Nov 13, 2026

Accountable to Whom? The Eroding Promise of Democracy in Kuwait

Student Author: Anamta Husain

This is a student blog post written by a student participant in the Democratic Erosion Course. This post was not written by nor does it represent the views of the Democratic Erosion Consortium.

In August 2026, the Emir of Kuwait issued a decree barring naturalised citizens from voting. He also amended nationality laws, which expanded grounds for revoking citizenship, including actions considered harmful to national interest and public order. Such broad terms might carry ambiguity in their scope and interpretation. Normally, under the Kuwaiti constitution, laws are promulgated only after both the Emir and the National Assembly approve them. However, in May 2024, the Emir suspended the National Assembly by decree for up to four years. He also suspended several constitutional articles, including the provision for joint approval of laws and the requirement of parliamentary re-elections within two months of dissolution. Legislative powers were thus transferred to the Emir, and the government now operates by executive decree. 

These events are important because Kuwait’s parliament historically held significant legislative power, contrary to other Gulf regimes. This is why critics once defined Kuwait as “one of the most democratic states in the Arab world.” Although parliamentary dissolution is common in Kuwait, suspension beyond the constitutionally stipulated timeline has happened only twice before. The recent consolidation of executive power hints towards signs of backsliding. David Waldner and Ellen Lust explain that backsliding in non-democratic regimes can occur through the deterioration of democratic principles, such as the erosion of legislative authority and institutional checks and balances in Kuwait. 

Kuwait’s backsliding was followed by long-standing political gridlock between the executive and legislature. The gridlock hindered important economic reforms and stalled decision-making procedures. The Emir cited this inertia as a rationale for dissolving parliament, stating he would not allow democracy to be “exploited to destroy the state.” However, the gridlock was not a result of democracy being exploited. The National Assembly carried sufficient power to hold the executive accountable and, in doing so, limit its powers. This is a normal feature of a democracy. Kuwait’s problem arose due to the distinct sources of legitimacy and accountability of the legislative and the executive, combined with the absence of institutionalised democratic norms and practices. 

Guillermo O’ Donnell classifies types of democracy by differentiating degrees of horizontal accountability, i.e., checks and balances across branches of government. But non-democratic regimes often also have distinct sources rather than just degrees of horizontal accountability. Kuwait is a constitutional emirate that coexists with a parliamentary system. The head of state, the Emir, is from the ruling Al-Sabah family. He appoints the Prime Minister, who, in consultation with the Emir, appoints cabinet ministers. The National Assembly is composed of 50 directly elected members through mostly free and fair elections and 10 appointed ministers who serve as ex officio members. So, the parliament is largely elected by the citizens, but the executive is appointed by the Emir.

These branches then derive their legitimacy from two different sources. Consequently, the relationship of horizontal accountability between them diverges from that found in a democracy. The executive is first answerable to the Emir, then the Parliament. This is why the possibility of legislative-executive gridlock arises.  

The parliament routinely hinders the law-making process, initiates ‘interpellation’ or interrogation of ministers, and often withholds confidence from a minister or the entire cabinet. It takes only 10 Members of Parliament (MPs) to table a no-confidence motion. If a simple majority is achieved, the Emir usually names a new cabinet or announces snap elections by dissolving the parliament. This causes instability in both the legislative and executive branches. In the last three decades, Kuwait has seen 31 cabinets. Furthermore, out of the 18 legislative terms between 1975 and 2020, 11 were dissolved before their completion, with the majority of dissolutions directly or indirectly being connected to confidence motions and interpellations. 

Normally, the legislature and the executive have shared legitimacy by virtue of their directly or indirectly elected nature in democracies. This creates an incentive to cooperate as they are ultimately answerable to the citizens. In Kuwait, the two bodies remain in persistently adversarial relations. Many interpellations are a response to MPs’ scarce influence over government agenda setting, as the cabinet has no parliamentary representation. Thus, horizontal accountability is not only a routine check on executive power by the parliament. It generates tensions between an elected body and an appointed executive whose legitimacy rests with the Emir. 

Moreover, Kuwait has banned official political parties. Interpellations and motions of confidence are often motivated by personal grievances, policy disagreements, and struggles over portfolio allocation. The absence of political parties further amplifies MPs’ self-interested behaviour. From 1963 to 2020, nearly 61.70% of the interpellations were raised by individual MPs rather than being co-sponsored. If organised political parties were allowed, they could have facilitated coordinated interpellations, the formation of shared party interests, and better bargaining between parliamentary opposition blocs and ministers. The current individualist non-partisan system has affected the development of what O’Donnell calls institutionalised democratic norms and practices, which could form through regular interactions between parties and institutions.   

Thus, Kuwait’s backsliding can be seen as an effect of a hybrid system, where clashes between the parliament and the executive became a constant factor. It does not reflect a failure due to the legislature’s democratic nature but rather fundamental tensions of an Emir-controlled executive sharing power with an elected body. 

This has also affected Kuwait’s economy, as it has been unable to diversify beyond oil production. An IMF report explicitly noted that the legislative-executive stalemate hampered fiscal and structural reforms. On the face of it, the Emir’s rationale for the gridlock justifying parliamentary dissolution seems true, even as it hides signs of backsliding.

More alarming is the citizens’ lack of social response to both parliamentary dissolution and tightened citizenship laws. A survey in 2024 showed that around 66% of Kuwaitis agreed that the National Assembly “slowed down” the government and 60% agreed that “the government could carry out effective actions to advance the state if it were not held back by the parliament.” The decreasing public trust in elected representatives, combined with an executive consolidating power, can open up a potential pathway to drastic backsliding. 

That democracy does not necessarily promise better economic growth compared to other regimes is widely observed. But it is equally important to note that hybrid systems under potential democratisation might themselves become a factor causing economic instability. The emergent tensions between political institutions affect both the state and the citizens. As a result, non-democratic regimes face a choice between hybrid regimes that might (or might not) lead to full-fledged democracy or to trade off accountability and representation for the economic prosperity promised by non-democratic leaders. In Kuwait, the choice is increasingly leaning towards the latter.

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