Almost exactly eight years ago to this day, Russia invaded and later annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, shortly after the Sochi Winter Olympics. Now Vladimir Putin has green-lit the invasion of Ukraine again, and it seems apparent that this will be a far more violent and extensive conflict than the previous invasion, which was limited to a fairly bloodless, small-scale occupation of part of the country. The invasion of Ukraine does not seem to be an attempt to consolidate Putin’s power within the Russian government, nor is it likely to increase his public support. What is clear, however, is that Putin has been preparing to deal with the internal repercussions of the invasion for as long as he has been preparing for the actual military undertaking itself. The invasion of Ukraine will inevitably result in the further curtailing of Russian civil liberties and the erosion of Russian democracy.
Given the unpopularity of the Ukrainian invasion, Putin must choose to persuade the Russian people of the legitimacy of his actions, or silence his critics. The two are not mutually exclusive, but it seems that Putin’s ability to censor his critics will be more important in this particular case. To understand why, we should examine the gap in efficacy between Russian domestic propaganda and Russian fake news.
A key difference between traditional propaganda and fake news is that propaganda is constructive, while fake news is often disruptive. Both attempt to advance the authoritarian agenda, but while propaganda usually directly promotes its own version of the truth, fake news can act indirectly by simply casting uncertainty upon the real truth. Creators of fake news are less invested in defending their claims from rebuttal, tending to choose quantity over quality. Fact-checking seldom works against fake news, because much as a demagogue would rather cultivate outrage than take accountability for their words, promoters of fake news will often cut their losses and promote a different claim rather than stick to their guns. (1) This is a successful tactic because the true source of fake news is often unknown or astroturfed. In state propaganda however, efforts are taken to maintain a semblance of narrative consistency.
The fundamentally disruptive nature of fake news means that it is more successful as a tactic in would-be-authoritarians’ arsenals when they are the underdogs or the outsiders, not when they themselves control the mainstream media. But skill at utilizing fake news does not necessarily translate to success at crafting persuasive propaganda. Russia found success in disseminating fake news on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to disrupt the U.S. presidential elections. Yet domestically, the Russian state-sponsored media’s greatest threat are those same social media platforms, which provide everyday Russians with access to independent journalism circumventing Kremlin-approved narratives. Putin’s identity in the media is one of legitimacy and order, and although they advance his interests, his name has always been kept separate from Russian bot farms and alternative media.
Before the invasion, Russian media denied outright that Putin would initiate conflict in Ukraine. They depend too much on the air of legitimacy to backtrack on their statements now, as the American alternative media might do. So instead, the Russian media has now tried to justify intervention by claiming that they are stepping in to protect Russians in Luhansk and Donetsk from genocide, rather than simply denying their original claims. In any case, it seems that the Russian media will not be effective in maintaining moral justification for the invasion in Ukraine. Putin has no choice now but to silence domestic criticism.
When it comes to informational warfare, Russia’s capabilities thus far had been asymmetrical, with a greater ability to conduct offensive operations in other countries than to lockdown dissent domestically. There were two major causes for Russia’s historical weakness compared with China, which is the gold standard of internet censorship for autocrats.
Firstly, Russia’s lack of domestic social media platforms leaves Russians dependent on American social media. For example since 2015, Russia has become by far the largest source of requests to remove content from Google Search and Youtube, far outstripping even China. Yet these requests are not a sign of Russian censorship’s potency, but rather a sign of its weakness. Unlike China, which either bans western social media networks outright or strictly regulates them by threatening access to the Chinese market entirely, Russian internet laws can only threaten fines for the failure to comply with the majority of these requests. This is a product of Russia’s need to adhere to the illusion of free speech, by cloaking these requests under the guise of curbing obscenity and extremism, even though the vast majority of Russia’s requests pertain to pro-Navalny content.
In conjunction, Russia lacked the technology and infrastructure to police internet traffic directly. Unlike in China, where the Great Firewall is enabled by the fact that three state-owned internet providers control all access to the country, there are thousands of private internet companies in Russia. To police them individually was impossible given the limitations of Russian censorship at the time, and thus historically, Putin relied on a minimalist system of media control. (2)
To combat these deficiencies, Russia has increased both the technological capabilities of its censorship in the past three years, as well as the scope and vigor with which they are applied. Since 2019 Russia has been investing in deep packet inspection software that allows it to filter through Russian internet traffic directly instead of dealing with American social media companies. And in 2021, Russia blocked TOR and a multitude of VPNs that were important tools for Russian political activists seeking to avoid censorship. The lack of safe communication tools will make it harder for Russians to organize mass resistance to Putin’s actions in Ukraine, even if the desire now is stronger than it was in 2014.
Citations
1. Jennifer R. Mercieca (2019) Dangerous Demagogues and Weaponized Communication, Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 49:3, 264-279, DOI: 10.1080/02773945.2019.1610640
2. Scott Gehlbach (2010) Reflections on Putin and the Media, Post-Soviet Affairs, 26:1, 77-87, DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.26.1.77
Image credit: The Atlantic
The media plays a major role in a democratic society since it is one of the institutional pillars through which a democracy can be implemented and reinforced. Indeed, a strong democracy requires an autonomous, free, and transparent media landscape that ensures a range of opinions. In light of the disastrous reality that humanity around the world is facing, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian government will not only emphasize the democratic backsliding that has significantly increased worldwide in the past few decades. But also, it will deteriorate even more the Internet freedom in Russia as emphasized in the article. The mass media is essential to democracy, but also to authoritarians. I agree with what the article is discussing regarding the lack of communication tools available for Russians to organize a large-scale opposition to Putin’s moves towards Ukraine and the media restrictions implemented to control the information.
First of all, the media may be a significant source of credibility and external check on existing authorities by exercising control and criticism, providing a space for the competition of ideas and interests, and encouraging political involvement, inclusion, and responsible action among citizens. As Dahl underlines in Polyarchy, some requirements for a democracy are for citizens to have freedom of expression, alternative sources of information in order to signify, formulate and have preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government. In this sense, the media plays a pivotal role in informing citizens and providing a tool through which citizens can speak, participate, and thereby promote public contestation (right to oppose) and inclusiveness (right to participate). According to Dahl, when a regime represents some degree of democratization that is substantially popularized and liberalized, then there is a high inclusiveness and a high liberalization. However, as in the case of Russia since the election of President Putin and at the time of the Soviet Union, the indicators of inclusiveness and public opposition tended to be low. As a common variable, in these types of regimes, a restraint in media freedom can be observed. It underlines the necessity of citizens having access to communication instruments that are free of government control, allowing them to voice their preferences and therefore allowing the formation and strengthening of democracy.
Yet, the media is playing a pivotal role in democracy. It is also essential for dictators to install an authoritarian policy and therefore prompting democratic backsliding. USAID defines democratic backsliding as a “common phenomenon” where “competitive elections are undermined, citizens lose their rights to mobilize or voice their demands, and government become less accountable”. Additionally, they state that this change can affect the quality of democracy through electoral competition, liberties and accountability which includes the vertical accountability exercised by the media. This reinforces Barmeo’s idea of media freedom as one of the causes of democratic backsliding. Furthermore, Levitsky and Ziblatt state that one of the behavioral warning signs to determine an authoritarian is its willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media. In Russia, one of the symptoms of this democratic erosion cited by the website Democratic Erosion, is the repression of the opposition leader – Aleksey Navalny and the curtailment of civil liberties with “the passage of the “sovereign internet” law, facilitating greater control over the internet and social media for the government”.
Now, how do authoritarian leaders take under control medias and prompt democratic backsliding? Bermeo highlighted that “media outlets are so often owned by holding companies dependent on government contracts”. For example, according to the website Democratic Erosion, after the election of 2000, Putin took over the independent media and began to attack his opposition. A year after, government business Gazprom bought TV network NTV. A former KGB officer, Putin was well aware of the necessity of controlling the public narrative. Many of the more hidden measures necessary to achieve it were pioneered by him, including broadly spreading government-sponsored disinformation and targeting independent media by legal and financial means, such as regulatory limits and financial restrictions that induce self-censorship. Therefore, as highlighted in the research of Musgrave in 2021, when the independent media declines in a country, society loses an independent watchdog, space for civic action become limited, and, the autocratizing government is free to control the public discourse and define its own agenda.
When speaking in the current context, to advocate the legitimacy of his actions which are causing civilians death, Putin is using different methods to censor and control the media. For example, Roskomnadzor issued a statement informing the Russian media “are obliged to only use information and data they have received from official Russian sources.” As a result, the Russian media minimizes the scale of the attack on Ukraine, describing it as a “military operation” and, by stating Putin’s official speech, “we were left no chance to do otherwise” (Law, 02/28/2022). Regarding the purpose of the war, the Russian press secretary Dmitry Peskov claims that it is for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, while no evidence is provided to support this claim. Moreover, recently, an article appeared in Wall Street Journal written by Trofimov highlighting that Russia’s Defense Ministry said it would strike Ukrainian intelligence and communications facilities in central Kyiv that it said are being used for “information attacks” against Russia. By doing so, Putin does not only want to extend his power, to scare the enemy, but to feed the propaganda in Russia by denouncing the enemy.
Thus, paying close attention to the media industry is critical not just in detecting the emergence of authoritarianism, but also in safeguarding democracies in crisis. The role of reliable and independent media in defining and contextualizing the illiberal threat, addressing polarization through transparent reporting, and identifying misinformation through fact-checking is essential. Since the media is playing a pivotal role in democracy, authoritarian leaders seek to restrict freedom of expression, information and use the media in their interests to reinforce their authority, which causes a democratic backsliding. The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces will have irreversible consequences for media freedom in Russia, democratic backsliding and civil liberties. While different countries around the world are imposing sanctions, will this bring the situation to an eventual cease-fire, or will it make the situation worse? Will the Russian people revolt against the regime, or will they be too afraid to do so?