the military’s top office.
What actually protected this amendment was actually simpler than any theory. The coalition passing it depends on the military’s tolerance to stay in power in the first place. So handing the military more power while simultaneously taking away everyone’s ability to ever challenge that decision, cost that coalition nothing. A government that needs the army’s patience to survive has no reason to say no when the army asks for immunity.
The other side
It would not be fair if we do not consider the other side of this too. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar called the new court the amendment’s “cornerstone achievement,” arguing it gives each province equal representation on the top constitutional bench, and he pointed to the Supreme Court’s past use of suo motu powers. Elected coalitions are generally known to rewrite laws constantly, and so is a governing majority using its votes to restructure institutions. But, the type of power being restructured here is different in kind, not just degree. Ordinary legislation changes policy, and policy can be reversed by the next parliament through the same process that created it. Immunity however, does not work that way. Meaning once the legal mechanism that could ever hold an office accountable is removed, a future parliament can’t simply vote that accountability back into existence, because the body that would rule on whether the reversal is even constitutional is the same Federal Constitutional Court this amendment just built.
What happens next
The real question is not whether the people in Pakistan noticed, as my arguments above mention they did, immediately and loudly. It is whether all those resignations, strikes and court petitions could add up to anything substantial considering the is no fully independent body left to rule on the outcome. That is vertical accountability outside the ballot box, with no court to carry it. So far the courts have not helped. The Sindh High Court dismissed a plea against the new court’s judges in December, saying it could not question them while the amendment stands. A challenge from four Islamabad High Court judges was refused by the Supreme Court’s office. In May 2026, the registrar returned another petition without a written order. As of the most recent reports, no court has ruled on whether the amendment itself is constitutional, and that is what is worth keeping an eye on.

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