Faced with the threat of a no-confidence vote in parliament that he was likely to lose, Prime Minister Imran Khan, in an attempt to block his ouster, sent shockwaves through Pakistan by dissolving the National Assembly on April 3rd, 2022. In a televised speech, Khan announced that his request for dissolution, which was executed shortly before the no-confidence vote could occur, was based on claims that the United States had conspired with Khan’s opposition to remove him from power. Because of this, Khan argued that any no-confidence vote held against him would be illegitimate and that Pakistan should instead hold snap elections to determine who should preside over the government. Despite this attempt to prevent his removal from power, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that Khan’s request for dismissal was in violation of the constitution, and Khan lost the no-confidence vote on April 9th, with 174 out of 342 MPs voting against Khan. Although institutions like the Supreme Court were seemingly able to resist Khan’s executive influence, Pakistan’s military continues to play a major role in deciding who becomes prime minister and influences the decisions of most of the country’s institutions. The military’s influence over Pakistan’s politics constrains its democracy and can be attributed to both the rise and fall of Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party.
Pakistan’s military took a number of steps during the 2018 national election to tip the scale in favor of the PTI. For example, members of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN), a main electoral opponent of the PTI, claim that military officials threatened them to defect from their party before the upcoming election. Those who remained with the party were subject to harassment from security forces, including raids and arrests. Likewise, supporters of Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and the founder of the PMLN, argue that the military pressured the Supreme Court to ban Sharif from public office after he was charged with corruption in 2017 because Shariff sought to reduce the army’s influence over defense and foreign policy.
Additionally, Geo, Pakistan’s largest television network, was forced off the air by the military after the network praised Sharif and was critical of Khan, which caused other media outlets to censor themselves out of fear of being similarly targeted. These actions weakened the PMLN’s electoral chances and demonstrate the military’s ability to constrain and dissuade party participation and free press in Pakistan. According to Diamond in “Elections Without Democracies: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” although a country may hold regular multiparty elections, without sufficiently open and free electoral contestation, the election results will not remove the ruling regime from power. Because of the military’s ability to influence Pakistan’s elections and limit dissent, Pakistan should be classified as a “psuedodemocratic” country, where elections are unlikely to reduce the longstanding power of the military over government affairs.
Khan, who first rose to prominence in Pakistan as a world-renowned cricket player, ran on a populist platform that promised to end the corruption that has plagued Pakistan’s politics for decades. Although he was considered a political outsider, Khan attracted many young and middle-class voters who were excited by the PTI’s proposed reforms, which included a robust Islamic welfare state for Pakistan, and the party grew increasingly popular. During the campaign, Khan was strongly pro-military, condemned Sharif for negotiating with India against the military’s wishes, and showed some sympathy towards the Taliban, which may have led to the military’s support of his candidacy against the PMLN. After the PTI won a plurality of seats in the national assembly, Khan was able to form a coalition government with smaller parties and independents to become prime minister. After Khan became prime minister, accusations were made that security officials threatened and bribed independent MPs to join PTI’s coalition.
Despite running on an ambitious platform, Khan proved unable to deliver on his campaign promises of broad change in Pakistan. In 2021, Pakistan’s inflation rose to the highest of any country in South Asia, which put a heavy economic burden on many Pakistanis and derailed Khan’s economic agenda. Khan largely failed to reign in corruption as he selectively persecuted his opposition while ignoring his allies’ corruption. Khan also strained his relationship with the army after he and Pakistan’s army chief, Qamar Bajwa, got into a tense disagreement regarding who should run the country’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency. It is believed that because of these governing failures and his increasing disagreements with army leaders, the military dropped its implied support of Khan, which opened the door for a no-confidence vote to be held. As the military became neutral toward Khan, members of PTI’s coalition began to defect and join the opposition against Khan.
During the leadup to the no-confidence vote, Khan accused his opposition of doing the bidding of the United States, saying “The people will always remember that you sold your country. Through a foreign conspiracy, you tried to topple a government.” As discussed by Muller in What is Populism, populist leaders like Khan try to delegitimize their opposition by claiming that they are working against the interests of the nation by opposing the populist who represents the “people’s agenda.” Although this rhetoric failed to stop the no-confidence vote, it has inspired mass protests from supporters of PTI to occur across Pakistan and the mass resignation of PTI members from the National Assembly. Because of this, Pakistan’s interim prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, who became the leader of the PMLN after his brother’s indictment, will have to contend both with an energized opposition that views his government as foreign and illegitimate as well as a military that continues to play an outsized role in Pakistan’s politics and policy decisions. Regardless of who leads Pakistan, the military will remain behind the scenes, ready to remove any leader who goes too far in challenging its authority.
I really appreciated your account of Imran Khan’s rise and fall. I definitely agree that Müller’s What is Populism? provides a useful lens through which to think about Khan’s rhetoric around the no-confidence vote. He clearly considers his entire opposition to not be a part of the legitimately-constructed nation. It’s particularly literal in his case, as he paints his enemies as being corrupt Pakistanis conspiring with the foreign nation of the U.S.
I also wonder why the Pakistani military hasn’t aligned itself more directly and consistently with one party, instead of providing and withdrawing support like this. Maybe by keeping itself somewhat distinct from any specific party, the military can protect itself from democratic political fortunes. They can always jump ship and find new allies to prop up if their current favored party begins losing power.
In a broader sense, I wondered why the military worked in the democratic system at all, instead of just staging a coup and creating a military junta to rule the country directly. Barring that, they could create a system like Iran’s theocracy. Military leadership could get the final say in decisions, even as many government figures are elected. However, I acknowledge that one could argue that something approximating that may already de facto be in place. Perhaps the military is simply not strong enough to overpower civil society completely and this strange pseudodemocratic balance is a natural truce. I also think it is interesting to consider the possible international benefits to remaining democratic. Democratic states like the U.S. surely are more comfortable aiding and working with countries like Pakistan when they seem at least somewhat democratic. Maybe the benefits of international support outweigh the military’s desire for absolute power. This would definitely be part of the reasoning behind the U.S. sanctioning authoritarian regimes.
I enjoyed your article, and commend the fact that you paid heavy attention to the details that led up to the takeover of Khan, the history of military intervention, and the subsequent effects it would have on Pakistan’s new government.
The theme of military takeovers is common in Asia, and as you have discussed in your article, has commonly involved critique against Western intervention – particularly against the United States. I wonder if this has to do with the political culture of Asia. While military takeovers have been noted before in Europe, they were before the establishment of modern democratic institutions. Contrastingly, Asian political regimes seem to have a problem of being able to achieve democracy, but then reverting as military involvement remains an integral part of state governance. Even in the United States where there is a heavy focus on defense spending, the military seldom has any effects on politics. So, it makes me wonder what is the true cause that gives the military power over politics in Asia.
I also agree with your argument that Pakistan is a pseudo-democracy. The conditions for democracy only hold if free and fair elections are accompanied by free and fair participation. This theme of holding elections but restricting the competition is something that I have seen quite commonly across countries that underwent democratic erosion.