The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine sent shockwaves across the West. Long-time geopolitical neutrals Finland and Sweden joined NATO, and many Western countries levied sanctions to cripple the power of the Kremlin, including most countries in Europe. One notable exception was the South Caucasus country of Georgia. 

What makes this case so anomalous is not a case of geography. After all, none of Georgia’s neighbors have imposed sanctions on Russia either. What is surprising is how Tbilisi has made such a sudden shift towards Moscow despite the country being invaded by Russia in 2008, leading to twenty percent of their land still being occupied by their northern neighbor. After this, Georgia had its eyes set on EU and NATO membership to protect against any future advances. So what changed? Why is Georgia suddenly bucking the West and aiding their former enemy, despite witnessing Ukraine face the same threat Georgia faced in 2008? I believe that populism is to blame.

In 2012, the “Georgian Dream” party was founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, a Georgian-born businessman who moved to Russia and gained his wealth in post-Soviet oil, gas, and steel. Ivanishvili later moved back to Georgia and claimed that he dropped his business ties to Russia, and has since donated heavily to his home country. His net worth is supposedly fifty percent of the Georgian GDP. His party promised to fix the deepening inequality, high inflation, and high unemployment that it attributed to the ruling “United National Movement” (UNM) party. In addition, Ivanishvili blamed the UNM for the Georgian loss of territory to Russia in 2008. This resonated with the Georgian voters, and in the parliamentary elections that year, with Ivanishvili at the helm, the Georgian Dream (GD) party won convincingly, and they have been in power ever since. 

At first, the party was reasonably pro-western, with promises to join the EU and NATO. However, the outbreak of war in Ukraine has heavily shifted the dynamic. Now under new leadership, but purportedly still with the backing of Ivanishvili, the GD has blamed Ukraine and Western officials for trying to pull Georgia into the war as “a second front.” Georgia failed to join the West in sanctioning Russia, and accordingly, trade between Russia and Georgia has increased by twenty percent since the invasion. Russia has responded by lifting visa requirements for visiting Georgia and began direct flights between the two countries again for the first time since 2019. 

The shift against the West in Georgia led to a Russian-style bill being passed over the summer that branded Western-backed NGOs and media outlets as “foreign agents.” This was not popular, leading to mass protests in Tbilisi that were met with violent police force. On top of this, 87 percent of Georgians “see the war in Ukraine as a shared cause.” With such a swift turn towards Russia, and cases of unrest rising, how is the GD still polling far ahead of any opposition, and how do a majority of Georgians still believe that the party is doing enough to support their post-soviet brethren in Ukraine?

The GD rose to power using fearmongering techniques, and this, among other populist strategies, is how the party and its coalitional allies, are hoping to stay in power following the parliamentary elections later this month. The Georgian Dream party has made demonizing the West an integral aspect of its messaging since 2012, and with the classic authoritarian playbook has used a crisis to take extralegal measures that erode democratic institutions, a process described by Levitsky and Ziblatt. Ivanishvili controls “courts, finances, and media,” and has been able to more easily stifle dissent through the control of these systems. The Georgian Dream has also been increasing its attacks on civil society and the media, especially by using labels like “enemies and fascists,” and media figures having faced legal battles and arrests. On top of this, the Georgian Dream recently announced plans to “ban the opposition and block rival MPs from taking up their seats if the party wins a sufficiently large majority.” What makes this win probable is that 61 percent of Georgians say that no party represents their interests, so there’s no obvious other choice for voters to make. This is in part because opposition ability to garner support is significantly stifled. For starters, the GD has been accused of voter intimidation and vote buying. Reporting also shows that Ivanishvili has collaborated with criminals for electoral success, and has used security sources for control, while opposition parties remain very low on resources. These are all telltale signs of populist tendencies, and if not taken seriously, can severely erode the democracy in Georgia to the point of authoritarianism. 

Problematically, the opposition coalition is mired in infighting and lacks sufficient resources. Attempts to mimic the populist tactics and rhetoric of the GD, a technique sometimes used to combat populism as pointed out by Jan-Werner Muller, are also falling short. 

Georgia’s post-2008 hopes of joining the EU and NATO seem to be on hold, as the EU has slashed funding for the country on account of its “democratic erosion,” and stopped the accession process to the bloc for now.

The reason why the GD is popular is not because of policy. It is because of fearmongering messaging and vilifying the opposition while taking advantage of mandates to strip key institutions, critical media, and opposition resources. This is why populism is also responsible for Georgia’s shift away from the West — Fearmongering tactics, such as saying that the expansion of NATO causes war, are catching on because of populist messaging, even though the ideas of joining NATO and the EU, as well as supporting Ukraine, are very popular within the country.

The GD is brazenly threatening Georgian democracy, and because of populist messaging and democratic erosion techniques, is still polling with a majority of the voters despite shifts away from the West and towards Russia. The scourge of populism and the Georgian Dream specifically is threatening Georgian security, and the way for Georgia to win the two-front battle against Russian hegemony and domestic populism is for the Georgian Dream party to be ousted later this month. For that to happen, opposition parties must pool their relatively meager resources and redirect their factional infighting by uniting against the party which is most threatening to Georgia’s future. Once this is done, pro-European and pro-Western parties will be poised to restart the process for Georgia to join the EU and NATO, solidifying the security of a democratic-leaning nation repeatedly under threat by Russia.