In recent years, the world has shifted towards more right-wing, populist-centered politics. While this may take many different forms, in Europe specifically, there is a trend in the proliferation of technocracy as a response to the rise in populism. Borrowing from Cas Mudde, political elites in Europe increasingly believe that more and more decisions should be left to experts to decide, completely sidestepping the voice of the people (Mudde, p.588). This is compounded by the fact that the European Union itself relies on nations giving up some of their sovereignty for the benefit of the EU, lending more legitimacy to its technocratic way of governance. Both populism as well as technocracy represent different challenges to a true, liberal democracy in the EU, challenges that have only increased in recent years and ones that are currently playing out during the EU elections. In light of these trends, this paper aims to answer the question: what do the recent and ongoing parliamentary elections in the EU suggest about the power of right-wing populism, technocracy, and the rise of technopopulism?

To analyze the rise of right-wing populism within EU member states, populism must first have a clear definition. This paper relies on Jan-Werner Müller’s definition, which is that populism extends beyond the traditional belief of anti-elitism, and is instead comprised of the notion that populists alone represent the people, those who disagree with them are not part of “the people” and are “illegitimate” whether they be citizens or political opponents, and a clear anti-pluralist attitude (Müller). Working off of this definition, it is clear that there has been a stark uptick in populist candidates as well as leaders within the EU. This is due to a multitude of reasons such as the decline of the center-left in Europe, divisive issues such as immigration, the prominence of technocracy, and increasing polarization (Berman). These issues along with a lack of faith in democratic institutions have allowed right-wing populists like Viktor Orbán to flourish through campaigns based on distrust of the other and promises of a greater tomorrow that include a lack of political competition and inflammatory rhetoric.

This increase in right-wing populist leaders and rhetoric within the EU is not a simple fluke within politics; the EU parliamentary elections are showing people that right-wing populism continues to cement itself as a force to be reckoned with. France’s National Rally party received nearly a third of the votes, the European Conservatives and Reformists and the Identity and Democracy group now control 131 seats in the chamber, and if all of the far-right populist parties were to form a single group, it would be the second largest force within parliament (Hernández-Morales). The ability of numerous right-wing populist groups to amass unprecedented power within the EU parliament suggests that the power and influence of these groups continue to grow, and more and more people view right-wing populist groups as an attractive alternative to mainstream politics. This attractiveness means that democracy is likely to continue to erode with seemingly no end in sight, especially since there has been a weakening of the center in European politics. This trend is further bolstered by the myriad of issues underpinning the EU as previously discussed, with one of the most prominent being technocratic ideals.

The EU’s current mode of governance is best defined as technocratic. Defined by Mudde as “rule by experts”, technocracy has historically been thought of as a response to populism (Mudde, p.590). It had a resurgence in popularity as well as implementation during the COVID-19 pandemic since “…the sense of urgency legitimized [technocratic governance] in the name of ‘the politics of necessity’” (Foster et. al, p.78). While technocracy is not a new concept within the EU, as populism continues to gain a foothold in European politics, it seems technocracy’s resurgence since COVID-19 is waning. As previously mentioned, the current parliamentary elections have granted populists both legitimacy as well as power.

Because populism and technocracy are seemingly opposed, a rise in populism means a lack of technocracy. This is true on a national level i.e. the National Party, Alternative for Germany, etc., but the EU as a whole has technocracy woven into the fabric of its being. The European Central Bank is an institution seen as a bastion of technocracy, and with institutions such as itself, there are no elections to be had, and thus no effect on its technocratic model of governance. The only tangible way to analyze how the elections will affect technocracy is through its relationship with populism, which currently suggests that there may be a resurgence in this form of governance as a response to the newly granted seats for right-wing populist parties. While this is a less than ideal outcome for defenders of democracy, a new form of governance has begun to emerge that poses an even greater threat: technopopulism.

As in the name, technopopulism denotes the combination of populist and technocratic ideals in order to appeal to voters (Tudzarovska). This is especially troubling in the era of political apathy where voters who do not align with the illiberal right and are not very politically active exhibit just as much tolerance for anti-democratic candidates and platforms as those who do align with the illiberal right (Svolik et al., p.15). Technopopulism is a particularly sinister threat as populism and technocracy have similar positions, “…which are highly problematic for liberal democracy. In essence, both are anti-political, pretending to have the (one) answer to all problems. They also share a critique of ‘the party model of representative democracy’, which is foundational to European democracies” (Mudde, p.590). Both of these models of governance help to erode democracy, and when put together, create the perfect storm for democratic erosion.

The right-wing populist parties that gained power during the EU elections have begun to rely on appeals to both populism and technocracy to gain power within the EU as well as their respective borders. Meloni’s party in Italy, the Fratelli d’Italia, is one of the biggest proponents of technopopulism, and they won big in this election (Picheta). Other countries like Greece and Bulgaria have seen a rise in technopopulism, and with this model being put on an international level, there is no telling what might happen in the future (Tudzarovska). Technopopulism is an alternative to the discontent with democratic elites and institutions that many Europeans feel, and can seem better than populism as there is an appeal to experts who many believe have the right solutions to mitigate this issue (Berman). Although scholars of democratic erosion know this to be a false belief, the EU parliamentary elections display that this is not a widely held position.

Populism, technocracy, and technopopulism have cemented themselves as forces to be reckoned with in the current EU elections. The gain in seats for right-wing populist and technopopulist parties show that not only is there a place in politics for these modes of governance, but a desire for them as well. All of these models present a challenge to democracy and actively work to erode it, which particularly in Europe, has disastrous consequences (Svolik et al.). The EU for decades has lauded itself as a model for democracy and cooperation around the globe, and now, the parliamentary elections have shown that it is not only countries belonging to the Union that are at risk, it is the Union itself. After these elections, the danger that the EU and its member states face is becoming more apparent, and the emergence of new forms of democratic erosion like technopopulism as well as the prominence of populism and technocracy present the perfect material for a continued focus on the region as a case study for democratic erosion.

Works Cited

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