The self-proclaimed “world’s coolest dictator”, Nayib Bukele, won presidential re-election in El Salvador in February of this year, extending his presidency to another five-year term. His landslide victory with close to 85% of the vote and his party winning over 58 out of the 60 seats in parliament demonstrates the overwhelming popularity that he maintains. The “Bukele Model” and his actions to consolidate power are overtly undemocratic and serve as an example of how focusing on an issue that is dire to constituents is sometimes more important to voters than “democracy.” 

Bukele who was initially elected in 2019 representing the Nuevas Ideas party, founded by Bukele himself in 2017, was a monumental victory ending the decades-long battle for power between the parties: ARENA and FMLN. His second victory is not shocking–despite being unprecedented given the constitutional article on presidential term limits that was previously interpreted to mean a person could only serve one term in a row. Although the elections have been verified and recognized as legitimate, the predominance of Bukele and his single party calls into question the other ways in which democracy is being undermined. 

Levitsky and Ziblatt in their book How Democracies Die, lay out a method in which “political outsiders” subvert democracy by capitalizing on a crisis. Bukele follows this model, as he rose through the political ranks representing a new party, he appealed to those who have felt “discontent and attract[s] those who feel prisoners of injustice.” By declaring a state of exception in 2022, following a series of murders, Bukele has explicitly restricted the functions of the judicial process and threatened civil liberties. As Levitsky and Ziblatt explain, authoritarians can exploit crises in order to seize power. Bukele has done just that and used persistent gang violence in El Salvador to maintain increased executive powers for over two years now. Under this state of exception, his overwhelming control of the parliament and judiciary has allowed for intense censorship of those speaking out against mass arrests and little due process. 

Most notably, his “war on gangs” has caused numerous violations of civil liberties even with calls from the human rights groups to end the state of exception. However, he maintains immense support because this was all conducted under an effort to protect civilians and reduce gang presence in a country that had one of the highest homicide rates prior to 2022. Despite the long history of violence in the small country of 6.3 million people, in his five years, Bukele has successfully decreased the murder rate by 70% in 2023. In his time in office, he has arrested over 70,000 suspected gang members and imprisoned them without formal legal proceedings or individual trials and the country had one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. Currently, the homicide rate in El Salvador ranks the lowest in Latin America despite being considered one of the most dangerous countries before Bukele’s presidency. His aggressive, and repressive, techniques to significantly drop the crime rates in El Salvador have propelled him to the international stage where he can further his ideas. 

What has now been referred to as the “Bukele Model”, even by Bukele himself, follows the state of exception with what scholars have deemed the three parts of this model: “​​the formal suspension of constitutional rights”, “mass arrests”, and “punitive legal reforms.” All parts of this limit democracy as Salvadorans must live under an emergency state that increases executive power and reduces citizens’ rights. The Bukele model is aimed at being an effective method to address gang violence and has already appealed to other leaders in Latin America. 

Bukele’s actions are not uncommon under authoritarian rule, or a state of emergency, and they are far from subtle. What makes Bukele different is that his support is not waning, he has used legitimate democratic tactics to gain power with many people’s lives being impacted by unprompted searches and excessive police presence yet he has been re-elected without any substantial opposition. By addressing an issue that both constituents and other leaders consider pressing, Bukele has maintained support. The significant reduction in gang presence has proved to be more important to voters than the civil liberties they lost under the state of exception. The recent election results indicate that people will trade certain democratic rights for safety and issues that matter more to them. 

Political scientist Milan Svolik found “Ordinary people are willing to trade off democratic principles for partisan interests.” A similar logic is applicable in this context as voters chose to elect someone who had undermined democracy in exchange for increased security in their day-to-day lives. Some may argue that all of his actions were taken under a constitutionally permitted state of emergency, but Bukele admitting that the safety increase would continue even without it demonstrates his desire to maintain power and continue to erode democracy. 

Bukele’s support may wane in the future as civil liberties remain limited and the concern for the country grows, but his overwhelming re-election should not be brushed off. The Bukele model and this case should be seen as a warning sign for how authoritarians can remain popular if they appeal and address the issues that matter most to voters. His success calls into question the concern for democracy and whether those worried about democracy in El Salvador and elsewhere consider that democratic ideals and institutions may not be the gold standard for all.